Norway and Moldova, Canada and India, the United Kingdom and Ghana: These countries have little in common. They differ in strategic culture, regional priorities, and in their relationships with the major powers. Yet, in little more than two years, the European Union has concluded a new kind of agreement with all of them—bilateral Security and Defence Partnerships (SDPs).
Largely below the radar, Brussels has since 2024 concluded 12 SDPs with countries in Europe, North America, Asia, and the Indo-Pacific as well as in Africa. What unites them is not membership of a common political community, but a shared interest in structured cooperation with the EU on specific security issues.
That marks a genuine break with Brussel’s previous approach to security and defense policy. For much of the post-Cold War period, the European Union’s external security relationships were organized around relatively stable political and geographic categories. The EU worked most closely with countries that were either members of the European integration project, part of the transatlantic alliance, or broadly understood as belonging to the political West. Beyond these groups, when it engaged in Africa or Asia, it generally did so with civilian EU missions and operations, not as a security partner. These categories were never entirely precise, but they provided a useful organizing principle. Security cooperation was expected to follow from a broader convergence of interests, institutions, and political values.
A New Logic
Today, that logic is less straightforward. Russia’s war against Ukraine has returned military power and territorial security to the center of European politics. At the same time, uncertainty about the long-term direction of US engagement in Europe has encouraged governments across the continent to think more seriously about diversification. Economic security, technology, supply chains, and defense-industrial capacity have also become intertwined with traditional questions of foreign and security policy.
The consequence is not the disappearance of alliances or established partnerships. NATO—potentially Europeanized—remains the central framework for most EU member states’ collective defense. But security cooperation is increasingly organized through a wider mix of bilateral agreements, mini-lateral formats, and flexible coalitions.
Across Europe, governments have concluded a growing number of defense arrangements since 2022. States are building overlapping networks of cooperation that sit alongside existing institutions rather than replacing them. The EU itself has also increased its activities in security and defense. So far, however, it has mostly focused on supportive action through defense industrial cooperation, defense financing, or active support for Ukraine.
It is here that the 12 SDPs come into play, where the EU presents itself as a security partner in a world defined once again by great power rivalry, where others too are looking to diversify their security policies. The emergence of such a high number of partnerships in little more than two years therefore raises three questions. With whom is the EU choosing to build these relationships? What kind of cooperation do they actually offer? And what will determine whether they become a meaningful instrument of European security policy?
Three Circles of Security Partners
So far, the EU’s security and defense partners can be broadly divided into three circles. The first circle is composed of countries already closely aligned to the EU via the European Economic Area (EEA) or as accession candidates. Among these, Norway and, as one of the most recent SDP signatories, Iceland, have a particularly close security relationship with the EU. Norway and Iceland are especially interested in security cooperation in the High North, which has gained prominence amid US pressure over Greenland.
Among the EU accession candidates, the EU has so far concluded security partnerships with Albania, North Macedonia, and the Republic of Moldova. Here the SDPs are related to these countries’ accession processes and regarded as a way for the EU to keep them closely aligned with its foreign, security, and defense policy—in competition with other actors in the Western Balkans, most notably Russia and China.
A second circle comprises “like-minded” NATO partners beyond the EU, namely Canada and the United Kingdom. The security partnership agreement with London marked a turning point in the difficult EU-UK relationship after Brexit, as it revived elements of foreign and security policy cooperation that had been lost after the UK exited the EU and former Prime Minister Boris Johnson chose to exclude foreign and security policy from the post-Brexit relationship. The agreement with Canada, meanwhile, involves a partner that, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mark Carney, is particularly keen on developing close relationships with other “middle powers.” This reflects Canada’s response to growing uncertainty in its relationship with its primary security partner, the United States, and to Washington's willingness to use economic and security dependencies against Ottawa as leverage.
A third and broader circle is made up of the EU’s global partners. Among these, there is a clear focus on the Indo-Pacific, with SDPs concluded with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India. Ghana is so far the only African country to have signed such an agreement. Like the EU, these countries are seeking to diversify their security relationships beyond the United States, without aiming—or having the means—to replace it.
India stands out as a traditional non-aligned country, which has notably continued its defense industrial relationship with Russia. Yet its SDP with the EU alongside bilateral agreements with individual EU member states—in particular France and Germany—signal a deepening of security ties with Europe. It is noteworthy that the EU signed the security partnership agreements with India and Australia at the same time as agreements on trade deals, signaling at least potential links between the EU’s economic and security agenda.
It is equally worth noting which countries the EU has so far not concluded a security partnership agreement with. Neither the United States nor China are included—despite being named as “strategic partners” in 2010—while middle powers in South and Central America as well as South Africa are absent. Owing to the Cyprus conflict, a security and defense partnership with Turkey also remains blocked. The only three non-EU NATO countries without an SDP are thus the United States, Turkey, and Montenegro; the latter of which is looking to join the EU as soon as 2028. Although Ukraine does not have an SDP with the EU, it has developed defense cooperation with Brussels that is, in many respects, deeper than the new SDPs. Brussels is thus integrating Ukraine into EU defense policy through other mechanisms.
Partnerships, Not Yet Alliances
A closer look at the 12 SDPs reveals a clear pattern: These are not traditional defensive alliances with a mutual defense clause akin to NATO’s article 5 and none of them mention the EU’s equivalent found in article 42.7 of the EU-treaty—or indeed any other form of commitment to provide assistance in the event of an armed aggression.
Nonetheless, they enable a wide range of consultation and coordination mechanisms across the full range of security and defense issues, as well as institutional venues for participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) instruments. These notably include the EU’s more recent forays into defense financing and defense industrial cooperation. With established partners like Norway, the SDPs also consolidate existing cooperation with the EU in security and defense.
Despite the vast differences between the EU’s 12 current security partners, the SDPs are intended to be “tailor-made” for each of them. In practice, however, they combine a common template with partner-specific adaptations. Many passages overlap almost word for word, but the agreements differ in the political and security contexts in which they were negotiated, as well as in the topics they cover and the mechanisms they establish.
The security and defense partnerships are thus best understood as a menu of cooperation offered by the EU to its partners, from which the two sides negotiate the areas of cooperation and consultation to be included.
The first common element to all SDPs is the establishment of institutionalized dialogue between the EU and the respective partner. At the highest political level, most SDPs provide for annual or—in the case of the UK—semi-annual consultations between the EU’s High Representative and the respective foreign and/or defense minister. An exception is found in the security partnerships with Norway, Iceland (both EEA), and the UK, which allow the High Representative to additionally invite representatives from these countries to meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, thus also enabling exchanges with the EU member states.
In some SDPs, such as those with Canada, Australia, or Ghana, this top ministerial level is absent. In addition to that, the SDPs include working-level consultations between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the respective foreign and/or defense ministries of the partner states on the thematic priorities of the security partnerships. As the number of security partners has already grown to 12, however, this also raises questions of administrative capacity and whether the EU and the EEAS can sustain this growing network of consultation. For instance, High Representative Kaja Kallas did not attend the signing of the SDP with Australia in person, as she was travelling in Africa at the time, reflecting the “tyranny of distance” to partners in the Indo-Pacific.
A second main element is that the SDPs cover a range of security and defense-related policy area for closer cooperation between the EU and the respective partner. There is a common core, including training and exercises, cyber security, hybrid threats, countering foreign disinformation and interference (except for the India SDP), counterterrorism, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and implementing the UN agenda for Women, Peace, and Security.
Other elements covered in most agreements are maritime security, security in space, as well as peace mediation and conflict prevention. Beyond these, there are subtle differences between the SDPs: The agreement with Japan is confined to the common core (with a particular emphasis on maritime security) whereas the SDP with the UK is the broadest, extending to areas of “soft security” such as climate, migration, economic security, and artificial intelligence. Yet whilst wide-ranging, the wording on institutional cooperation—for instance on CSDP missions or PESCO projects—is markedly more cautious than with partners such as Norway or Canada, a distinct legacy of Brexit. Especially for the first and second circles of security partners, the SDPs also include joint commitments for the support of Ukraine, for Iceland as the most recent SDP even a consultation mechanism for sanctions in connection with the Russian war against Ukraine.
A third common element of the SDPs is building bridges for third country participation in the EU’s own CSDP instruments. There is no single set of rules within the EU for these, so the SDPs help to bundle existing offers. These range from framework agreements for participation in EU missions and operations, participation in joint exercises to cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA), and participation in selected programs of the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism.
A fourth and new element of the security partnerships is their linkage with EU instruments for armaments cooperation and financing. In principle, the security partnerships include the objective of a dialogue on defense-industrial cooperation, for instance via a dialogue between the EDA and the relevant partners. Central here is the “Security Action for Europe” (SAFE) instrument, introduced in 2025. Through SAFE, the EU grants loans amounting to €150 billion to EU states for defense projects. The loans themselves are open exclusively to EU member states (including projects to support Ukraine) and come with a "Buy European" clause, such that at least 65 percent of the procurement carried out with them must go to firms from the EU, the EEA, Ukraine or SDP partner states.
The SDPs thus become a political prerequisite for preferential access to the armaments market in Europe, even for states outside the EEA. The precondition of granting a country’s own defense industry enhanced access to procurement under SAFE, the Ukraine loan, and potential further EU armaments instruments is, in addition to the security partnership, a further agreement building on it.
As of July 2026, the EU has concluded such an additional agreement with Canada, while negotiations with the UK have failed for the time being. Other defense companies, including in particular those from the US, remain limited to a maximum of 35 percent of the value of procurement.
The Test of Partnership
The rapid expansion of the EU’s SDPs suggests that the instrument is likely to remain a permanent feature of European security policy. Additional partnerships can be expected as the EU seeks to deepen relations with countries that play an important role in regional security, defense-industrial cooperation, or economic resilience. Yet the more important question is not how many partnerships the EU can conclude, but what it is seeking to build through them.
The immediate challenge is implementation. The agreements may create consultation mechanisms, political dialogues, and opportunities for cooperation across a wide range of policy areas. But their value will depend on whether these become meaningful channels for coordination and joint action rather than additional diplomatic formats. This may require a gradual deepening of cooperation, including more regular participation of selected partners in EU consultation mechanisms, stronger links to missions and exercises, and more systematic cooperation in capability development and defense-industrial projects. The challenge for the EU will be to create tangible forms of cooperation while preserving the flexibility that has made the instrument attractive to a diverse range of partners.
A second question concerns the broader logic of the partnerships themselves. At present, each SDP is primarily organized as a bilateral relationship between the EU and an individual partner. Yet, as the number of partnerships grows, a different possibility emerges. Many of the EU’s partners face similar challenges, whether in relation to maritime security, cyber threats, economic coercion, sanctions implementation, supply-chain resilience, or support for Ukraine. The question is whether Brussels will eventually seek to connect these relationships more systematically and aim to itself become a center of gravity bringing different partners together.
This would represent a significant evolution in the purpose of the instrument. Rather than acting solely as a party to a growing number of bilateral partnerships, the EU could function as a convenor of wider networks of cooperation. The logic would shift from a series of separate relationships toward a broader ecosystem of partners linked through the EU. Whether such a development is politically feasible remains uncertain, but it would give the partnerships a significance beyond their current institutional design.
The most important test, however, may lie outside Brussels. Much of the discussion surrounding the SDPs focuses on what they offer the European Union. Their long-term success will depend equally on how they are perceived by partner countries themselves. Different partners clearly attach different meanings to the agreements.
For accession candidates, they support a wider process of integration with the EU. For Norway, they reinforce an already dense security relationship. For the UK, the SDP forms part of the wider post-Brexit search for a sustainable model of security cooperation between two actors that share strategic priorities but remain institutionally separate. For Canada, it offers a framework for closer engagement with one of its most like-minded partners at a time when Ottawa is actively diversifying its security and economic relationships beyond the US.
This diversity is both a strength and a challenge. The partnerships are attractive precisely because they are flexible. Yet that flexibility also means that their success cannot be measured simply by the number of agreements signed. The more relevant question is whether partners continue to invest political attention, diplomatic resources, and practical cooperation in them.
Ultimately, the significance of the SDPs extends beyond the individual agreements themselves. For decades, the EU’s international attractiveness rested primarily on access to its market, its institutions and, for some countries, the prospect of membership. Only by developing a strong defense industrial base and robust defense instruments can the EU be an attractive partner that can generate a similar pull in the field of security policy.
If partners regard the EU as a meaningful center of security cooperation in its own right, the instrument will have succeeded. If not, the partnerships risk remaining useful but largely procedural additions to an already crowded landscape of international cooperation.
Jake Benford is Senior Expert Europe and Geopolitics at Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Nicolai von Ondarza is head of the Europe/EU research division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.
