It’s entirely a cliché to say that the world is at an inflection point. Far too many moments that seem historically significant pale in eventual memory, while the significance of others may not be fully recognized at the time. It is clear, however, that the international system is undergoing a period of profound change, of the kind that happens only every 50 to 100 years—in this case, the transition from the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” of American military and economic predominance to a more contested and unbalanced multipolar world.
The key feature that makes this emerging world different from the past 30 years—and indeed, different from the past 80 years—is that power is increasingly held more widely, by a variety of states in different regions. The emerging world is not bipolar: The United States and China are ahead of their competitors, but by far less than their Cold War counterparts were. Today, China and the United States together make up only 42 percent of the global economy measured in GDP; in 1950, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Western Europe accounted for 88 percent of that figure.
Much of this missing power is increasingly held by “middle states.” They are regional powers that possess some significant economic, demographic, technological, or latent military power. These are a varied set of countries, from Germany and France to Japan, Iran, Turkey, Brazil, and India. Though they are not “superpowers”—and each would struggle to go toe-to-toe with the United States or China—each of them nonetheless possesses some ability to challenge the superpowers, and to shape political and economic outcomes within their home region.
And while much attention has focused lately on the Global South or the BRICS states, middle powers are also emerging from the ranks of industrialized states in the global north, where America’s Asian and European allies are poised to become more significant players. In part, this is a curious biproduct of the United States’ overwhelming military and economic power during the post-Cold War moment: Many US allies have the economic, demographic, or technological basis to be major powers, but have had their military capabilities artificially suppressed over time by their reliance on the US military.
As the United States transitions from global hegemony to a more focused, prioritized global strategy—encouraging burden-shifting among its allies—these states will become more significant players, particularly in military terms.
Rising Allies
Nowhere is this dynamic more visible than in Germany, where both the threat of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the growing prospect of US retrenchment have prompted a major public debate on defense spending, rearmament, and even future conscription.
Despite some noises about fears from Germany’s neighbors, this debate is not about the legacies of World War II, nor a reflection of any latent pacifist inclinations among the German population. Indeed, unlike America’s other post-war enemy-turned-ally, Japan, Germany has not been a militarily neutered power since the World War II. West German military power was an essential component of NATO during the Cold War, providing as much as 50 percent of the alliance’s land power assets by the 1980s. Though Germans may have a conflicted moral relationship with their own military power and history, it’s a relationship that has been openly discussed in German society since the 1950s.
Instead, today’s German debates are first and foremost about spending and capabilities, and second about the institutional and legal frameworks within which those capabilities should be deployed. When it comes to spending, it is unfortunately true that during the post-Cold War period, Germany’s significant military capabilities were allowed to decline to near insignificance. Few threats remained after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the continued US presence was sufficient to manage regional contingencies in the Balkans and elsewhere. In 1989, Germany had a military of over 500,000, and spent 2.8 percent of GDP on defense; by 2004, its military was half that size and defense spending only 1.4 percent of GDP.
In the context of this stunning military atrophy, overcoming political obstacles to spending are not enough. The steps that have already been taken in the last few years are undoubtedly significant, particularly lifting the constitutional “debt brake” and committing Germany to 3.5 percent of GDP core defense spending as soon as 2029. But to be effective, this money will need to be effectively channeled into rapid rearmament and growth of the military via a limited existing defense-industrial base. Policymakers will need to carefully consider where they will be able to build domestic capacities, where they can work with European partners, and where they may need to buy off-the-shelf capabilities from outside parties.
The institutional question is equally pressing. During much of the Cold War period, German military power was enshrined within the construct of NATO, largely managed by US military planners and decision-makers. Indeed, one of the ways in which German society was able to overcome an aversion to rearmament was to create distance between its own policymakers and military decision-making. Even during the post-Cold War period, Germany foreign policy remained contained within a broader set of European and transatlantic institutions that often removed German policymakers from prime mover status, delegating decision-making to Washington, Brussels, or simply to “consensus” among European states.
American retrenchment suggests that Germany’s time as a mere adjunct to US power is fading and offers the prospect of a more independent German role as a middle power, with significant influence in both military and economic terms.
German power is likely to remain constrained by Berlin’s preference for Europeanized and communal decision-making. Yet, this is a double-edged sword. Germany’s economic power and influence globally is enhanced because it is embedded within the European Union. As Europe’s predominant economic power, Berlin itself carries substantial weight in EU economic policymaking. One might argue that in economic terms, Germany is only somewhat “constrained” by the consensus requirements of European economic policymaking; its own power is then bolstered by its role in the broader European economy.
As German military power grows, German influence over its most important peers in Europe—the United Kingdom, France, Poland, and perhaps Italy—will likewise grow, giving Berlin both the benefit of significant influence over joint European-level policies, and the added influence that comes from the consensus of working with other European states. In the military context, this will be more shaped by bilateral and minilateral agreements with key states—as opposed to the EU role in economic policymaking—but the results will likely look similar. Germany’s use of force will be shaped by self-interest, but that self-interest will continue to be mediated through discussion about broader European interests.
Triangulation
As Germany’s military power grows and it becomes less constrained in coming years, German policymakers will need to carefully balance three specific relationships.
The first of these is a rethought transatlantic relationship. Though it will be tempting for Europeans more broadly to see American retrenchment as a betrayal, the United States remains an important partner for Europe, even if it ceases to be the continent’s primary defense provider. Over time, this will hopefully become a more equal relationship, of the kind that Elbridge Colby, US President Donald Trump’s Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, recently described as “partnership, not dependency” at a NATO ministerial meeting.
There are ample reasons to do so. The United States continues to share values with Europe, is undergoing many of the same difficult political debates—from the role of the state in regulating technology to the extent of acceptable migration—and continues to share a common interest in stability and ensuring that both American and European economies, which are highly interlinked, continue to grow and prosper.
Secondly, Berlin will need to build a more sustainable and stable relationship with Beijing. Though the United States and Germany share an interest in resisting Chinese economic coercion and hegemony, their relations with China also diverge in various ways. Germany will need to build a China policy that is not entirely shaped by US interests and seek to engage with Beijing on more than economic issues.
Finally, and most importantly, Germany will need a new Russia policy. Germany’s post-Cold War strategy of economic engagement with Russia was in many ways a failure, particularly when coupled with the tensions created by NATO and EU expansion. It is entirely understandable that German policymakers are wary of making similar future mistakes. Yet, they cannot let this fear cause them to outsource their Russia policy entirely to their Eastern European neighbors. Military containment of Russia—the preferred policy of some of Berlin’s neighbors—is a necessary piece of the puzzle, but as the experience of the Cold War showed, a policy based solely on containment will inevitably be unstable and prone to crises. Berlin must formulate a Russia policy that balances its own needs with those of its neighbors, and includes some level of engagement with Russia to mitigate tensions.
This engagement will necessarily be limited. Even the resolution of the war in Ukraine in the next few years will not bring much in the way of opportunities for economic and political engagement with Moscow. But today’s approach, where European states are not even talking to Moscow is unsustainable. Long term, Berlin will need to push toward a more balanced Russia policy that combines military containment of Moscow’s territorial ambitions with the diplomatic and economic engagement that can defuse future tensions.
For German policymakers, balancing the country’s role within the European context as a primary defense provider with the necessity to reduce the risk of conflict that role requires will be a tough needle to thread. Yet, as an emerging middle power, Berlin’s primary influence in coming years is likely to be over its “near abroad,” whether that is its fellow EU and NATO member states, or Russia. Berlin will not be alone; Germany must act in concert with other European states, particularly France, on questions of nuclear deterrence, and the UK, Poland, and others on conventional military questions.
But Germany can act as a lynchpin for the continent: A confident Germany that can balance deterrence and diplomacy is the key ingredient to a stable balance of power on the European continent in coming decades.
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center at Washington, DC.
