Conflict and crises in one part of the world often ripple across the globe. During the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions in East Asia halted production in Europe. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has shaken global food and energy security, driving up inflation and undermining development. Similarly, Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack and Israel’s war in Gaza have mobilized public opinion around the world, with protesters (and governments) accusing the West of double standards. Despite all the talk of de-globalization, the world remains deeply interconnected.
Does this interconnectedness mean the world has become a single stage for great power rivalries? Certainly, geopolitical competition is now unfolding on a global scale. For example, through weapons supplies and troop deployments, the two Koreas are effectively facing off against each other European soil, with North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian ones and South Korea having emerged as an important provider of military aid to Ukraine. This, in turn, is exacerbating instability on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, Beijing is actively forging partnerships across regions, from its involvement in the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to its “unlimited friendship” with Moscow.
From Washington’s perspective, half a dozen revisionist powers appear to be challenging the United States’ hegemony in several regions at once. The US, in turn, is bringing its allies in Asia and Europe closer together through trilateral agreements: with Japan and South Korea (JAROKUS), Japan and the Philippines (JAROPUS), and Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS). Advocates for a “Global NATO” subscribe to the vision of a world as a unified theater for geopolitical strategy.
A Hierarchy of Interests
However, this “one theater world” concept overlooks the strategic interests of both major and minor powers. While it is true that great powers are vying for influence in every region around the globe, this engagement is not uniform, as there is a hierarchy of interests. For China and Russia, securing their positions within their respective home regions takes precedence over engagement in distant theaters. Many Europeans do not want to decouple from China economically, expand NATO globally, or intervene militarily in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
US allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea, despite their strong support for Ukraine, are focusing their attention and resources on the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, India seeks to prevent its development from being derailed by any entanglement in foreign wars. This sentiment resonates strongly with other countries from the Global South, which are seeking to avoid taking sides in the great power contests of the Global North. And having to deal with two hot wars and the potential for a third one, the Trump administration may also adhere to a hierarchy of interests across different regions and layer its engagement accordingly.
Taking this hierarchy of interests into account, what will be the main theaters of great power contestation after the end of Pax Americana? By definition, a major theater for great power contestation involves: a challenge to US hegemony in the region; the potential for a war with spillover effects extending far beyond the immediate region; the involvement of non-resident major powers in a conflict, even if they are not direct protagonists; and at least one nuclear power perceiving its core interests to be so threatened that it would consider the existential risk of using nuclear weapons. Three theaters match these criteria: Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.
Three Interconnected. Theaters
In Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stated goals include challenging US hegemony in the region and opposing the US-led world order. Russia has repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons, affecting the strategic calculus of all involved powers. The war has reverberated around the globe, with non-regional countries involving themselves in a war in Europe for the first time. China, Iran and North Korea are supporting Russia, while Australian, Japan, and South Korea are aiding Ukraine. Also, China, Turkey, Indonesia, and a team of seven African states have proposed peace plans or offered to host negotiations.
Even if the war in Ukraine is settled or frozen, potential new conflicts in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, or Moldova could further intensify the antagonism between the West and Russia, with some experts even expecting Russia to move against the Baltic countries. Europe appears poised to remain a key theater of geopolitical competition.
In the Middle East, Iran, though much weakened, is challenging US hegemony. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are vying for influence. With ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, the region remains highly volatile. Israel, an undeclared nuclear power, would only use nuclear weapons if its existence were threatened. However, an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities could push Iran over the nuclear threshold and escalate the conflict between these two regional powers into a full-blown war. Iranian retaliation, possibly targeting Gulf oil facilities, could trigger a major energy crisis with effects felt around the world.
How Russia will maintain its influence in the region after the fall of Syria remains to be seen. China’s mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia to convince both to reestablish diplomatic relations, as well as the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia in the BRICS, has highlighted Beijing’s growing influence in the region. India is similarly building strong partnerships with Iran, Israel, and the Gulf states. With so many stakeholders in a potentially escalating regional war, the Middle East is set to remain a major theater of geopolitical competition.
By comparison, East Asia remains relatively stable. However, the region is the primary theater of the struggle for regional and global hegemony between China and the United States. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula or accidents in the East and South China Seas could easily spiral out of control.
The main area of contestation is the Taiwan Strait, where the American and Chinese tectonic plates meet. Beijing, feeling encircled, is seeking to break through the First Island Chain into the strategic depth of the Pacific. The US and its allies are interpreting China’s assertiveness as the aggressive moves of a military peer into the Pacific—the first time this has happened since Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Insecurities on both sides are creating a classic security dilemma. Despite reservations, a war over Taiwan would likely draw in US allies such as Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea. North Korea could seize the opportunity to open a second front on the Korean Peninsula, and Russia is unlikely to stand on the sidelines. In the event of a blockade of the Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia might be forced to choose sides despite their preference to remain neutral.
The Dangers of a Hot War
A blockade or a hot war in the region would severely disrupt critical global supply chains. European allies of the US would face significant pressure to align. Unlike Europe and the Middle East, where the US and China advocate for nuclear restraint, in East Asia the core interests of both superpowers are at stake to such an extent that a nuclear incident cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, North Korea has frequently threatened the use of nuclear weapons.
With stakes this high, major powers may be inclined to avoid escalating conflicts into a hot war. If East Asia becomes the primary theater of a new Cold War, it may experience a stability similar to that of Europe during the previous one, while other regions could become more susceptible to proxy wars. In that case, great power competition in East Asia could primarily unfold on the geoeconomic battlefield. Then again, a major conflagration around Taiwan would be very difficult to contain and could escalate into a regional or even a world war.
Could there be a fourth theater? Geopolitical competition in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia and the South Pacific has intensified but seems unlikely to draw the same level of great power commitment as the three main theaters discussed above.
South Asia, with three nuclear powers—India, Pakistan, and China—neighboring each other, may qualify as a fourth theater. Recent skirmishes between India and China in the Himalayas highlight the persistent mistrust between the two SCO and BRICS partners. However, Beijing and Delhi do not challenge each other’s core interests, so a full-blown war is unlikely. In contrast, a war between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan can never be ruled out, given their historic antagonism. A conflict in South Asia is unlikely to generate spill-over effects to other regions, however, or garner significant support or involvement from non-resident powers. Despite the substantial interest in a market of two billion people at the crossroads between East and West, the direct engagement of China, Russia, the United States, and European states in the region remains limited, making South Asia a secondary theater.
Navigating New Geopolitics
Russia has actively sought to exploit the dynamics of a three-theater chessboard, aiming to divert Western attention away from Ukraine. Moscow’s new closeness with Pyongyang, however, has seriously irritated Beijing. Recent setbacks in Mali and Syria suggest Moscow is punching above its weight. In fact, it was Russian and Iranian entanglement in their respective wars that opened a window for the Turkish-backed militia to topple the Assad regime.
Mirroring the Russian setback in Syria, a full-scale war between Israel and Iran would have serious and immediate implications for US support for Ukraine. Europeans must understand that trade-offs between the European, Middle Eastern, and East Asian theaters will shape their strategic environment as much as battlefield outcomes do. For instance, the United States' strategic focus on competition with China will create significant pressure to shift the burden for European security onto European shoulders. And Europe is likely to lack the resources needed to project hard power beyond its own theater. As a result, the Europeans have already begun to downplay the commitments outlined in their Indo-Pacific strategies.
Across the Indo-Pacific, US allies must reckon with the strategic consequences of American involvement in two hot wars in Europe and the Middle East. Even a superpower’s resources are too limited to fully sustain a third major war in East Asia. The fear of abandonment in Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra echoes similar anxieties in Berlin, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh.
The US Remains Top
The United States remains indispensable as an “offshore balancer” in every major theater. This suggests that, despite perceptions of relative decline, the US continues to occupy a top position in the global hierarchy of powers. However, whether Washington chooses to leverage this position depends on the outcome of the ongoing debate among “primacists,” “prioritizers,” and “isolationists.” Trump’s recent antics, suggesting the addition of Greenland, Panama, and even Canada to the United States, hint at a nationalist, expansionist stance reminiscent of a revived Monroe Doctrine .It remains uncertain which of these groups will influence the direction of the Trump administration the most.
Either way, Washington must recognize that the majority of its allies and partners do not support a one-theater strategy but instead prioritize their immediate interests within their respective home regions. Moreover, as with the administration of US President Joe Biden before it, the Trump administration must be careful to avoid overextending US resources—a trap adversaries would eagerly exploit to weaken American influence.
Finally, with the electorate increasingly opposed to “forever wars,” Washington will need to allocate greater resources toward rebuilding the American heartland. Given these structural constraints on resources and the lack of willingness or ability among key allies to shoulder a larger share of the burden in maintaining US primacy, the temptation to cut deals at the expense of allies is likely to grow.
China has invested heavily—both financially and politically in Europe and the Middle East, aiming to establish itself as a major influence in both regions while striving to remain above direct involvement in conflicts. However, European appeals for Beijing to moderate Moscow’s behavior and American calls for it to leverage its influence in Tehran to rein in Iranian proxies suggest that China cannot have its cake and eat it.
Most states in the Global South are unwilling to compromise their development by becoming entangled in the war in Europe. As Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar remarked, “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems.” In other words, the Europeans should manage their own conflicts, just as the rest of the world manages theirs. This suggests that the days when the West could rally the world to its causes are over.
Similarly, few are buying into the Russian narrative, either. Whether hedging and balancing are sufficient to avoid choosing sides while pursuing national interests remains to be seen. Global geopolitical competition—and the trade-offs between the three theaters of contestation—are potentially reshaping the security and development structures of smaller states. The recent conflicts in Georgia and Syria illustrate this point.
Strategic Narrative Rethink
The reality of a three-theater world also requires rethinking strategic narratives. In the Indo-Pacific framework, India is often viewed as a counterweight to China. However, India lacks both the capacity and the political will to play a significant role in East Asia. While a substantial deployment of Indian troops on China’s western flank would certainly complicate Beijing’s calculations, Delhi would likely refrain from involvement in a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
This does not necessarily diminish the value of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) which brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, but it does suggest an interpretation of this collaboration that aligns more closely with Delhi’s perspective than with Washington’s. This difference in strategic outlook may explain why the Indo-Pacific concept holds less appeal beyond the “Global West.”
Similar grand strategy questions arise when considering Southeast Asia. The prevailing view in Washington is that as long as Indonesia and Vietnam counterbalance China, the rest of Southeast Asia can remain on the sidelines, without the region falling prey to hegemonic designs. However, despite its own territorial claims, the new government of President Prabowo Subianto in Jakarta is showing little inclination to check Beijing’s ambitions in the South China Sea. In general, Southeast Asians want the United States to remain committed to the region without causing major disruptions. They are concerned about isolationist tendencies in Washington but are also hesitant to align with the primacist strategists, In other words, Southeast Asians will go to great lengths to avoid choosing between their primary economic partner (China) and their main security provider (the United States).
Multi-alignment Strategies
Both India and Indonesia are pursuing multi-alignment strategies, with ambitions extending beyond their home regions, while trying to avoid the flashpoints of global US-China competition. Yet, can a power truly aspire to be a global player if it is unable to foster common prosperity or at least stability in its own backyard?
If the answer is no, this also challenges a broad interpretation of the concept of multipolarity. Indeed, several powers—Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia—are leveraging cracks in the international order to make a bid for regional hegemony. However, a country that neither plays a major role in the three key theaters nor acts as a benign hegemon in its own region cannot reasonably aspire to be a pole in a multipolar world.
This is also reflected in the diverse power constellations across the three main theaters. Only the Middle East can be described—albeit with some qualifications—as a multipolar constellation. In contrast, both Europe and East Asia feature bipolar orders: the US and its allies on one side, and Russia or China, respectively, on the other. This suggests that creating an equilibrium, and thus stabilizing these bipolar regions, is more feasible, while the Middle East is more likely to remain unstable.
Managing Competition
The existence of three primary theaters of great power contestation—with hot wars raging in two and the possibility of conflict in the third—marks the end of Pax Americana; the costs of upholding it are prohibitive. Combined with democratic and fiscal constraints in the United States, a three-theater world poses a formidable challenge to American primacy. A strategic shift from winning to managing great power competition would align more closely with the general instincts of the Trump II administration, and the outlook of America’s anxious allies and partners.
After the collapse of the liberal world order, Europe must recalibrate its geopolitical posture to navigate a world driven by hard power. Rigidly dividing the world into democratic and autocratic states is an obstacle to effective strategy. The EU’s current values-based foreign policy, and that of a number of European countries, should give way to a realist approach that recognizes the limits of Europe’s own capabilities. Rather than expending resources on security engagements in distant regions like the Indo-Pacific, where the EU’s core interests are not directly at stake, the Europeans should focus on safeguarding their own continent and stabilizing Europe’s volatile neighborhood. Success will hinge on the EU’s ability to forge strategic partnerships based on shared interests rather than ideological alignments.
Marc Saxer coordinates the Asia-Pacific work of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on geopolitics, geoeconomics, and world order.
