The world has become an increasingly hard place for Europe. Its relative decline vis-à-vis other powers has become more visible over the past few years. As a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic ramifications of Russia’s war against Ukraine (not to mention the lack of structural reforms), key European states such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy face sluggish economies, a gloomy growth outlook, and/or significant public debt.
Chinese exports and overcapacities are challenging the economic model of Europe’s export-driven economies.Against this macroeconomic backdrop, it is hard to imagine how the continent will manage the green transition or succeed with its rearmament effort. And in terms of security, Europe is now “home alone,” as the United States displays open hostility and uses coercion to achieve its foreign policy priorities.
When many states from the Global South refused to publicly condemn Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly, European leaders realized that their continent’s problems are of much less concern to others than they thought, and that the European vision of global order was anything but a silent consensus.
Back to Basics: Global Order
In light of these profound changes in international politics, debates on global order and the balance of power have re-emerged. Based on realist international relations theory, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity—referring to one, two, or multiple great powers respectively—are the dominant concepts used to describe the distribution of power in the international system. Albeit simplified, these concepts of order help understand one’s place in the world—and to learn lessons for future grand strategy.
Whether one sees today’s world as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar often varies across realms of international politics. Regardless of the understanding of order that experts are leaning toward in their analysis, they mostly agree that today’s world does not match either of the ideal types. In fact, there is a good case to be made that elements of unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity exist today in parallel; European states individually and the EU as an international organization have to navigate these new dynamics.
At the same time, the current moment of transition is also an opportunity for Europe—the EU institutions, its member states, and key European partners like the United Kingdom or Norway—to shape the future order toward a more desirable one, namely managed multipolarity.
Europe’s Squeeze Scenarios
Two of these currently present structures constitute a considerable challenge for Europe: the remainders of US unipolarity, now turning from a relatively benign to a pure power politics approach, and the bipolarity resulting from strategic competition between the United States and China. In both contexts, Europe looks like a geopolitical loser, with its central interests—defined as security from aggression, economic prosperity, and freedom and fundamental rights—being under pressure or even in danger.
The United States’ relative power compared to other players is undoubtedly in decline, for example vis-à-vis China in the realm of development cooperation and foreign investment or vis-à-vis the United Arab Emirates in artificial intelligence. However, Washington still remains a key player, especially in global security. No other country spends as much on its military, and despite the mediation efforts of other powers, it also seems that no other player has the capacity to enforce deals on ongoing conflicts through pressure on the parties of a conflict.
This power is visible in Russia’s war against Ukraine, where Washington currently plays the central role in forging a deal—and where Europeans are struggling to make sure their interests are represented. If the United States was a relatively benign hegemon toward its allies, as has been the case over most of the past seven decades, Washington’s power benefited Europe, especially as European and US interests have often been aligned.
Yet, with the Trump administration now relying on an approach of pure power politics, including coercion, threats, and open hostility toward allies in Europe or Asia, the remainders of US dominance when it comes to power politics pose a strategic dilemma for Europe. The years of dependence have left Europe exposed to US strategy changes and power politics, but it still cannot strive for full autonomy, either, due to the lack of own military capacities. (Military experts believe that the Europeans currently wouldn’t be able to defend themselves against a full-scale Russian aggression without US assistance.)
Bipolarity between the US and China in several spheres of international politics, especially in economics and technology, is an only marginally better alternative for Europe. A stable balance of power between the two superpowers could prevent escalation but not necessarily tensions—and it is here where European states individually, just as other middle powers or small states, and the EU itself are particularly exposed to the ramifications of bipolarity and great power competition.
The recent summit meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Buzan, South Korea, demonstrates this: While the US and China agreed on a trade truce, the EU has not obtained supply chain security from China. As competition between the US and China persists, the EU is exposed to pressure from both sides: the EU-US trade “deal” de facto codifies a permanent tariff for European exports to the US, and the EU has not found a response to Chinese overcapacities on its markets and a lack of reciprocity. Furthermore, the EU is exposed to coercion and retaliation measures from both sides, for example to US secondary sanctions on companies dealing with China or Chinese pressure on US allies.
In both scenarios, the Europeans are being squeezed by one or between two great powers; especially when these trends intensify, its lack of collective action will make it almost impossible for Europe to shield itself from the ramifications.
Working Toward Europe’s Desired Future
An alternative for Europe is to actively work toward an international order that benefits its interests and those of other middle powers: multipolarity. In contrast to dependence on a single hegemon or the pressure to pick a side, an order with multiple power centers allows middle powers to play out their respective strengths more efficiently and pursue partnerships for achieving strategic interests.
The approaches on the EU level and strategies of key European states like France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or Italy already demonstrate that multipolarity is seen as a likely and desirable future. The intensification of bilateral and EU relations with countries like India or the Gulf states, active involvement in COP30, the G20 summit in South Africa, and the EU-African Union summit that immediately followed: All this allows Europe and its middle power partners to forge partnerships in the shadow of US unipolar power politics and US-China competition and create meaningful solutions.
In the realm of security and defense, the EU is laying the groundwork through security and defense partnerships (SDPs), of which eight have been concluded since 2022 and three more—with Australia, India, and Switzerland—are being negotiated or explored. Through further instruments, like the Coordinated Maritime Presences or the European Peace Facility, the EU positions itself as a global security partner rather than just a taker of US security.
There is the danger, of course, that multipolarity will be messy rather than managed. Such an order, characterized by fluid, transactional cooperation, and a lack of international norms and rules, could fuel competition rather than cooperation between middle powers, expose them to the risk of immediate retaliation or the prospect of short-term gains in reaction to their policies, and hence amplify their weaknesses. Managed multipolarity, in contrast, would strengthen global governance through formal or informal organizations and widely accepted rules and standards. Because of the importance of open markets and global rule of law for the EU’s economy and security, it has a strategic interest in promoting such guardrails.
To work toward managed multipolarity, the Europeans should leverage the collective strength of the EU institutions, member states, and the UK as a key European power. They should offer attractive solutions and partnerships to partners. The EU can do so especially on issues such as technology or climate protection, even if this requires upfront investment, and advance these topics through issue-based cooperation and partnerships.
Key European states like France, the UK, and Germany, or smaller states with extensive multilateral engagement like Sweden or the Netherlands, can play a key role in convening other middle powers and states from the Global South for global solutions in international organizations. Going beyond European priorities is necessary to gain the trust of partners and create the basis for cooperation of powers reluctant to choose sides between the United States and China. If Europe adopts this perspective for its foreign policy going forward, it can play a constructive role shaping the future of global order.
Gesine Weber is Senior Researcher in Global Security at the Center for Security Studies of the ETH Zürich.
