It’s far from certain whether people around the world think about Europe, or the European Union, a lot (if at all). Yet polling data—when collected regularly—at least makes it possible to gauge how people react to questions about Europe, and whether there are any meaningful shifts in that respect.
At the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), we have, since January 2023, conducted four rounds of public opinion polling outside Europe. (In addition, we survey Europeans on a more regular basis.) Taken together, the results from the past three years tell a story of a continent that is increasingly seen as distinct from the United States—and of transatlantic relations that are perceived very differently by Europeans and Americans.
A Perception of Decline
Start with early 2023, when we asked people in China, India, Russia, Turkey, and the United States—as well as across Europe—which of 10 different adjectives best described the world’s major powers. Everywhere, the US and China were more often perceived as “strong” than the EU. And many respondents not only in Russia but also in Turkey and China perceived the EU as either “declining” or “untrustworthy.”
Back then—as well as a few months later—most people around the world thought of the EU’s policies toward their country as the same as, or similar to, those of the US. In October 2023, majorities in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, China, India, Russia, and South Africa shared that view—and only in Brazil and South Korea did majorities see the EU’s and the US’ policies toward their countries as “different.”
These were the years of Joe Biden’s presidency, when Russia’s aggression against Ukraine allowed the US and Europe to reinforce their alliance following the first Trump administration. But that “united West” was largely “divided from the rest” in terms of how people in other parts of the world viewed Russia and the war in Ukraine. Most people in that “rest” also rejected the notion that they had to choose between a US-led and a China-led global camp. Instead, many appeared to believe in an “à la carte world,” for which a US-dependent Europe was ill-prepared.
Trump’s Return
Then came November 2024 and Donald Trump’s re-election as US president, which much of the world welcomed—contrary to European public opinion, which saw it as mostly a “bad thing” for both their countries and world peace. Europe seemed increasingly isolated: not only detached from America under its new leadership, but also out of tune with broader global sentiment in its gloominess about the Trumpian world.
Paradoxically, the global public didn’t seem to notice the European predicament. Majorities in places as varied as Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, China, Indonesia, India, and the US considered the EU “a power that [could] deal on equal terms with global powers, such as the US and China.” And—apart from Russia—most people held a positive view of the EU, seeing it either as their country’s “ally” or, at least, a “partner.”
A year later, much of the world had revised their assessment of what Trump’s re-election meant for their country, for world peace, and for American citizens downward. In several countries, the prevailing mood shifted from broad welcome to broad criticism. Trump seemed to be “making China great again,” contributing to the growing popularity of the Asian superpower—and not of the US—in many corners of the world.
Changing Views
This meant that Europe was no longer quite so isolated in its skepticism vis-à-vis Trump. But perceptions of the European Union were changing, too, with many beginning to regard Europeans not simply as adjuncts to American policy but as independent actors in their own right. Russians started to see the EU, rather than the US, as their main “adversary.” Ukrainians drew even closer to Europe, while their disillusionment with Trump’s US increased. Majorities in China and South Africa now saw the EU’s policies toward their country as “different” from those of the US.
That was accompanied by a growing mismatch between public views in the US and Europe regarding the transatlantic relationship. In November 2025, fully 40 percent of Americans perceived the EU as their country’s “ally,” while only 16 percent of Europeans, on average, reciprocated that view. (That figure has since fallen further, to only around 10 percent as of May 2026.)
Encouraging Reading
From the perspective of European policymakers, it should be encouraging to see the generally positive sentiments toward Europe across the world. Except for Russia, most people on different continents see the EU as either an “ally” or a “partner;” very few perceive it as a “rival” or “adversary.” Most expect their country’s relations with the EU to remain strong or become even stronger. And people generally regard the EU as globally influential.
But there are caveats.
One is that there are 195 countries in the world today. When we look only at the largest regional players, we miss many others, who might be either more critical of Europe (for example, countries in parts of Africa and the Middle East) or more agnostic about it (for example, countries in Asia).
Another point is that geopolitical shifts can lead to changes in a public’s foreign policy attitudes. The events of the past six months—which have included Trump’s threats to annex Greenland, the US-Israeli war against Iran, Washington’s inconclusive efforts to end the war in Ukraine, and the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, among others—will very likely affect the way America is perceived globally. But how Europeans have reacted to these developments—and how they react in the months to come—may also shape the way Europe and the EU are seen by others.
The final caveat is that it’s useful to think of public opinion data as reflecting a certain potential—which is left to leaders to realize. Much of the world may see the EU, in the abstract, as a “global power.” But that perception will be subject to scrutiny whenever Europeans behave in either a powerful or a powerless way when confronted with an actual crisis. Not everyone might be paying attention, but those who are will draw their own conclusions.
Pawel Zerka is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and its lead public opinion analyst.
