The 28-point “peace plan” for Ukraine drawn up by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and his Russian counterpart Kirill Dmitriev demonstrates a new reality in international conflict resolution. It is not foreign ministries and diplomats who negotiate war and peace, but special envoys without any experience in negotiation, personally appointed by the presidents of the states. They act in a transactional manner, without the involvement of the victim (Ukraine) and other affected parties (Europe) to negotiate a deal of mutual interest.
Under US President Donald Trump, various factions within the US government are competing for the president’s attention by trying to fulfill his desire to end the war in Ukraine at almost any cost. There are no clear guidelines as to what US interests are in this war, except that there should be economic benefits. The consequences of the outcome for European NATO allies, or the future of Ukraine, seem to be irrelevant. It can be assumed that Trump did not even know (and still does not know) the details of the 28-point plan he has used to issue an ultimatum to Ukraine (which he later weakened).
Russian Influence Operations
Issues such as international law, the sovereignty of states, and how to achieve a legitimate peace accord no longer play any role. What is important to Trump is to somehow bring the war to an end and reap maximum profits for the US.
Unlike the Europeans, the Russians seems to be well prepared for this new transactional reality of the Trump administration. The Kremlin has turned this into an influence operation involving Dmitriev, the US-educated head of the Russian welfare fund, who is working with real estate investor Witkoff to negotiate the maximum possible profits for Trump and his associates at the expense of Ukraine and Europe. Moscow’s goal is not to achieve a ceasefire or peace, but to damage relations between the United States, Ukraine, and the Europeans to as great an extent as possible. The 28-point plan reflects not only Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ultimate goals in this war, it also uses the Kremlin’s humiliating rhetoric toward Ukraine.
This humiliation and Moscow’s refusal to compromise in these informal negotiations demonstrate once again that the Kremlin sees no reason to accommodate the US or Ukraine, nor does it have any interest in actually ending the war through compromise. For these reasons, the compromise proposal negotiated by US Secretary of State Marc Rubio with Ukrainian representatives in Geneva and most recently in Florida can only be rejected by the Kremlin.
Moscow’s central goal remains to alienate Donald Trump from Ukraine to such an extent that he ends all support for the country being attacked in this war. This would primarily affect intelligence cooperation in defense against Russian air strikes and information concerning strategic targets in Russia; it would render Ukraine strategically much less able to fight back and to protect its civilian infrastructure.
Putin will only end his war at the negotiating table if Ukraine surrenders on Russian terms. It can be assumed that he wants to break Ukraine militarily in order to take revenge on it for this war, which has been enormously costly and humiliating for Russia.
Europe as Damage Limiter
For Europe, the 28-point plan is another low point in its relations with the US. Once again, Europe can only engage in damage control to prevent things from getting even worse. The Trump administration did not deem it necessary to involve European countries in the negotiations in any way, even though they will be directly affected by the consequences of such an agreement. The best-case scenario for European countries would be to prevent this plan from going ahead, as it will greatly strengthen Russia's military presence in Europe.
Once again, it is clear that the US under Donald Trump is not an ally with whom the Europeans share common interests and values, but rather a selfish player who does not care about European security, would accept spheres of influence in Europe, and has no problem with economic deals at the expense of Europeans. It is not even clear whether the US still stands by the security guarantees in Article 5 of NATO.
Becoming Active Players
Europe, and Germany in particular, have become Ukraine’s most important supporters in this war. They are now paying for the weapons and ammunition that the US is still supplying. However, they are not playing any role at the negotiating table to end the war.
It is astonishing that there is still no European plan to end the war that defines solutions to the key issues. These include security guarantees for Ukraine, the status of the occupied territories, securing the contact line after a ceasefire, financing the reconstruction of Ukraine, and the elements necessary for a legitimate peace.
The 28-point plan once again highlights the importance of a plan developed jointly by Europeans and Ukraine to end the war. Surveys show that the Ukrainian population is prepared to cede territory de facto—but not de jure—in exchange for genuine peace with acceptable security guarantees. Europeans should therefore not only continue to support Ukraine militarily and financially, but also develop such a plan with Kyiv for a workable ceasefire and be prepared to back it up financially and militarily.
Germany and its European partners have no choice but to take on more responsibility for ending the war. It is abundantly clear that, in Europe’s own interests, Ukraine must be integrated into the European Union and European security structures. The emergence of a rump state or a heavily armed gray zone in the EU’s eastern neighborhood would be a security policy nightmare for Europe.
Russia is not strong enough militarily or economically to completely conquer Ukraine. But it has sufficient resources to destroy Ukraine as a functioning state. European countries should not be under any illusions that the Trump administration can withdraw from this war at any time. At the same time, however, Germany and other European countries should try to prevent the US from withdrawing completely for as long as possible by maintaining continuous contact with members of the US Congress and pragmatists in the Trump administration.
In order to show the Trump administration and Moscow that European countries are relevant players, a solution should finally be found to use Russian assets for Ukraine which are currently frozen in Belgium. More consistent action should be taken against the Russian “shadow fleet,” especially in the Baltic Sea region, and further loopholes in sanctions should be closed. Without the Europeans, Trump cannot simply ease most sanctions against Russia. New ways are needed to provide long-term military financing for Ukraine through joint European loans (“Eurobonds”) and to massively ramp up the production of weapons, ammunition, and defense systems. All of this has been discussed within the EU for a long time, but still too little action has been taken.
Only a Europe that is capable of acting, that takes responsibility militarily, financially, and with regard to Ukraine’s integration into the EU, can become a player in negotiations to end the war. Ukraine is our ally in achieving this goal and reshaping the European security order—not the US. These are the key lessons to be learned from the useless and unsuccessful 28-point plan.—translated from the German by Kate Brown
Stefan Meister is head of the Center for Order and Governance in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
