Ambassador Ischinger, we are speaking shortly after the capture of the Venezuelan strongman, President Nicolás Maduro, by US special forces, and at a time when tensions are rising between the United States and its European allies over Greenland. How would you describe the current state of the transatlantic relationship?
There is a lot of nervousness, a loss of mutual trust, some degree of loss of credibility as well. I could go on. But the question is: How much of this doom and gloom is really warranted and to what extent is it just noise? My own position is inspired by Mark Twain: The news of the death of the transatlantic relationship is greatly exaggerated. The last time I looked, there were still about 80,000 US troops in Europe. That is roughly half of the size of the Bundeswehr’s land forces. In other words, let’s not exaggerate.
Still, how much of a break with past US foreign and security policy does the second Trump administration represent?
Well, we need to differentiate. I’m not aware of any expert who would disagree that there is a problem regarding the US intervention in Venezuela with regard to international law. But the US has engaged in similar actions in the Western Hemisphere before—such as Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989-90. With that in mind, I refuse to get too worried.
What worries me in terms of the health of the transatlantic relationship is the more fundamental question of the reliability and the trustworthiness of the Trump administration regarding such issues as, for example, security guarantees for Ukraine…
Currently the key question for the future of European security…
Indeed. Security guarantees, as we know them, are not worth a lot if they are only on paper. And even if they are ratified by an act of the US Congress, it’s essentially politics. The security guarantee Germany enjoyed during the Cold War was effective and credible because there were up to 300,000 US soldiers in this country and lots of nuclear weapons. In other words, the security guarantee was underpinned by a capacity to act, and to deter. And when it comes to American support for eventual European security guarantees for Ukraine, the one thing we know is that the Trump administration has no intention of putting any boots on the ground. In consequence, the question of the political credibility becomes even more important.
And I’m not sure that our friends in the White House are sufficiently aware of the doubts about their reliability. That’s what worries me. Because I think there is nothing more important for the security of the European continent than an effective and lasting end to this conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin may not be willing to give up his original war aims, but he may accept some kind of interim solution, and that will end the war permanently only if there are sufficiently strong deterrence measures to make sure that Russia doesn’t try again. That is the most fundamental question. And in order to get that done, we need the United States to be a credible and a leading partner.
The Biden administration didn’t want US boots on the ground either …
Yes, but my point is: The Trump administration’s activities with regard to other conflicts or potential conflicts like Venezuela, Greenland, other places in the Western Hemisphere, the way the administration talks about Canada—all this renders the quality of the American partnership in the project of safeguarding European security and the future of Ukraine more problematic.
Denmark has warned that it would be “the end of NATO” should the US invade Greenland.
I understand how complicated it is for the Danish prime minister, for European partners to come up with a winning formula on this. But I agree we should now go from statements to action. We should propose to Washington that we establish a large joint NATO mission in Greenland, led by the US, with strong participation of the Nordic member states and others with relevant military expertise. I think we should not ignore the stated American concerns. We need to make sure that Greenland is not going to fall into the wrong hands. So, if that’s the diagnosis, why can’t we be proactive and propose joint action instead of lamenting.
Still, with the Trump administration openly loosening its commitment to international law, does that not strengthen China and Russia?
The point that it would now be easier for China to justify action against Taiwan by pointing to what the US is doing, or is threatening to do, has been made. Frankly, I believe the last thing China is concerned about is how Europe might interpret a move on Taiwan under international law. Their primary question is not about legality, but about capability: What if we fail? What if we end up in a situation similar to Russia in Ukraine? And the problem for Beijing is that China has not fought a war in generations. They don’t know how to fight a war—which explains their caution and why they have not acted so far. In my view, this is less about legal precedent set by Washington and more about military know-how: weighing the odds of success versus the risk of failure.
When it comes to Russia, international law certainly plays a role, but the more striking point is this: Moscow is learning a harsh lesson. What they attempted in Ukraine in February 2022—seizing Kyiv—and have failed to achieve even after four years, the US managed to accomplish in Venezuela in just 90 minutes. For Russia, this is a deeply humiliating and humbling experience.
So, on balance, the elimination of Maduro is probably helping to deter Russia and weakening Russia in the long run because oil prices are presumably going to fall. Economically, strategically, militarily—I’d think that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had a good reason not to criticize the Americans, but to say instead: “You know who should now be next.”
The European allies have refrained until recently from open criticism of Trump in order not to anger him and not risk his support for Ukraine in particular. Is this, in your eyes, a wise course of action?
I think it’s important that the European Union and the Europeans at large speak out clearly regarding their adherence, support, and defense of the accepted principles of international law. The idea of being a value-based community is extremely essential.
Having said that, I think it is good policy for the Europeans, given the nature and the atmospherics of the Trump administration, to use political psychology. We know that the most effective way to achieve a positive outcome with the Trump administration is to present proposals in a way that allows them to conclude: If we accept what the Europeans are suggesting, it benefits us—and it aligns with the president’s way of thinking.
Basically a “make him look good” approach?
That’s too simple. But present things in a way that allows the United States to be seen as the successful leader. I think that makes achieving our goals easier.
The new US National Security Strategy published in December reads in parts like an extrapolation of the speech US Vice President JD Vance gave last year at the MSC. Still, it shocked many in Europe. Did it shock you, too?
It shocked me less than most, I think, because the way I read the National Security Strategy is that it consists really of two different documents. One part of it is a JD Vance kind of speech. The other part is written by foreign policy or security professionals, and they are meaningful. And we should insist on those elements of the strategy which are of positive relevance to us. Like the idea that Europe is very important to the US.
And something else is important: There was a long discussion in America in the first half of 2025, about whether or not it would be in the interest of the United States to offer to relinquish the job of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR, to a European general. Some of my American friends came to me and said: Wouldn’t that be a great idea if a German were SACEUR?
In Congress, in the Senate, there are people who know a little bit about nuclear deterrence, about how NATO works. They came quickly to the conclusion that it would be a very, very bad idea. Because the American SACEUR has a double hat, commanding US forces in Europe and also commanding NATO as a whole. He is the holder of a key link in the nuclear command chain with respect to extended deterrence covering Europe.
And if that link were broken by way of a non-American sitting in the SACEUR seat, the credibility of the nuclear extended deterrence promise would be seriously weakened. The United States did not pursue this idea any further. A new American SACEUR is now installed. That’s good. We should talk about that. And not only about the parts of a document which are more problematic.
Still, the Trump administration, the president himself, seems to be particularly unhappy with the EU as an organization, as an institution. In 2019, you wore a blue hoodie at the MSC with the stars of the EU on it. Will it make a reappearance?
I’m thinking about it, actually. I hope that one of the outcomes of the forthcoming MSC can be a signal that Europe, including the United Kingdom, is alive and kicking. But to do so, we cannot limit ourselves to declarations. We have to start doing things. And one of the things that we need to do is to build a comprehensive, consolidated European defense market. Currently, within the EU, we have too many separate small defense industries.
But if we want to be a credible actor as the European Union, we need to be able to compete in global markets. We need to wean ourselves off the near total dependence on the United States, and that requires larger, more capable companies. We need a European Raytheon, we need a European Lockheed Martin.
What else?
I truly believe that is important that we admit that the current constitution of the European Union does not allow the EU to be a credible foreign policy and defense actor. And there is nothing that will help remedy that unless we review the situation in a very fundamental manner.
We need to go back to [the late German Interior and Finance Minister] Wolfgang Schäuble’s idea of a core Europe. Where are those four, five, six, or seven states are that are willing to go ahead? Can we have majority voting on foreign policy issues in such a core group? I think that would be listened to with great attention in Moscow, in Washington, and even in Beijing.
Last point on that score: When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said rather proudly, we’re now spending an additional €500 billion on defense, and I’m going to build the largest army in the EU, I believe the message could have been framed more effectively: We’re going to spend these €500 billion in such a way that Europe can actually defend itself.
On that note, we need to remove the current obstacles in the German-Polish relationship, with the reparations question being on the agenda again, and so on. Why can’t Germany offer to Poland one or two submarines, or a number of tanks or artillery pieces, as a gift?
Poland defends us, they are our frontline country now, right? Imagine how such a move would affect the anti-German public in Poland? It would speak of the fact that Germany is recognizing that Poland, a militarily strong Poland, is a key power for Germany.
What I’m trying to say here: Dialogue alone is not enough. We need tangible action to demonstrate commitment. Otherwise, we will not be taken seriously.
What will the focus of the conference be this year?
Alongside a special emphasis on technology, global crises, and trade and geoeconomics, this year’s discussions in Munich will center on three core themes: Germany’s global role under its new government, the growing importance of European defense, and strengthening transatlantic relations again.
Today, at the beginning of 2026, I find it impossible to define one overarching theme. There is now a growing tendency to stop distinguishing between democratic and authoritarian actors. The Trump administration doesn’t treat Russia—an authoritarian state with lots of repression—in a fundamentally different manner than the Trump administration deals with Ukraine when they negotiate. The distinction is beginning to disappear, which makes the world a less safe place for democracy.
It’s a slippery slope. A foreign policy only based on power and the pursuit of hardcore interests, while abandoning the values part, would be leading us in the wrong direction. The key question is: How can Europe work to restore a rules-based international order, which is now under severe strain? That’s something we’ll be discussing at this year’s MSC.
The interview was conducted by Martin Bialecki and Henning Hoff.
