The withdrawal of the United States from its global leadership role is palpable in many policy fields. And there are few areas where it is as tangible as in the realm of global public goods (GPGs): peace and security, economic stability, global health, climate stability, and the protection of human rights and dignity. If provided, all of these positively affect anyone anywhere—and, if undersupplied, they negatively influence all of us directly or indirectly.
For over 70 years, the US government applied a broad definition of its national interest, whereby American citizens’ wellbeing was seen as connected to the security, prosperity, and freedom experienced elsewhere. As a result, Washington provided European and other countries with a security umbrella, maintained the norms and institutions that assured global economic and financial stability, facilitated multilateral cooperation on global challenges like communicable diseases, and, despite obvious inconsistencies, promoted human rights globally.
Yet, over the years, Americans started to doubt that the benefits outweighed the costs of supplying GPGs. Concerns about other countries’ free riding rose, debates about fairer global burden-sharing became increasingly prominent, and resentment about the costs of US leadership for American taxpayers grew.
The Hegemon Withdraws
Under President Donald Trump, the US government has now embraced stark zero-sum thinking, with the security and prosperity of other countries no longer being regarded as an asset but often as detracting from the security and prosperity of the US. As a result, instead of providing GPGs, the US administration is now exploiting the uncertainty that comes with growing gaps in their provision for deals that benefit America first.
The consequences are visible across the entire spectrum of major GPGs. Substantial cuts in US foreign aid and the withdrawal from the financing of international organizations and multilateral initiatives are hitting global health efforts particularly hard. Experts warn that, by 2029, the world might see six times more HIV infections and a significant rise in the number of AIDS deaths. By withdrawing from multilateral treaties and organizations—among them the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, and the UN Human Rights Council—and cutting US State Department staff, Washington is also dismantling the diplomatic and operational basis for GPG provision.
And last but not least, it is slashing the knowledge and expertise that has long underpinned the supply of GPGs, from weather and pollution data collection to mRNA research and global human rights monitoring. Where Washington is still assuming a leadership role, as in some efforts at peace mediation, there are reasons to doubt the durability of its commitment. Washington’s role as the leading supplier of GPGs, in short, is coming to an abrupt end.
As the US withdraws, global challenges are expanding. The Peace Research Institute Oslo has pointed to “the highest number of state-based armed conflicts” in more than 70 years—conflicts with many destabilizing spillover effects. Unprecedented climate disasters are showcasing the destructive global ripple effects of unmitigated climate change. And the cross-border repercussions of unmanaged economic and financial crises remain just as real as the risks posed by unchecked viral outbreaks.
For Europeans, who benefitted disproportionately from US leadership on GPGs, this is a particularly concerning moment. As they regularly emphasize, the growing gaps can only be filled if they themselves assume a greater leadership role—and if they seek much closer cooperation with countries elsewhere in the world. Yet outdated habits and assumptions regarding countries of the Global South still impede European governments from engaging meaningfully.
Above all, there has been an overfocus on how governments in Global South countries have performed on GPGs that affect core European interests. For many Europeans, China has been a particular disappointment. The country has, among other things, long pursued policies and practices that are at odds with open, rules-based trade, denying European companies the same economic opportunities in China that Chinese companies enjoy in Europe. And few things have done more to shape European perceptions of commitment by China and countries of the Global South to the global common good as the way these states have reacted to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, Europeans have frequently failed to appreciate Global South contributions to challenges with fewer ramifications for the West. While people in Europe may be aware of Global South countries’ fence-sitting when it comes to Russia’s war of aggression, few will have heard of Cuba’s role in mediating peace in Colombia, Jordan’s role as one of the world’s top refugee-hosting nations per capita, or Nigeria’s part in ensuring a peaceful power transition in Gambia in 2017.
Europeans Are Focusing on Disappointments
It is thus unsurprising that Europeans surveyed by the MSC in September 2025 are skeptical that countries in the Global South can be meaningful co-producers of GPGs. In France, Germany, and Italy, only a quarter of respondents believe it is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” that China or other powerful non-Western countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa will take on greater responsibility if Washington no longer leads on global problem solving.
In addition to focusing on disappointments, Europeans have often been reluctant to properly engage with alternative preferences and priorities for GPG provisioning. In many ways, they still look at countries of the Global South through the lens of the “responsible stakeholder”—a term coined by Robert Zoellick, the former US diplomat and president of the World Bank, in a much-regarded 2025 speech on China. Accordingly, agency on the part of the Global South is mostly welcomed if it is in line with Western-centric notions of “responsible behavior” but meets resistance if it clashes with European policy preferences.
If they are serious about forging new partnerships that can effectively deliver GPGs, Europeans are well-advised to take a more nuanced look at GPG provisioning by countries in the Global South—both at the wide range of these countries’ contributions and at the preferences expressed in their initiatives. This also requires Europeans to move beyond the metric commonly used to assess countries’ global efforts: their financial contributions.
Many examples of Global South leadership become apparent when nonfinancial leadership roles, namely governments’ diplomatic, operational, and knowledge contributions, are included. These contributions cut across different policy domains—from peace and security to global economic and financial stability to global health, climate stability, and the protection of human rights and dignity—and they are not restricted to the more powerful states.
Southern Agency
Among other things, governments in the Global South have assumed diplomatic leadership by proposing new initiatives in the realm of GPGs or mobilizing international support for a specific public good. They have been particularly active in agenda setting in the fight against climate change, where countries of the Global South, especially smaller ones, have launched a multitude of initiatives that push for stronger climate targets. For instance, Vanuatu, together with several Pacific Island states, led an initiative that resulted in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirming states’ binding obligations to tackle climate change. In the realm of human rights, countries in the Global South have demonstrated diplomatic leadership by bringing alleged human rights violations, among them alleged violations of states’ obligations under the Genocide Convention, before the ICJ. In this vein, Gambia instigated proceedings against Myanmar over the persecusion of the Rohingya and South Africa against Israel over its war in Gaza.
By allocating the operational resources needed for GPG provisioning, Global South countries have also assumed relevant operational leadership, including on protecting human dignity and on promoting peace and security. Examples include the provision of shelter and the supply of food, water, and medicine in humanitarian emergencies. The world’s top refugee hosts—in absolute and per-capita terms—are countries in the Global South. And while Western countries lead on financing UN peacekeeping operations, the top 10 countries contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions are all from the Global South.
Last but not least, governments in the Global South have led on providing the legal, technical, and political expertise needed to produce or disseminate a GPG. This knowledge leadership has often come in the form of South–South capacity building, whereby Global South countries have provided expertise tailored to the distinct needs of developing contexts. Cuba’s model for local disaster-risk-reduction management, which the Cuban government—in cooperation with the UN Development Program—has shared across the Caribbean, is one example in the security realm. In the field of economics, India’s leadership on digital global public goods is a case in point. It aims at reducing knowledge gaps in digital public infrastructure to facilitate more equitable economic development.
While the examples cut across multiple policy domains, many are geared toward the same overarching objective: reducing perceived imbalances and inequities, both as they pertain to the agendas and to the structures of existing GPG provisioning. To forge effective partnerships, Europeans thus not only need to more fully acknowledge and more systematically build on Global South countries’ multifaceted contributions. They also have to be more open to efforts to reshape GPG provisioning in ways that better reflect the needs and concerns of countries in the Global South.
Is China Offering the Only Vision?
Otherwise, Europeans risk further losing influence to others that are eagerly catering to this widespread demand for change. Over the past few years, Beijing has proposed several global initiatives, all of which it has framed as part of an alternative framework for GPG provisioning that better reflects the wishes and needs of the world’s majority. In September 2025, China launched a fourth such initiative, which focuses on the reform of the global governance architecture. In contrast to Beijing, which suggests it has a long-term vision for the governance of GPGs that is particularly attuned to the needs of the countries of the Global South, Europe cannot but appear reluctant and disjointed in its own GPG-related outreach. And while China is promoting a narrative of improvement and change, Europeans often seem to be clinging to the status quo.
If they do not reach out in a manner that is much more active, systematic, and attuned to Global South countries’ preferences, Europeans will not only face growing GPG-related challenges. They will also risk a situation where the only country that projects a comprehensive vision for how to fill the gaps left by Washington is one with far less liberal preferences.
Sophie Eisentraut is head of research and publications at the Munich Security Conference.
