Since US President Donald Trump’s re-election, Europeans have been uncertain about what US policy on Ukraine might now look like. They have taken some comfort in the nomination of retired General Keith Kellog as US special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, who wants to achieve “peace through strength,” supports further arms deliveries to Ukraine, and is pushing for decisive American leadership to end the war. They fear the influence of Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr, or Vice President JD Vance, who are both pushing for peace through accommodation, which essentially means ending the war on Russian terms. It is said of Trump that he likes to surround himself with a “team of rivals,” listening to their different views, and then relying on his instincts to form his opinion. Europeans should prepare for a high level of uncertainty, disruption, and volatility.
Shortly before taking office, the second Trump administration became more realistic about the challenges ahead. Kellog now talks about needing “100 days” to stop the war, rather than “24 hours” as Trump once suggested. Yet, Europeans cannot base their approach toward Ukraine on the hope that Trump does not want to look weak or naïve in front of Putin, or that he will follow European reasoning. They need to prepare for different scenarios. This starts with defining their interests, identifying the means and tools they have to shape the war’s outcome, and deciding what they are willing to invest.
Europe’s Limited Capacity to Act
Alas, so far hope seems to be the strategy. Politically, Europeans are unable to agree among themselves on a sound Ukraine strategy, and militarily they lack the capabilities and industrial capacities that would put them in a position to offer Ukraine a different trajectory than the one the US might propose.
Until now, the US has provided two core elements of support to Ukraine. First, it has shaped political unity and kept the Ukraine supporters together, such as in the Ramstein format and in NATO. Second, it has delivered the bulk of the military support for Ukraine and offered unique assistance in sensitive areas like intelligence, targeting, and military advice. There was criticism of US President Joe Biden’s “slow-cooking the frog” approach—but ultimately the US has proved necessary to maintain the Western response to Russia’s invasion.
While Europeans have now overtaken the US in financial support for Ukraine, this does not mean that they can replace the US—neither in quantity nor in quality. The European Union is promising a lot but is still slow in delivery. Out of the announced €241 billion, only €125 billion have actually been allocated. Perhaps most importantly, the US is providing the overall security umbrella for Europe that ultimately deters Russia from attacking NATO territory. Were the US to reduce its commitment to Ukraine and to condition future support on fulfilling certain requests, the Europeans would not be in a position to quickly fill all the gaps.
Thus, the Europeans may have no choice but to live with any deal Trump strikes on Ukraine, even if it goes against their own interests. If the US were to make its military engagement in Europe conditional on European political support for a deal, the European NATO allies would probably fall in line. They would hardly endanger their own life insurance to support Ukraine.
Yet, failing Ukraine is likely to embolden Russia, thus aggravating Europe’s security situation and putting additional pressure on NATO—without the Europeans knowing whether the Americans will eventually honor their Article 5 commitment. Currently, it is not clear how Trump’s desire to reduce the US security commitment to Europe will translate into practice. Yet Europeans are clearly vulnerable, and this is limiting their choices when it comes to Ukraine.
Deal or No Deal: Scenarios to Prepare For
The war could continue on its current trajectory. For Putin, it is going quite well, despite heavy losses. He is convinced that he can outlast the West. As long as Putin believes that he is more likely to achieve his war aims through military means than through diplomacy, he is unlikely to come to the negotiating table.
In one version of this scenario, Putin would feign engagement in the US-brokered talks while continuing fighting, which would wear down Ukraine and likely divide Europeans. Some might be tempted to reduce their support, because Russia’s tactical negotiations could be misunderstood as a real path to peace that should not be undermined by further “military escalation.” If the US administration fails to strike a deal, there is a risk that Trump will become annoyed and blame Kyiv. He might then significantly reduce or even cut off support and leave the mess to Europe.
Over time, both a continuation of the war on its current trajectory and a “failed deal” scenario carry a high risk of a Ukrainian defeat through exhaustion. Europeans would be left to deal with the possible socio/politico-economic consequences, ranging from waves of migration to a breakdown of government in Kyiv and internal turmoil―as well as the military fallout. In parallel, the US might then signal less commitment to NATO, leaving the Europeans under even more pressure abroad and at home.
To avoid such a development, Europeans would need to not only continue their current support for Ukraine, but to scale it up significantly and make it sustainable. They would need to find ways to narrow Putin’s options to ensure that he changes his cost-benefit calculation and engages in real negotiations. An immediate priority would be to stop Russia’s advance on the battlefield. Given that the necessary increase in support to achieve this has not yet materialized (with the US still on board), the chances of the Europeans making a quantum leap soon are slim.
A second scenario would be a US-brokered deal. If the Trump administration were to accommodate the Russians’ requests, such as recognizing Russian territorial gains, neutrality for Ukraine, no NATO membership, and no Western military presence in the country, Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign state would be at risk. Russia would be emboldened, the chances for another war in Europe would increase, and European weakness would become clear to everyone. A bad deal for Ukraine could also drive massive wedges between the Europeans, because some, like Poland or Sweden, would blame this failure on insufficient support from others.
In another version of this scenario, Putin’s lack of commitment or excessive demands could offend Trump and, in the desire to not be accused of weakness, he could opt for peace through strength. By increasing economic pressure through sanctions and military pressure through weapons delivery, Trump could send a signal that he will not accept a dictated peace on Russian terms. If Putin were to realize that his strategy was not working, this might lead him to make some real concessions.
Given their limited options, instead of opposing Trump’s deal, Europeans should look for ways to influence and shape it. To do that, they would have to agree among themselves (and with Kyiv) on a common line. They would need to convince Trump that it is in his personal interest and that of the US that Ukraine emerges from the war as a strong sovereign state, even if it fails to fully restore its territorial integrity. If successful, Europeans would have to provide much more of the military, financial, and political resources themselves, but could hope for continued, albeit limited US support.
What to Do?
In light of these constraints, Europeans should focus on three avenues to improve their capacity to act:
First, present a coordinated long-term plan to improve European military capabilities as outlined in the NATO plans, supported by credible financing schemes. Second, forge unity among Europeans and try to work with and not against the Trump administration for the best possible deal for Ukraine and Europe, also by involving European leaders that Trump might listen to (like Giorgia Meloni). Third, offer plans on how to secure a deal, which includes monitoring a potential ceasefire, as well as on how to maintain Ukraine’s long-term sovereignty by deterring Russia not only at NATO’s Eastern border but in Ukraine.
Currently, Europeans are deeply divided on those issues: Should Europeans give up on the objective of Ukrainian victory and instead focus on damage control? Would it make Europe safer to commit European troops to secure a ceasefire or would it further endanger Europe’s own security? Would Europeans be willing to send those troops even if they were to be removed from NATO commitments? And are they willing to tell their publics that even more and sustained support is necessary for Ukraine, even if it might cost an election victory?
As long as Europeans fail to agree, however, the risk of the next war in Europe will increase.
Claudia Major, starting in March, is senior vice president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Jana Puglierin leads the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Berlin office.
