The incoming US administration will define what will happen in and around Ukraine. US political and military support for the country cannot be substituted by anyone else. Those who have been designated to take up key positions in the second Trump administration seem to understand that quite well.
For US President-elect Donald Trump personally it very much matters whether he can deliver on his often-repeated promise “to end the war in 24 hours.” Both his political credibility and legacy hinge on that particular statement—and the whole world will start measuring Trump’s ability to make his foreign policy a success on whether he delivers on that promise. Even more so, the Trump II administration’s handling of Russia’s war of aggression will show whether the concept of “peace through strength” is viable.
A quick success, or at least something that could be seen as such, would significantly strengthen US credibility and enhance Trump’s space for maneuver in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region. The returning US president will clearly steer away from anything that could end up having any similarities to the disastrous withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021. He understands it would destroy his political legacy in an even more powerful way than the exit from Afghanistan destroyed President Joe Biden’s.
End the Fighting, Start the Talking
Trump’s first goal would be to achieve a pause in combat operations and to achieve it as quickly as possible. The second goal would be to get Ukraine and Russia to start talking to each other. These would be minimum-level aspirations. It seems that Trump doesn’t have a clear and structured, predefined plan about how to do this and has been open to listening to different ideas.
Such conversations should have given him the sense that the repercussions of any chosen strategy would go far beyond Ukraine and would substantially define the European and Western security architecture as well as the US policy toward Europe and Russia. The post-World War II “status quo,” which was the cornerstone of the Western security for generations—the US security umbrella over Europe that was guaranteed to function under any circumstances—is not over, but under discussion in the United States.
The general way the new US administration will handle the Russian aggression against Ukraine will substantially define the new paradigm of transatlantic relations. It will certainly entail a new level of European responsibility for their own security, including for Ukraine, but probably also translate into a trade-off that could secure the minimum level of necessary US security presence in Europe in exchange for partial but significant enough support for US policies elsewhere, including on China.
A New “Division of Labor”
There could be a number of way in which the Trump II administration would define a new “division of labor” between the US and Europe when it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine, but the bottom line seems to be that the US should secure a deal and that Europe should make it sustainable—both militarily and financially. In this context, a bold and proactive European stance on Ukraine could mean a lot for Trump, but it would need to meet two important premises: It should be designed and communicated as a coherent European strategy and it should be backed up by credible commitments on capabilities and resources.
In other words, for Trump and his administration to believe in it, Europe first needs to start believing in such a strategy itself. In Ukraine there is a lot of skepticism about an independent European role without the US at least “backing it up.” And such mistrust is unlikely to fade away.
One of the key concerns in Ukraine is that the Kremlin would try to “outsmart” the West and play on Trump’s desire to achieve a quick end to the fighting and deescalation. It could well play into Putin’s hands by destroying momentum on Western assistance for Ukraine, giving the Russian leadership a chance to address domestic issues and to start destabilizing Ukraine internally. The Russian propaganda machine can present almost any result as a victory for Russia.
A Just and Sustainable Peace
Ukraine needs a just peace and Europe, at a minimum, a sustainable one, because it is a vital security issue for the continent. It’s time for Europe to recognize—politically and publicly—that a “bad solution” for Ukraine will sink Europe’s credibility to a level from which it would never recover again. Therefore, it is an existential European interest to work with the Trump II administration from the very first moment committedly and proactively.
Europe should also credibly explain to Trump that Ukraine’s effective integration into the EU is key for making the country a sustainable democracy and market economy and a part of the West. After a ceasefire, the Kremlin would immediately start destabilizing Ukraine in order to try and make it a failed state. It’s unclear whether Moscow has given up its desire to occupy all of Ukraine militarily, but it will certainly do everything it can to split Ukraine into at least two or more parts. To counter this, European integration should be used to secure a European and united Ukraine as part of the European security architecture.
The Trump II administration is also unlikely to only focus on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Possible negotiations will probably include a wide range of issues—from strategic stability and the European security architecture to critical minerals and relations with the other key world powers, including China. These issues can be treated in different—official or semi-official—formats or even backchannels.
The Kremlin is aware that the Trump team sees issues like China and the Indo-Pacific as well as the Middle East as of greater strategic importance than Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Russia has certainly prepared different strategies and scenarios for addressing such priorities. Possible trade-offs could be damaging not only for Ukraine, but also for Europe. The Europeans can address this by proposing to the US that they negotiate from a common “Western” standpoint.
Europe seems to be far less vocal than the US about the fact that the war in Ukraine has been increasingly sliding into a global conflict. North Korea is now a full-fledged part of the war, delivering not just weapons and munitions, but also manpower. The Iranians are also delivering weapons to Russia, while China is supplying everything possible short—to our best knowledge—of lethal weapons. There is a new pattern of cooperation and interaction evolving, and there should a clear and bold Western answer to it. A lack of such an answer will create a perception of weakness, and that is exactly what is happening right now.
A European Military Presence
The clear perception of European weakness is being caused by the lack of a common position on an eventual European contribution to security guarantees or at least security commitments for Ukraine. The best option would be to move swiftly on Ukraine’s NATO membership, and the second best would be to have a bold Western presence, including the US, in the country.
If both options are not available for the time being, which seems to be the case for now, then the idea of “European” troops logically emerges as a “temporary” alternative. The Trump II administration is unlikely to send troops to Ukraine, so in the case of a possible deal it would be left to European countries to send these troops and finance them.
Without the real presence of a security component on the ground it would be impossible to stabilize any ceasefire and to generate the sense of safety and security that is indispensable for any “normal life” to return to Ukraine. Any options that are limited to monitoring a ceasefire are doomed to fail and will be manipulated by Russia.
Europe, including the United Kingdom and other non-EU member states, should be taking part in the discussions about a security presence from the very beginning and communicate to the incoming US administration what is needed from Washington to support and ideally “securitize” a European engagement on the ground.
Risks and Opportunities
For Ukraine, Trump’s return to the White House is viewed as a mixture of risks and opportunities. Ukrainians got used to the “too little, too late” paradigm of assistance and clearly understand that retaining it would mean the current war of attrition would continue. It is one of the key reasons why many Ukrainians are cautiously positive about Trump, even if there is the real chance of US assistance being reduced substantially. The chance for a “peace through strength” is very alluring, although its conception is pretty vague. Among key concerns is the easing up of the sanctions imposed on Russia.
Germany is clearly seen in Ukraine as a key player in any of the scenarios. With the German elections approaching, the big question is where Germany stands on all of these issues—the sort of question that is continuously asked in Ukraine. Whether Berlin will simply “follow” the US or try to shape a common European approach that would make a great difference to Ukraine.
Pavlo Klimkin served as Ukraine’s foreign minister from 2014 to 2019.
