Ambassador Heusgen, Germany’s new National Security Strategy was supposed be ready by February 17, the start of the Munich Security Conference. But now there appear to be delays. What sort of signal does this send out?
The most important thing is the substance of the document, not its date of publication. I don’'t think it’s necessarily a bad thing for the National Security Strategy to take some time to be ready. For me, this indicates that the German government is taking the whole process seriously, that it wants to present a document which actually makes sense and is meaningful for the whole country, maybe involving the federal states too.
What kind of document can we expect, with input from such a wide range of actors?
Of course, the more people that are involved, the greater the risk that the document gets watered down. It is right that the German Foreign Office is running the process. It has to draw conclusions in terms of the actual content of our foreign policy. The foreign ministry will also have to insist that the security strategy goes beyond descriptive statements, that it also answers structural questions.
The chancellery and the foreign ministry have something of a competitive relationship. What role does that play in the process?
The strategy has to have the backing of the entire federal government. The chancellery, where I worked for many years myself, does not have the staff to do the kind of large-scale work needed to draft a National Security Strategy. So, I think it makes perfect sense that it is being managed by the German Foreign Office.
You served as Angela Merkel’s foreign policy advisor for 12 years. Given that experience, what do you think that kind of document should contain?
It has to do two things in particular. First, it has to draw conclusions from the crime against civilization committed by Vladimir Putin when he launched his attack on Ukraine. In other words, it must draw conclusions based on the Zeitenwende, or “historical turning point,” recognized by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, above all regarding our future policies toward Russia, China, and the Global South. With this in mind, our strategy must define the goals and priorities toward which we want to focus resources. Second, we must answer the question of our structural and organizational position. I have been arguing for a National Security Council for many years now; in the past this has not come about, thanks to departmental rivalry. I also advocate a stronger link between the various instruments used in foreign policy, trade policy, development cooperation, security, and defense policy. That’s what a National Security Council will have to achieve.
Regarding an institutional home for the proposed National Security Council, the same question comes up: the chancellery or the foreign ministry?
There are a number of possibilities. Of course, the simplest solution would be to expand the existing Federal Security Council, turning it into a National Security Council. But you can also set up a new institution, maybe based on the US model, where the president’s National Security Advisor also chairs the National Security Council. Or you can do it like in the United Kingdom, where the National Security Council is an independent body located between Downing Street, the Ministry of Defense, and the Foreign Office, led by a Foreign Office official.
Along with Wolfgang Ischinger, your predecessor as chair of the MSC, you called for the merger of the German Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. That was in late 2021, in the run-up to the formation of the new government. Do you still hold to that position?
We are currently seeing a worldwide trend toward merging foreign, development, economic, and trade policy instruments. Canada, for example, has combined all three strands into a single ministry of global affairs. Our neighbor Belgium has merged its foreign and development ministries. So has Denmark, which now conceives of foreign and development policy as a single thing. They have a dual ministry, with two ministers in charge, so multi-party coalitions need have no fear of a shortage of ministerial posts. There’s no limit to the imagination. We just have to turn the much-discussed Zeitenwende into practical policy. We can’t say: We have come to a big turning point, and so we’ll just go on like before. We have in any case to make this turning point a reality and deal with its various policy dimensions, doing so in a networked way.
What other changes are needed, besides a mega-ministry and a National Security Council?
We have to internalize the idea that we live in times of global systemic competition. And we have to work out how to hold our own against a rogue state like Russia, which is plying its dreadful trade in Africa as well as in Ukraine. We also have to be able to hold our own against a country like China, which is now hyperactive around the world. We have to position ourselves properly for this. This has to happen in Berlin; but it also has to happen with our representation abroad. We must be able to gather our forces to act more coherently and effectively, for example bringing together all German representatives under a single roof, whether they are diplomats, development workers, business representatives, or financial investors.
Speaking of the Zeitenwende, Germany’s historical foreign policy shift: Today the consensus view is that it was a serious error to have such high levels of energy dependency on Russia. But hardly anyone seems to feel responsible for how it came about. What’s your take on this?
It’s always easy to point the finger in retrospect. Germany’s Russia policy has a long history, based on the experiences that we as Germany have had with Russia. Our point of reference was World War II, and the fact that Germany bears responsibility for the deaths of 20 million people on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Trust was built up during the phase of Ostpolitik, and that helped to bring about German reunification in 1989 and 1990. These feelings of guilt and gratitude were also involved in shaping Germany’s Russia policy.
In saying that, I am not looking to apologize, simply to explain. When Chancellor Angela Merkel took office, the contracts for the Nord Stream 1 pipeline had already been signed. Later, when it came to Nord Stream 2, the government had already decided to phase out nuclear energy more quickly, in keeping with the wishes of a good 80 percent of the population after the Fukushima reactor accident. Coal was not an option. Green energy sources would not be enough. That’s why natural gas was needed as a transitional energy. And which gas do you use? The cheapest gas available, from Russia. And there was an overall political constellation where the economy minister, German industry, and the state government in question were all in favor of building another pipeline. Given all that, it is understandable that the decision was made as it was. Nonetheless it was still the wrong decision.
But Germany’s historic debt to countries like Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland is even greater than the one it owes to Russia. And Russian gas was only cheap in theory...
That is correct. However, it is easier for us to take difficult decisions today because we took the diplomatic route after the first Russian aggression in 2014-15, we really tried everything to find a peaceful solution. On February 24, 2022, Putin deliberately left that path and began his war of aggression. And we had to react to that and support Ukraine to the best of our ability. The crimes of the Nazi era also oblige us to do so, above all the massacre in Babi Yar near Kyiv, where more than 30,000 Jewish Ukrainians were murdered over a single weekend.
Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, has been sharply criticized for acting too hesitantly, including by you. Can you understand the people who now have your job at the chancellery sometimes react with annoyance to this kind of criticism?
It would be surprising if criticism did not leave its mark, but, since you make the comparison: After the first Russian aggression in 2014, Germany took the lead, together with France. The Minsk agreement was reached under Franco-German leadership. It was possible at that time, working with the Ukrainians, to stop the Russian troops. But during the current crisis the German government has not taken the lead. Cooperation with France does not seem as smooth as it was eight years ago. It is true that the German government regularly makes claims about its European leadership role. But you are not taking a lead if you are always in last place and always doing the bare minimum, as we have recently seen with the decision on sending tanks to Ukraine.
Incidentally, it is great that the American government is so committed to Europe, especially given the many challenges the United States faces in the Indo-Pacific, for example. But we know that US governments that are not as pro-European could return to office at some future point. That is another reason why we in Europe really need to take on more of a leadership role, not just talk about it.
But that would also require Germany to have a “strategic culture,” often mentioned as something that the country lacks...
But a lot of things are already happening with that. Since the summer, the Munich Security Conference, we have been organizing a series of events called “Zeitenwende on Tour.” Along with various partners, we’ve been on the road, doing our German tour, so to speak: We’ve already done Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Mainz, Neuss, and Leipzig is coming up soon. We go to schools, and we hold town hall discussions with the people in these places. And our booth is overrun, there is enormous interest. At the same time—and in my opinion the government underestimates the German population on this—there is great willingness to support the consequences of the Zeitenwende. People understand that something dramatic has happened and they are ready to act in response. They just want it explained to them and they want their questions answered. To me, this shows that we are already seeing change in our strategic culture in Germany
We are expecting a trio of new strategy papers from the government: the National Security Strategy, a China strategy, as well as guidelines for a feminist foreign policy. Do you think these will fuel discussion of foreign policy even more? And how do these three documents fit together?
You’d have to ask the German government that. In my view, a security strategy without China cannot work. I don't understand how it is possible to do them in parallel. And unfortunately, I still do not understand what a “feminist foreign policy” is. I am in favor of a foreign policy which is massively committed to women and to gender equality. When I was German ambassador to the UN, tackling sexual violence in conflicts was high on the agenda. I think that is part of foreign policy, which is why I have a hard time with the adjective “feminist.” For me, it is the substance that counts, not the terminology.
What are the themes that will define this year’s Munich Security Conference?
One theme is very clear: Russia's invasion of Ukraine, entering its second year. What are the chances that the war and the suffering of the people will come to an end? Another topic will be Europe: How should we position ourselves? The transatlantic relationship is high on the agenda at every Munich Security Conference, and we are expecting a high-ranking US delegation.
In addition, we want to focus more closely on representatives of the Global South. Many of them have been reticent on how to deal with Russian aggression. They lean toward Russian and Chinese narratives, which claim that the war is an East-West conflict, between Russia and the United States or NATO, and that the Global South is suffering as a result. As a former UN ambassador, it is important for me to respond to this: This is not about East-West, it is about defending the United Nations Charter, defending the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, defending a rules-based international order. The international legal system has come under massive pressure as a result of the Russian attack on Ukraine, an attack which has no basis in international law. We have to share this perspective with the countries of the Global South, but at the same time we also have respond a lot more to their concerns. We need to listen a lot more and talk a lot more.
This is also important for another reason, which I alluded to at the beginning of this conversation. Our huge fixation on China is not healthy. Of course, China is an important trading partner, but we have to be clear about not becoming too dependent. We need to open up other markets, and countries in the Global South are ready to do that.
Another concern for us is that so many dictators and war criminals manage to go unpunished. How do we enforce international law? How do we prevent impunity? This serves to encourage peace in the long term, that’s another reason why it is important.
What are your criteria for a successful MSC?
A successful conference is one where we make progress on the issues I have raised, one which strengthens transatlantic and European cohesion. A successful conference is also one where we have close conversations with the Global South, not just as a one-off, but as a continuous, intensifying process. We want the MSC to make a contribution to that.
The interview was conducted, in German, by Henning Hoff, Joachim Staron, and Nikita Divekar. This is a translation. The original version can be found here.
Christoph Heusgen is chairman of the Munich Security Conference (MSC). He previously served as Chancellor Angela Merkel’s foreign policy advisor (2005-2017) and German ambassador to the United Nations (2017-2021).
