Early in the morning of August 18, at Munich airport, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz boarded a government jet bound for Washington, DC. His nervousness was palpable during the flight. He had no way of knowing what awaited him and other European government leaders in the US capital. The aim was to show support for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after the Alaska summit between US Presdident Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. But what if Zelensky were only about to be offered the terms of a dictated peace? What would the Europeans do? What would Merz do?
In the fall, a few weeks after this flight to Washington and after only a few months in office, the German chancellor drew a thick line under decades of German foreign policy. “We are witnessing the provisional end of a rules-based, multilateral order based on international law,” he told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung. He added: “We are in a phase in which the law of the strongest is being enforced in many places.” His words barely registered, even though he had abandoned a core tenet of German foreign policy up to then, namely that the rules-based multilateral order, though under pressure and in danger, was not yet lost. This doctrine is also found in the coalition agreement between Merz’ center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), which includes a commitment to “strengthen” multilateralism. However, the reality Merz found himself confronted with offered little scope for this.
He had been able to prepare for what he was about to face since February 2025, if not before. Zelensky’s unprecedented humiliation at the White House and the provocative speech by US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference shattered the illusion that, while Donald Trump's second term would once again challenge the Western world, it would not shake it to its core. Trump and Vance had shattered the protective space where German politics had nestled for decades. The new US National Security Strategy only confirmed that once more in black and white almost a year later. Now, of all people, it’s Friedrich Merz, long-time chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, a group that promotes Atlanticism and German-US understanding, who must confront this challenge: He is Germany’s first post-Atlantic chancellor.
The German political scientist Herfried Münkler has described what this means in his book “Macht im Umbruch” (“Power in Transition”). It’s no longer just about fostering Western ties. It will depend on Germany, as an economically, politically, and geographically irreplaceable power in Europe, whether and in what form “the ‘West’ will continue to exist,” he writes. So, the foreign policy responsibility of a German chancellor could not be greater.
In a keynote speech on foreign policy at the Körber Foundation in January 2025, Merz summed up this responsibility by saying Germany must transform itself from “a sleeping to a leading middle power.” To this end, he announced plans to expand the chancellery into a center for foreign and security policy analysis and decision-making. A National Security Council and a new culture of strategic thinking should enable Germany to assert itself in the global systemic conflict with authoritarian powers, he said.
It turned out to be a stroke of luck that Zelensky’s treatment in the Oval Office and Vance’s speech shook up German politics even before the new government was formed. This opened up the possibility of using the constitution-changing majority of the outgoing Bundestag to set up a debt-financed special fund of €500 billion for infrastructure and to lift the debt brake on defense spending. These decisions gave Merz the leeway to demonstrate decisive action once the Bundestag elected him chancellor and to regain the “lost trust” he had lamented.
More Support for Ukraine
This became particularly evident at the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025 when all allies committed to spending 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense and security from 2035 onwards, with 3.5 percent of GDP going to defense spending in the narrower sense and 1.5 percent to defense-related infrastructure. Without the amendments to Germany’s constitution months before, the summit would have “turned out very differently,” Merz admitted in an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung after the meeting.
The special fund and the decision on defense spending gave Merz leeway but did not automatically furnish him with authority. The new chancellor could only gain that by standing up—together with others—to the unpredictable US president on an issue of central importance to Europe. In Ukraine, “nothing less than the peace order of the European continent is at stake,” Merz said in his first government statement to parliament.
The first days of his chancellorship proved to be defining, both in good and bad ways. Merz showed he was willing to take the initiative. His joint trip to Kyiv with French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk fueled hopes for a ceasefire. In a conversation conducted on Macron’s cell phone, the four Europeans gained the impression that Trump was prepared to join them in putting pressure on Putin and supporting an ultimatum for a 30-day ceasefire. But this impression proved to be wishful thinking. Merz had made the rookie mistake of taking Trump’s words at face value. The occasionally successful, but never lastingly fruitful attempts to pull Trump onto Ukraine’s and therefore Europe’s side were to become a lasting challenge to his chancellorship.
In June, during his first visit to the Oval Office, Merz managed to perform the balancing act of humoring the president while speaking up when he disagreed with him. He contradicted Trump’s absurd comparison of Russia and Ukraine to children fighting and reminded him of Russia’s crimes against civilians. Merz benefited from Trump’s lingering dislike of the former German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and probably also from his experience in US business life. In any case, he succeeded in establishing a useful dialogue with the president—and, as his interlocutor, was actually able to assume European leadership.
When Trump rolled out the red carpet for Vladimir Putin in Anchorage on August 15, Merz recognized the need to act quickly. His chancellery was instrumental in organizing a trip within hours by European leaders including Merz, Macron, Starmer, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to show their support for President Zelensky, who had been summoned to Washington for a meeting following the Alaska summit. On his way to Washington, Merz could not be sure that he would not witness another humiliation of the Ukrainian president. But at that point, Zelensky was spared further humiliation; instead, he was given the vague prospect of security guarantees.
Once again, it was Merz who contradicted Trump’s absurd claim that a ceasefire could be skipped and a peace agreement negotiated immediately. The chancellor showed he could stand his ground in humiliating circumstances, a vital skill in the Trump era. Merz had his strongest foreign policy moments so far in these attempts to stand by Ukraine as it battles Russia’s invasion. However, neither Merz nor anyone else were able to permanently avert the danger that Trump would return to his original intention and force Ukraine into a dictated peace, as became apparent in November when the 28-point plan was announced. Overall, continuity has prevailed in Ukraine policy since the coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD took office. Merz has continued and intensified the considerable military support for Ukraine that his predecessor Olaf Scholz had finally provided after a hesitant start, without, however, delivering Taurus cruise missiles or at least using them as leverage, contrary to his pledge when he was opposition leader. The main difference has been that Merz was no longer able to operate in America's slipstream. Germany has in effect succeeded the US as Ukraine's most important ally, without remotely being able to replace it. Ukraine has remained dependent on US weapons (paid for by the Europeans) and US intelligence. Moreover, after 19 rounds of sanctions, the Europeans have largely exhausted their willingness and ability to increase pressure on Putin.
In December, as host of American-Ukrainian talks and a European solidarity meeting with President Zelensky at the chancellery, Merz achieved his greatest diplomatic success to date. According to the participants, Ukraine received the prospect of reliable security guarantees from the US and European NATO states, which would allegedly be similar to those of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. However, the pressure on Ukraine to renounce substantial parts of its territory in favor of the Russian aggressor remained undiminished. The Berlin meeting was followed by an EU summit that was hugely consequential for Ukraine’s future defense capabilities. A €90 billion interest-free loan was agreed to ensure Ukraine’s financial solvency. However, Merz failed in his push to use Russian state assets frozen in Europe for a “reparations loan.”
Thus, the German chancellor did not achieve his original goal of putting Ukraine in the strongest possible negotiating position. Merz and his foreign policy advisor Günter Sautter may have played a key role in the attempt by the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to mitigate conditions that were unacceptable from a European and Ukrainian perspective. But Europe remained on the back foot at all times. In the end, Merz had to content himself with averting the worst. The chancellor attributes this to failures in the early years of the war. These did happen. But Merz also disappointed the hopes he himself had raised.
Flashpoint Middle East
In the second flashpoint that has shaped his term so far, the Middle East, Merz has at no point been asked to play a leading or mediating role. Rather, his problem has been the extent to which he is prepared to maintain a position that deviates from the European mainstream, and to justify that position at home. In his Körber speech, Merz postulated that the concept of Israel’s security being part of Germany’s raison d’état (Staatsräson) would “once again be measured by deeds and not just words.” Unlike the practice during Olaf Scholz’s term in office, Israel would receive the weapons it needed to defend itself, he said.
In fact, it was Merz who then not only temporarily halted some arms deliveries, but also openly communicated this decision after Israel announced its intention to take Gaza City—as well as expressing doubts about still considering the security of Israel to be a part of German raison d’état. (During his visit to Israel in December, Merz would try to coin a new wording and call the German commitment to Israel “essential” to the Federal Republic). Weighing up the demands for resolute solidarity with the Jewish state voiced by large parts of his conservative bloc against the outrage in the international and German public over the severity of Israel’s military operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which had claimed many civilian casualties, Merz finally decided to distance himself clearly from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he had previously praised for doing the “dirty work” of destroying Iranian nuclear facilities.
In doing so, Merz exposed himself to sharp criticism from his own ranks and at the same time revealed the limits of German policy in the Middle East. In Europe, the existing rifts over the Middle East have rendered attempts to “lead” unnecessary. Meanwhile, German hopes of being able to influence Israeli policy in its capacity as a reliable partner have largely been dashed. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul’s numerous trips to the region yielded few results, which led him to express his frustration openly.
The Limits of Political Unity
With his clear criticism of Israel’s conduct of the war, Wadephul came under pressure from within the CDU/CSU, which in turn revealed cracks in the “unified foreign policy” postulated by Merz when he took office. Wadephul is the first Christian Democrat to head the foreign ministry since Gerhard Schröder in 1966 (not to be confused with the later SPD chancellor of the same name). The idea that this would eliminate the traditional rivalry between the foreign ministry and the chancellery or permit something resembling a monolithic foreign policy has proved to be a fallacy. Foreign ministers tend to pay less attention to domestic political sensitivities; that’s in the nature of their office.
This became apparent during a visit by Wadephul to a war-ravaged suburb of Damascus when he referred to the fragile situation in Syria and expressed doubts that Syrians would return from Germany to these ruins in the near future. The resulting outrage among parts of the CDU/CSU over his alleged undermining of its restrictive migration policy made Merz realize the disadvantages of his desire for a “unified foreign policy.” Effective foreign policy does not always require speaking with one voice; sometimes different messages are needed for different audiences. Thus, the conventional division of labor between the larger coalition partner (which provides the chancellor) and the smaller coalition partner (which provides the foreign minister) had practical advantages.
Merz has made the first structural change with the inaugural meeting of the new National Security Council (Nationaler Sicherheitsrat, or NSR) on November 5. The NSR, which essentially has the same members as the previous Federal Security Council, meets in secret. The only announcement after the first meeting was a decision on an interministerial action plan to defend against hybrid threats.
The NSR met again after the 28-point plan on Ukraine became public. With a small staff led by the head of the chancellor’s office, Jacob Schrot, the NSR is intended to help ensure a faster and more coordinated crisis response; however, it will initially have little impact on the accustomed procedures in foreign and security policy, which are determined by the principle of departmental responsibility. With its modest resources, the NSR is at best a seedbed for a new strategic culture, which is unlikely to be a priority at the moment.
Little Time for Fundamental Change
Merz has been kept busy with crisis management during his first months in office. This is one of the reasons why his foreign policy engagements have rarely taken him beyond Europe and the United States. He was absent from the UN General Assembly, even though Germany is running for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 2027/28. Apart from trips to Brazil for a preliminary meeting of the Climate Change Conference and to southern Africa for the G20 summit and the EU-Africa summit, Merz has had little opportunity, at least up until the end of 2025, to live up to the claim of being a “leading” European middle power on the global stage.
His public mockery of Belém, the venue for the climate conference, proved unhelpful. Planned trips to India and China were delayed. In relations with the Chinese leadership, there is no sign of the self-confident policy Merz had pledged, either in practice or in terms of a new strategy, after the postponement of his foreign minister’s trip to China and after a high-level visit by Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, the leader of the SPD, in November. Instead, the federal government has been busy coming to terms with the alarming extent of its dependence in supply chains and rare earths.
In Europe, Merz has succeeded in restoring trust particularly in areas where his predecessor failed to meet the communicative and interpersonal requirements of the office—for example, in his relationship with the French president. While Scholz tended to underestimate this human dimension, Merz has in some cases overestimated it. The notion that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who was under domestic political pressure, would overlook the tightened regime of checks at the German-Polish border in his delight at the arrival of the new chancellor proved to be unrealistic.
In terms of European policy, apart from organizing a digital summit with Macron, Merz has mainly made his mark as a fighter against the “bureaucratic monster” Brussels. He initiated a letter from 20 heads of state and government to European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen with demands to slash overregulation. It didn’t exactly require heroic European political courage.
A leaner, less bureaucratic EU is desirable, but doesn’t top the list of challenges vital to the bloc’s survival at this turning point in history. It is striking that Merz avoids issues he had raised when he was opposition leader, such as a European nuclear umbrella. Merz has joined Macron in calling for European sovereignty but has so far failed to put forward any fundamental proposals of his own on the future of the EU or the West. This is understandable given the urgency of foreign policy crisis management, especially as he faces political turbulence at home as well.
But it shows the chancellor is at risk of failing to achieve the goals that he himself formulated. Merz is preoccupied with keeping his head above water. There’s no land in sight.—translated from the German by David Crossland
Daniel Brössler is senior editor at the Berlin parliamentary bureau of Süddeutsche Zeitung. He previously worked as a correspondent in Bratislava, Warsaw, Moscow, and Brussels.
