Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have fundamentally changed European security. Not only has war returned to Europe, but the collective security order built after the end of the Cold War is finally disintegrating. With Donald Trump’s second term in office, the US role in the transatlantic alliance is being called into question and therefore NATO’s Article 5 no longer applies reliably.
Under pressure from the Trump administration, it is now high time for European countries to invest heavily in their own defense and prioritize support for Ukraine. What is missing, however, is a fundamental debate on a new European strategy for Russia. Without fundamental regime change in Moscow, there will be no peace in Europe. At some point, a different Russia must be reintegrated into Europe. But Europe must define what kind of Russia that will be and how it will come about.
Russia’s Relative Weakness
Russia under President Vladimir Putin is a revisionist power that uses war and repression to maintain that power because of its internal weakness and lack of development prospects. Yet it is precisely the regime’s vulnerability that leads to internal and external aggression. It is the syndrome of a declining power that is using military might to try and avert an end of its empire.
Against this background, Germany and Europe need a medium-to-long-term strategy for political change in Russia. Deterrence and isolation are not a strategy for change, they are more likely to reinforce structures. Peace in Ukraine can only come about through political change in Russia. A deal between Trump and Putin can bring about a pause in the war, but not lasting peace.
Putin’s war against Ukraine since 2014 has served to redefine Russia’s role in European security and halt the loss of influence in Ukraine. This was preceded by a deep crisis of legitimacy in the Putin system at the time of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2011 and 2012. Mass demonstrations against the return of Putin in major Russian cities revealed there was a change in values underway in Russian society. Progressive sections of society, especially in the big cities, demanded political participation and real elections.
For Putin, this was the moment when this element of the Russian population broke with the social contract consisting of political inactivity in exchange for increasing societal prosperity. With Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, the regime needed a new source of legitimacy. The conflict with the West, above all the United States, became the central component of an ideology that was systematically built up. Russia’s leadership made (hybrid) war against the West a central element of its survival strategy.
The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was an important element in mobilizing society in favor of an imperial, backward-looking policy. The regime was able to score a quick success, which it justified on historical grounds, and the costs were low. However, the euphoria did not last long, and the country’s economic decline was not halted. This is why Putin attacked the whole of Ukraine in 2022 in order to restore the empire, but also to distract attention from the shortcomings of his own policies. Additionally, Europe’s and, above all, Germany’s appeasement policy had encouraged him in this.
The ignorance of the aggressive nature of the Putin regime, which is trying to divide Europe and permanently weaken liberal democracy, was systematically dismissed by a great number of European leaders and their supporting political class. Much more serious was the fact that these allowed themselves to be bought off by supposedly cheap Russian gas, thus confirming the impression in the Kremlin that Germany and most of the European states will tolerate almost anything for money. Russian gas came with a political price: the corruption of the European political and economic elites.
Trump as Game Changer
While the Russian blitzkrieg against Ukraine has failed, Trump’s re-election brings Putin even closer to his actual goals of ousting the US from Europe, dividing up zones of influence, and of gaining a veto on European security issues. The Putin system will not give up these goals, as not only is Russia’s role in Europe and the world at stake, but also its own legacy.
The Trump administration is prepared to go to great lengths to accommodate Russia in Ukraine, as it believes it can pit Russia against China and Iran. All three states share a central interest, however: the end of the US-dominated world and a transformation of the global order into a multipolar system that is purely interest-oriented and serve their interest. Russia’s technological dependence on China is now so great that it has become a junior partner. Moscow will never oppose China for economic and ideological reasons.
Europe and Ukraine are the biggest losers of these developments, highly dependent on US security guarantees and arms supplies and ultimately the main target of Russian aggression while Moscow wants to redefine its role in European security. It is an illusion to believe that Putin and the system he has created will stop with the war against Ukraine and the West in return for concessions of any kind. Only a regime change in Moscow can lead to lasting peace in Europe.
Focusing on Ukraine not losing the war, or perhaps winning it after all, will not solve the Russia problem. The Putin system must be weakened in the long term so that political change is possible from within. It is not about hoping that Russia will disintegrate as a state, the country is far from that. Rather, Russia's economic, technological, and demographic weakness must be reinforced by, among other things, expanding and maintaining sanctions and making offers to progressive Russians. At the same time, it remains crucial that Russia feels the limits of its own military power in Ukraine.
Weakening Russia in its Neighborhood
Above all, Europe should become more active in the post-Soviet neighborhood. In addition to its seat on the UN Security Council and nuclear weapons, Russia’s dominance in the post-Soviet space is the central element of its global power projection. With the war against Ukraine, Russia is accelerating the end of this hegemony in the post-Soviet regions due to limited resources and overextension in Ukraine. Moscow must increasingly make compromises with countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, as it needs new trade routes and partners to circumvent sanctions.
The EU’s offer of accession to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia is an important step toward rejecting Russian zones of influence in Europe. By becoming more active in its eastern neighborhood, by investing in infrastructure, the economy, opening markets, and security partnerships, the EU is weakening Russia’s traditional role.
Many countries in these regions are turning away from Russia due to the security risks and are trying to limit its influence through new partnerships. Deeper economic and infrastructure cooperation with these countries should limit Russia’s ability to circumvent sanctions or expand trade with other states. Equally, Russian influence on these countries, such as economic dependencies and the dominance of the information space, should be limited. The strengthening of regional cooperation and more political engagement in the resolution of territorial conflicts should also be elements of EU policy.
The aim is to proactively limit Russian influence on its neighboring states and the EU. All Russian activities against European infrastructure, including in the Baltic Sea, should be countered by punishment and direct sanctions. A greater military presence is also needed here to respond directly to sabotage. Cyberattacks must not only be prevented, but there should also be counterattacks on the Russian (information) infrastructure. Those in Europe who act in Russia’s interests and even pass on internal information from Europe and NATO to Moscow should be isolated and excluded from the EU at a certain point.
With regard to Russia itself, communication channels via the internet and social media should be kept open and opportunities for Russians to obtain visas and residence permits should be made easier. Putin’s policy of self-isolation should be undermined by making offers to the part of the Russian elite that is increasingly dissatisfied with the war and the country’s economic decline. Many entrepreneurs and oligarchs are dissatisfied with the developments and should be offered the opportunity to get off the sanctions list by supporting Ukraine and turning away from Putin's Russia. A long-term offer is needed for a different Russia to reintegrate into Europe if it distances itself from Putin and his imperial policies.
Stefan Meister leads the Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
