There is a widespread view in Europe and beyond that the United States, led by a new Trump administration, will work against the rest of the world—and Europe in particular. (Indeed, when Internationale Politik Quarterly first approached me to write the scene setter for this issue, the initial placeholder title for this article was “The United States vs. the World: The Second Trump Administration and the Future of Transatlantic Relations.”)
Many American progressives, some European leaders, and a range of international observers appear to hold this view, believing that President Donald Trump is inherently hostile to Europe as a result of his “America First” focus. Such beliefs manifested in the many pre-election conversations about the need to “Trump-proof” transatlantic institutions, especially NATO.
Indeed, Trump does not see the United States as the world’s “indispensable defender” (as The Economist put it in January), and he is unlikely to accept the status quo in Europe—or in much of the rest of the world. But neither should Europeans. Trump’s identification of key problems in the transatlantic relationship should be seen as a first step toward making progress on them—together—and benefiting from a renewed transatlantic relationship.
This renewal will occur within the context of the Trump administration’s America First policy approach.
Taking Security Seriously
First, as he did during his first term, President Trump will continue to ask Europeans to take security seriously and to step up. He has not been the only president to voice concerns about Europe’s minimal dedication to self-defense. Decades before Trump’s election, American leaders made the same point in different terms. For instance, in 2016, then-President Barack Obama stated that “Europe has sometimes been complacent about its own defense.”
Similarly, in 2008, then-President George W. Bush urged his European allies to “increase their defense investments to support both NATO and EU operations.” In recent years, some European leaders have begun heeding these calls: In April 2024, while announcing a gradual increase in the United Kingdom’s defense spending, then-Prime Minster Rishi Sunak warned that Europeans “cannot keep expecting America to pay any price or bear any burden if we ourselves are unwilling to make greater sacrifices for our own security.”
A recent European Commission report completed by Finland’s former President Sauli Niinstö stated in October 2024 that Europe must tend to the “new reality” it faces. This new reality is best exemplified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which underlined “Putin’s long-held perception that the West and Western people are weak.” Niinistö urged Europeans to prioritize security in a very clear way, stating that “security is the foundation of everything we hold dear. Security is a public good—the most important thing that everyone needs. It is the precondition for maintaining our values, as well as being a necessity for our economic success and competitiveness. If we lose security, it takes with it our well-being and our plans for the future.”
These insights are the perfect foundation for working with the new Trump team on both the military capabilities and operational concepts that can improve security in Europe. And these conversations should also consider how the private sector from both sides of the Atlantic can contribute to and shape this environment. There’s a lot to work on.
Enhancing Energy Security
Second, Trump is likely to continue to emphasize the geopolitical risks of Europe’s energy policies. He sparked a lot of criticism in his first term for criticizing Germany (in particular) for its dependence on Russian gas. While that has changed since Russia’s invasion—the Bruegel think tank reported that between 2022 and the end of 2023, the EU slashed its imports of Russian fossil fuels by 94 percent—Trump is likely to point out that Europe still depends on Russian liquified natural gas (LNG), which is not sanctioned. He is also likely to agree with European energy analyst Ana Maria Jaller-Makarewicz, who pointed out last December in the Financial Times that it was indeed “surprising” that EU imports of LNG from Russia reached an all-time high in 2024 and that overall, “instead of gradually reducing Russian LNG imports, [Europe is] increasing them.”
Trump will almost certainly seek arrangements that favor the increase of US LNG—a theme that he repeated consistently throughout his first term and his most recent campaign. He will have support among some Europeans. Mario Draghi, the former president of the European Central Bank, in his now famous report from September 2024 observed that Europe has “the highest energy prices: EU companies face electricity prices that are two to three times higher than those in the United States and in China.”
Energy costs will also impact the development of Europe’s tech sector, which is already lagging behind the United States and China. Only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European. And while the reasons for this gap are many, high energy prices will continue to be a drag on reform and innovation—which in turn could impact aspects of the transatlantic relationship.
Alignment on China Policy
Third, Trump will likely seek European alignment with US efforts to oppose China’s increasing political, economic, and military aggression. He recognizes that the best way for that to happen is for Europe to first help itself by breaking free of its deep dependencies on China. This process of continent-wide self-help requires that Europeans engage with Trump in good faith when he points out legitimate and pressing problems that are originating from Beijing.
As just one example, by rushing to abandon fossil fuels in pursuit of net-zero emissions, Europe has made its energy infrastructure and supply reliant on green technology supply chains that are almost entirely dominated by China. Relatedly, Beijing is purposefully flooding European markets with cheap, subsidized goods—including, among other things, solar panels and electric vehicles—that prevent European firms from being able to profitably compete, thereby positioning China to be a sole supplier. In the absence of policy reversals, as my Hudson Institute colleague Peter Rough has noted, the Chinese Communist Party has more opportunities to entrench itself in European electronic systems, steal intellectual property, and consolidate its influence in a private sector establishment that is addicted to Chinese capital and resources.
Through his America First policy agenda, particularly his push for greater US manufacturing independence, Trump has demonstrated his view that economic and material dependencies eventually lead to an erosion of political autonomy. On the basis of this understanding, he wants Europe to reclaim its status as a capable and reliable US partner by asserting greater independence across a variety of areas. Only then will the collective West be able to resist Chinese revisionism.
This process can start, as previously mentioned, with expanded US-European energy cooperation—which will give Europe a solid foundation on which to rebuild its economic-industrial base and diminish Chinese leverage over European decision-making.
A Strong Position Vis-à-Vis Russia
Fourth, regarding Ukraine, while there is a common perception that the new US president will prioritize a “friendly” relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his statements so far tell a different story. During a phone call between President-elect Trump and Putin to discuss the ongoing war in Ukraine soon after his reelection, Trump purportedly warned the Russian president against escalating the war, while reminding him of the US military’s significant presence in Europe. The Kremlin subsequently denied that this interaction occurred, lending credence to the initial reporting.
The interaction is one example that, as Trump’s former national security advisor Robert O’Brien observed, the second Trump administration will take seriously the mantra of preserving “peace through strength.” Shortly after the conversation with Putin, Trump met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris ahead of the Notre-Dame Cathedral’s reopening ceremony. During the meeting, Trump voiced his hope for a strong post-war Ukraine—the security of which, in his view, should be guaranteed and supported by Europe, possibly with the placement of European troops within the recovering country. Additionally, he urged his counterparts to pressure Beijing into forcing Moscow to end the conflict, potentially by using tariffs on China as a motivator.
The next day, Trump called for an “immediate ceasefire” in the Russo-Ukrainian War—writing on social media that “Zelensky and Ukraine would like to make a deal and stop the madness.” In the same message, he also prodded Putin by noting that “close to 600,000 Russian soldiers lay wounded or dead, in a war that should never have started, and could go on forever.”
Trump is not content to blindly accept Russian propaganda and disinformation. His apparent willingness to defy Russian leadership, speak with European stakeholders about the conflict, and advocate for a managed conclusion to the war stands in opposition to the pre-election prognostications that he would immediately abandon Ukraine and Europe upon his return to the White House. So far, he has worked to establish a process by which the war can be resolved.
Migration as a Common Concern
There are, of course, more issues that the United States and Europe could work together on in the coming years. Trump will be receptive to discussions about how to combat the growing scourge of antisemitism in the United States and across Europe.
And there will be many opportunities to discuss the problems of mass migration and illegal immigration that continue to impact both sides of the Atlantic. Decades of development policies by the United States and Europe have failed. They have not produced the types of communities and societies in which people want to stay. Not only is it worth seriously rethinking development priorities and approaches, but it is also necessary to speak honestly about the problem of migration, which has had and will continue to have significant social and policy implications for the United States and Europe.
There must be a transatlantic consensus that the primary responsibility to our democracies is the stability of our nations’ societal and economic fabric, something that will not be achieved by open borders, mass migration, or the growth of radical Islamism throughout Europe. Since shared values are a key part of the fabric of the transatlantic relationship, this matters.
The challenges and potential solutions are unfolding within the context of Trump’s America First policy agenda. As he and many of those close to him have repeated, America First does not mean America alone. But it does mean that US policy must be concerned first and foremost with advancing the interests of the United States, with Europe working with us as a capable partner.
European countries must demonstrate that they are dependable allies by strengthening their national defense, securing their energy infrastructure, safeguarding their economic security, and standing up for the values that bind the United States and Europe together.
Europeans must begin to demand as much from themselves as they demand from the United States.
Some European leaders recognize this. Shortly after Trump’s reelection, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni told other European leaders, “Don’t ask what the US can do for you, ask what Europe should do for itself.” Meloni has advocated for Europe to maintain a pragmatic, constructive, and open approach with the new Trump administration, focusing on areas of potential cooperation. Similarly, Macron warned, “We [in Europe] think that we should delegate our geopolitics to the United States of America, that we should delegate our growth debt to our Chinese clients, that we should delegate our technological innovation to the American hyper-scalers. That’s not the best idea.”
A Chance for Renewal
The renewal of the transatlantic relationship as a reciprocal political-economic-security arrangement is possible. To ensure it evolves in positive directions, Europe must first recognize and take steps to resolve the myriad problems that are plaguing the continent. There are opportunities now, working with Washington, to address them.
Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. In 2017, she was the primary architect of the first Trump administration’s National Security Strategy.
