European integration has always centered around Germany and France, and the relationship between the two countries. The worst thing that can happen during US President Donald Trump’s second term is a falling-out between the two. This is why the whole of Europe is now watching the incoming German government closely. How Europe will fare in the Trump II era will depend to a large extent on what Germany does in the next few months and years. The best scenario for all concerned would be if Germany opts for a strong Europe, together with France.
This may sound emotional. But then, consider this. Trump has reserved a special place in hell for Germany. “The Germans are bad, very bad,” he once said, complaining about “the millions of cars they sell in the US” and “the vast sums of money they owe us for the powerful, and very expensive defense it provides to Germany.”
In fact, Trump wants Germany to become more like America. He wants it to become more militaristic, spending vast sums on defense (and US weapons). He intends to raise tariffs on EU imports, hitting Germany particularly hard and challenging Berlin to protect its companies. The country may well become more nationalistic in the process. And by undermining or leaving multilateral treaties and institutions, Trump is also destroying the main underpinning of the stable, postwar Germany we all know.
In other words: America is, under Trump, pushing Germany to behave more like a Machtstaat. The question is: Can the rest of Europe tolerate this? Can it live with this? The answer will determine not only Germany’s but also Europe’s future.
Containing Germany
The main focus of postwar peace in Europe was the containment of Germany. The essence of European integration was, and is, that Germany can never be dominant again on the continent, as such dominance has in the past often led to war with France. After World War II, both the EU and NATO have put the brakes on Germany—militarily, politically, and economically. After World War I, brakes were put in place, too. But these were installed by the winners, who treated Germans as losers, humiliating them. By way of frustrated response, the Germans began to turn their country into a terrible war machine once again.
After 1945, the approach was entirely different. This time, there were to be no winners or losers. All states participating in European integration became part of an economic system, strapped into the same corset of rules applicable to all. This way, political problems between European countries that had escalated so often in the past, leading to yet more wars, were now immediately turned into technical problems—with Brussels bureaucrats each time finding technical solutions for it, enabling governments to move on and keep engaging with each other on new issues.
For some European citizens, this technocratic governance melting political clashes into fishing quotas or chemical directives is hard to relate to. But for the rest, it is actually a brilliant system. Thanks to it, European states have managed to avoid wars for one of the longest consecutive periods in history.
The US as Great Protector
However, people sometimes forget that this system has been facilitated by the United States, right from the start. The fact that (West) European countries, in the early 1950s, could start focussing so intently on rebuilding their continent after three devastating Franco-German wars, on creating affluence and establishing welfare states, was only made possible by the fact that Washington completely took on the task of Europe’s defense.
For seven decades, during the Cold War and after, the US was Europe’s Great Protector. In this framework, the sensitive issue of Germany’s remilitarization hardly surfaced. A minimally militarized Germany suited the Americans (and the French!) very well. For Germans themselves, who are probably more afraid of German power than most other Europeans, it proved a godsend too. Under the American security umbrella, they had the chance to turn their country into an open, cosmopolitan, and friendly place no one need be afraid of. A country of engineers and carmakers reading Schöner Wohnen, the popular German interior design magazine which roughly translates “Living More Beautifully.”
Hanging in the Balance
Now, this entire postwar arrangement hangs in the balance. The US is tearing up the contract, right at the time when a mostly demilitarized Europe faces the biggest security challenge in decades with Russia’s war in Ukraine, which could easily spill over. President Donald Trump is placing conditions for military support for European countries on the size of their military budgets and their trade balance, among other things. He is basically bilateralizing American support for Europe. Poland is in. So is Estonia.
But for Germany, Trump seems less willing to be lenient. Despite all the German efforts in recent years, despite the Zeitenwende (Germany is Ukraine’s second biggest security sponsor, after the US), he considers it a “free rider.” And so, the country that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has instinctively run to Washington for protection—in exchange for buying American weapons and defending American positions in Europe and NATO—is now in a bind. Former President Joe Biden and Chancellor Olaf Scholz were close. Under Trump, Germany risks being bullied or dumped by its principal protector.
“Free riding has become an essential component of German national identity,” political analyst Hans Kundnani wrote in The Paradox of German Power. Today, many Europeans like to complain that Germany’s transformation from a pacifist “Wandel durch Handel” (“change through trade”) country with a weak army into a security and defense player is half-hearted and does not go fast enough. Of course, they are all having trouble adapting to a new, mercantilist world with great powers using Europe as a chess board.
More importantly, they easily forget that the European country currently going through the hardest Zeitenwende is Germany. Furthermore, if the transformation had actually gone faster in Germany, the criticism from other European quarters would probably have been even harsher. Think of the way former Chancellor Angela Merkel was depicted in Greek newspapers during the euro crisis a decade ago, when the main challenge was not yet military but still mainly financial and monetary: in a Nazi uniform.
It is during severe crises that one realizes the German problem at the root of European integration is still there—it is just contained. Today, some European countries are urging Germany to become stronger, yet others are uncomfortable with a strong Germany. It is damned if it does, and damned if it doesn’t. This permanent ambivalence toward Europe’s largest country is what makes it so hard for it to drastically change course, especially if the main challenge is of a military nature.
Opting for More Europe
The best way for Germany to make this transition—including militarily—without upsetting the delicate balance in Europe is to avoid going it alone and instead do it in a thoroughly European context, with others. In other words: Germany should opt for more Europe. In tandem with France, it should push for more integration and make Europe much stronger, including militarily. It is only in such an arrangement, safely embedded in a larger entity, that Germany can drive in the slipstream and not cause wider friction on the continent.
This is the main task for the next government in Berlin: Instead of pulling the brakes on Europe, it should invest in it with renewed zeal. It should further reduce dependance on Russian energy and throw its full weight behind a European energy union. It should encourage its companies to be more cautious with business deals in China and do more “friendshoring” in Europe. It should embrace the new European Commission’s “buy European” procurement proposals. It should increase military aid to Ukraine and embrace eurobonds (common European loans) so that the European weapons industry can develop. It should resist nationalist tendencies to close borders or protect its own companies, and stick to EU rules as much as possible. It should try to maintain good relations with the Trump administration, but not if that weakens Europe.
And finally, contrary to what has alas become common practice in many EU member states, it should explain to citizens why it is taking this course and make the case for the common European interest. The stronger Europe is—economically, politically, militarily, and even psychologically—the higher the chance that it can sail through this turbulent time in its history relatively unscathed. And a strong Europe is by far Germany’s best bet.
Caroline de Gruyter is Brussels correspondent for NRC, the Dutch daily newspaper.
