Ahead of Donald Trump’s second term as president of the United States, there was a real danger that European Union member states would seek to strengthen bilateral relations with the US rather than focus on a common strategy. A proverbial beauty contest could have been the result, with each individual EU member state attempting to flatter Trump at the expense of the others. Such a disarray would have dealt a severe blow to the EU’s power, as well to wider Europe’s overall global standing relative to other powers. Some commentators, such as Josef Janning in his article for Internationale Politik Quarterly, predicted impending doom, even Europe’s total collapse. “Wake-up call” was the word of the month.
However, the beauty contest scenario has not materialized. Two months after Trump took office, Europe stands more united than at any time since the end of the Cold War. European leaders agree that what is needed now is more Europe. The added value of the European Union is clearer to its citizens than it has been in many years. Moreover, the EU’s growing appeal extends beyond its borders: the United Kingdom and the EU are negotiating a comprehensive security and defense partnership, and nearly half of all Canadians would like to join the EU.
Europe has President Trump and Vice President JD Vance to thank for the “rally round the flag” effect. Luckily, the Trump administration seems to lack any understanding of how Europe works. In particular, the US Vice President’s miscalculation to deliver a speech that many Europeans considered offensive, in Munich of all places, backfired. It spurred on an unprecedented European consensus—against the United States. But it is Trump’s Ukraine policy that has proved to be the most serious affront against Europe.
The White House may have expected that, if presented with a choice between Ukraine and the United States, Europe would prioritize the transatlantic relationship without a question. But on the contrary, Europe has clearly signalled that it will not give up on Ukraine. And this applies beyond Europe, too. Other US allies such as Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have been participating in European meetings on Ukraine strategy, including in a forum of high-ranking military officers in Paris in mid-March. Trump has managed not only to unite Europe against him, but a wider “Europe+” too.
Trump, Vance, and their Make America Great Again supporters appear to believe their own narratives about Europe as decadent and fundamentally unable to act on its own. Thus, Trump’s policies are achieving the opposite of what he intended or are having unintended consequences—in a charitable interpretation of what his intensions may be. Instead of America, he is making Europe great again. In the worst case scenario for Trump, an emancipated Europe comes at the expense of US global power. Trump has made three key errors which may end up derailing his plans:
Ukraine Has Become an Essential Part of Europe
First, Ukraine’s position in Europe has changed radically since Russia launched its full-scale war of aggression. If the so-called “Ukraine crisis” after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014 was considered a peripheral problem, now Ukraine is perceived as central to European security. The shift in perception is the result of three years of full-scale war. Even in 2022, the idea of Ukraine as part of Europe was not yet widespread. Still today, not all European countries share the same sense of urgency in their support for Ukraine. But a broad consensus has emerged over the past three years—the recognition that simply abandoning Ukraine would put all of Europe in grave danger. Always its own worst advocate, Russia’s hybrid warfare has been a key element in solidifying this threat perception.
Ukraine’s insider status was institutionalized by upgrading it to an EU candidate country and opening the accession process a few months after the 2022 Russian invasion. This important step closer to EU membership enabled Ukraine to escape the gray zone between the EU and what Russia defines as its sphere of interest. Although arguably a low-hanging fruit from the EU’s perspective, the decision to grant candidate status meant in practice that EU enlargement has moved from a technocratic and market economy logic to a geopolitical one.
Moreover, Ukraine itself has made sure that its candidate status will not remain an empty promise. In spite of the war, Ukraine has already made solid progress in the reforms necessary for EU accession, so much so that European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen optimistically estimates that Ukraine could become an EU member before 2030, if reforms continue apace. The war has changed the cost-benefit calculation of Ukraine’s EU accession, not only for the EU but also for Ukraine itself. Reforms are now progressing also in areas that had previously proved resistant, including the judicial system, the fight against corruption, and gender equality.
Europe Can Act Decisively, but Only if It Has to
Second, Winston Churchill once famously said that the United States will always do the right thing, but only after first exhausting all other options. The same applies in slightly modified form, to Europe. The European Union always manages to find a consensus in the end, but only after first working its way through every possible disagreement.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that a 100 percent consensus is rarely realistic. The EU is currently working on ways to circumvent the usual veto player suspects, mainly Hungary and recently also Slovakia. The aim is to reduce the potential of a small number of spoilers to stall aid packages to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. For example, support for Ukraine has been moved into a voluntary coalition of the willing, which allows EU countries to work around the usual unanimous decision-making. It deprives Hungary of its veto power and ultimately renders the spoilers irrelevant in the decision-making process.
The power of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán should not be overestimated. Hungary possesses no significant economic or military strength; Orbán’s only way to exert influence beyond Hungary’s borders is through his veto at the EU level. Moreover, Orbán is well aware of the limits of his power: despite initial stalling attempts, Hungary agreed to extend sanctions on Russia just in time for the third anniversary of Moscow’s war of aggression.
It would be wrong to conclude from the vetoes applied by some member states that Europe has failed, or that it will fail. The EU functions to a degree through peer pressure, which can enforce a learning process even on reluctant member states. One such crucial development with regard to Ukraine has been the transformation in Germany and France, the architects of the failed Minsk process.
French President Emmanuel Macron has undergone an impressive learning curve: whereas in 2022 he was suggesting offering Putin an off-ramp, in 2024 he was leading the debate on deploying European troops to Ukraine—now increasingly likely becoming a reality. Olaf Scholz, the outgoing German chancellor, has proven less capable of adapting his thinking, sticking consistently to his notion of “prudence” that has caused many delays when it came to taking decisions on military support for Ukraine. However, peer pressure, especially from Germany’s traditional northeastern European allies, has kept Germany on the right track. The pro-Ukrainian narrative has become so mainstream that even Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has adopted a very pro-Ukrainian stance, and Eurobarometer surveys regularly suggest that the Portugese are more supportive of Ukraine than even the Estonians.
Antagonism Is Not Good for Alliances
Third, the Trump administration has unleashed a new dynamic within Europe. Washington’s hostile moves—like the repeated threats to annex Greenland, if necessary by force—have alienated loyal allies like Denmark. The Netherlands—another traditionally close US ally—is working on developing European alternatives for US-dominated payment infrastructure, seeking to become more independent of the United States in the financial and digital sectors. The incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz, a lifelong transatlanticist, went through a Gaullist U-turn, calling on Europe to achieve not only strategic autonomy but independence.
Even on the political right, Trump’s policies and the actions of his inner circle have received mixed reviews. Jordan Bardella, chair of the far-right Rassemblement National party in France, canceled his speech at the annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), after Steve Bannon’s Nazi salute. Christian Tjybing-Gjedde, a Norwegian right-wing populist politician, who twice nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, has now changed his mind due to Trump’s apparent intention to abandon Ukraine.
As the security situation in Europe has deteriorated in the wake of the Trump administration’s open hostility toward Europe and in particular toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, even the euroskeptic Sweden Democrats are calling for more EU. And if Trump’s right-hand man Elon Musk thought that his campaign to support the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) would help them win the elections and form the new German government, he has fundamentally misunderstood European coalition politics.
Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence for the United States is that Europe is now zealously working to implement the numerous American demands. In February 2025, on his first visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recited a long wishlist, including that Europe assume full responsibility for its own security, invest in the continent’s defense, and build an efficient European defense industrial base. Europe is now working on all these issues, with the EU currently haggling over the details of the recently adopted “Readiness 2030” initiative.
Among other things, this will include a relaxation of EU fiscal rules and large EU-backed loans for defense investment. There is a consensus that Europe must build up its military capacity as quickly as possible, given the real danger that the US may not merely turn its back on Europe, but that it could even act against European interests. In classic European style, however, negotiations on how best to reach this goal are far from complete. In particular, controversy still surrounds the possibility of using “eurobonds” for defense financing.
Reasons to be Europtimist
Decision-making in Europe will probably never be as efficient as in the United States, as Europe is unlikely to become a United States of Europe with the efficiency of a presidential system. But given the breathtaking speed with which President Trump is destroying democracy and the rule of law in the US, along with the world economy and the US global alliance structure, this might actually turn out to be an advantage. With their infinitely complex balancing mechanisms and consensus-building processes, institutions in Europe cannot be hijacked overnight the same way that Trump and Musk have succeeded in the United States.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has shifted the power dynamics in Europe. Domestic political turmoil in the three major European states Germany, France, and the United Kingdom has made them incapable of decisive and convincing leadership. But smaller European states have stepped up, taking the lead on the support for Ukraine.
For instance, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), along with the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have formed an increasingly cohesive group. This so-called NB8 group is among Ukraine’s top supporters, both in absolute terms and as share of GDP. Denmark, led by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, is playing a particularly outsized role: Copenhagen has provided Ukraine with almost €8 billion in military support. Together with the Netherlands, Denmark was the driving force behind the much-disputed F-16 fighter jet coalition for Ukraine. The Czech Republic, for its part, has launched and is taking the lead in already the second round of an ammunition procurement initiative for Ukraine. Not even Macron dares to exclude the smaller European states from key meetings anymore.
At the same time, the Franco-German tandem is becoming less relevant for European consensus-building. This opens up space for other large countries like Poland and Italy to enter the center stage of European power. Leadership is now distributed in a more fair way in Europe, but it has also become more diffuse. The crucial, decisive question will be whether Europe will be quick enough to adapt to and work with this new, more diffuse leadership structure.
The idea of a federal Europe—touted as a silver bullet to most of the EU’s problems, especially among pro-European Germans—is not a realistic solution in the current situation. Brexit cannot be easily reversed, and Norway does not yet seem ready to join the EU. Canada has deep cultural affinity with Europe, but its location will likely raise a question about Europe’s geographical borders. Thus the answer to the current challenges must be a “Europe+”: encompassing all of Europe and reaching well beyond it, including the European Union, but not limited to it.
What Europe urgently needs is a healthy dose of self-confidence and faith in its ability to overcome the challenges. After all, there is no logical reason why Europe should not succeed. Europe has enough resources to provide its own defense and to keep supporting Ukraine, too. The political consensus is in place. European citizens expect bold action. The only limitation to Europe’s success is our own imagination.
Minna Ålander is an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Europe Program and a non-resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis’ (CEPA) Transatlantic Defense and Security Program.
