In reaction to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Union has undergone a profound transformation of its security and defense policy. What was long considered duplicating structures and processes of NATO has converged over the past few years into a strategy that sees EU defense initiatives as complementary to—and in support of—NATO’s collective defense framework. In particular, the EU’s two most significant levers—budget and regulatory power—are now being used in ways that help member states reach NATO’s spending targets and planning goals. This shift is most welcome and necessary in a time of mounting threats to European security.
Building a credible deterrence against Russia is Europe’s number one strategic priority. Given the great urgency, the EU has adopted a pragmatic model of action that rejects politically and financially costly visions of structural autonomy. Instead, Europeans are building significant military capability within the proven framework of NATO defense planning—enabled by the EU.
Historically, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has sat uneasily alongside NATO. Critics argued that separate EU command and rapid reaction structures risked siphoning scarce resources and creating parallel institutions rather than strengthening the collective security order anchored in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. This perennial tension was exacerbated by the overlapping yet diverging membership of both organizations and the ups and downs of the transatlantic relationship.
However, ever since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine altered the European security landscape, political leadership within the EU has framed cooperation with NATO as strategic complementarity. The European Council’s June 2025 conclusions explicitly reaffirmed that a “stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defense will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains … the foundation of collective defense for those member states that are also NATO members.” This marks a deliberate attitudinal shift from earlier debates about European autonomy to one emphasizing mutual reinforcement: The EU builds defense capabilities that help NATO as much as they serve EU objectives.
The Twin Levers: Budget and Regulation
The EU has two main levers at its disposal for shaping defense cooperation: budgetary instruments that mobilize funding and investments, and regulatory frameworks that create flexibility and incentive structures for member states. Since 2025, the EU has used both levers to improve military readiness. Crucially, it is doing so not in pursuit of standards and defense planning of its own but following those of NATO. Thus, the EU is becoming an enabler of NATO.
At the heart of EU efforts is the “ReArm Europe” initiative, later formalized as the “Readiness 2030” framework. This comprehensive investment strategy aims to mobilize up to €800 billion in additional defense expenditures by allowing member states greater fiscal room to maneuver, loosening the EU’s economic governance rules, and creating targeted investment instruments. By reducing regulatory hurdles and providing financial incentives for joint procurement, the EU is increasing the ability of its member states to contribute meaningfully to transatlantic alliance planning goals. The most significant budgetary instrument within this framework is the Security Action for Europe (SAFE). Adopted by the European Council in May 2025, SAFE is an EU-backed loan mechanism of up to €150 billion designed to help member states make “rapid and significant increases in their defense investments” through joint procurement plans.
SAFE’s design fundamentally alters how defense is funded in Europe. By leveraging EU budgetary support to aggregate demand and finance capability acquisition collectively, SAFE helps close key gaps that individual member states might struggle to fill alone, for instance in air defense, drone, ammunition, and deep strike capabilities. This has practical implications for NATO’s planning process: Interoperable systems and shared platforms become more likely when procurement is coordinated across multiple states. The instrument also reflects a broader EU policy shift: Defense spending is increasingly treated as a strategic investment rather than as a burden. “Readiness 2030” explicitly frames these financial tools as essential to strengthening both the European defense industry and member states’ operational readiness.
Meanwhile, established EU defense institutions such as the European Defense Agency (EDA) have found new active roles. EDA has transitioned from a coordination body to a practical facilitator of collaborative planning and procurement. Its chief executive since early 2025, German General André Denk, has emphasized that “member states’ willingness to cooperate has increased dramatically” and that EDA support extends across the capability development cycle—from research to joint procurement. This includes facilitating collaboration on key defense technologies, identifying capability gaps, and fostering interoperability. Thus, EDA’s work is inherently supportive of NATO goals: By harmonizing requirements, aggregating demand, and reducing duplication, the agency helps ensure that European armed forces can operate together seamlessly within NATO frameworks.
The practical outcome of these budgetary, regulatory, and institutional approaches is that EU defense initiatives now directly support NATO’s capability development and planning goals rather than being seen as competing with NATO. EU member states have substantially increased their defense budgets. Total defense spending reached approximately €343 billion in 2024, rising to an estimated €381 billion in 2025, which exceeds NATO’s previous benchmark of 2 percent of GDP and puts the new 3.5 percent agreement on hard defense well within reach by 2035.
While increased spending remains a national decision, the EU’s fiscal and regulatory frameworks have provided enabling conditions as well as much political pressure and attention to the issue. By encouraging joint procurement and offering fiscal flexibility, the EU is helping member states allocate more of their resources to capabilities that are interoperable and relevant to NATO planning. “Readiness 2030” identifies priority capability areas including air and missile defense, artillery systems, ammunition, drones, cyber and electronic warfare, and military mobility, many of which are explicitly aligned with NATO’s own capability shortfall lists. By coordinating efforts around these priorities, the EU is contributing to an overall strengthening of NATO’s European pillar.
A New European Strategic Consensus?
In Europe’s current security crisis, the EU has displayed great understanding of its strategic priorities as well as the tools—and their limits—at its disposal. Still, not all that glitters is gold. In matters of defense, the EU continues to struggle for relevance as this is primarily a topic for the member states and the NATO alliance. Germany’s non-participation in SAFE demonstrates its cautious view of EU integration in defense: That Germany saw its path to building the strongest conventional army in Europe solely via national investment rather than this EU instrument is not only an indictment of perennial bureaucratic obstacles but also does not bode well for the degree of interoperability the EU can actually achieve amidst Europe’s current procurement bonanza. The United Kingdom’s eleventh-hour decision to forego participation in SAFE—while Canada happily joined—further shows that the EU may be a useful, but not essential, NATO planning instrument.
More importantly, to put EU efforts in the service of NATO planning and targets is not without its risks. With the Trump administration undermining confidence in the reliability of the transatlantic alliance, there is, politically, more incentive than ever for European autonomy. So European leaders are attempting a difficult balancing act between strengthening their sovereignty and keeping the indispensable United States invested in Europe. For the time being, both goals can be served simultaneously through a massive ramp-up of European military capabilities within the framework of NATO. If it succeeds, it might create this most elusive of concepts, a true European pillar within NATO. Ultimately, however, it is the member states whose actions will determine success or failure.
Patrick Keller is deputy research director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and heads its Center for Security and Defense.
