The European concept of “like-mindedness” among states assumes that partners largely share a worldview and assess global changes in similar ways. Japan is a prime example of this theory. The country’s foreign policy elites feel the same unease that Europe does about the rapidly shifting world order and the role their foremost ally, the United States, plays in this transformation. A week of travel in Japan confirms that the country views the “demolition man” that is US President Donald Trump with the same concern.
Yet, Japan is drawing very different conclusions from this shared assessment. There is little movement toward strategic independence comparable to the momentum seen in Europe. Instead, Tokyo is doubling down on its alliance with Washington. Rather than devising a “Plan B,” it is pursuing a “Plan A Plus.”
The more the US sees allies as free-riders rather than force multipliers, and the more it becomes—in the words of political scientist Stephen M. Walt—“a predatory hegemon,” the more determined Japan is to demonstrate its strategic value to the US. If the Americans loosen ties and shed commitments, Japan will tighten and reinforce them in the hope of keeping the United States engaged. As one analyst put it, Japan must prove that “America First” goals are better achieved with Japan at America’s side — even though Japan harbors serious reservations about that agenda. That is the essence of “Plan A Plus.”
Demonstrating Indispensability
According to mainstream thinking in the foreign policy community, Japan has no choice but to make itself indispensable to an America that doubts the concept of alliance. If Japan were to follow Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s approach and seek new middle-power allies to counterbalance the United States, warns Yoichi Funabashi, a grand seigneur of Japanese strategic thought, it would only push America further into isolation.
The challenge for newly elected Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is to avoid the binary choice between submission to China and subservience to a United States that increasingly treats alliances like a security protection racket. To do so, Japan aims to demonstrate its strategic indispensability.
Rarely has Japan felt lonelier over the past several decades than it does now. As China multiplies its defense spending, increases pressure on Taiwan, leverages rare earth minerals against Japan, and introduces fine-grained export controls, Japan’s principal ally appears to be drifting off course. Donald Trump’s strategy toward China sometimes looks more like great-power collusion than great-power competition; the new US National Defense Strategy does not even mention Taiwan; and America’s commitment to South Korea seems to be loosening.
Some in Japan look to Europe with envy. Europe can at least rely on “the European pillar of NATO,” and it has the European Union—a bloc of friendly countries to band together with in times of crisis. In the Japanese imagination, the EU represents the “Plan B” that Japan lacks. Not even as a long-term vision can Japan rely on strategic self-reliance. After all, Japan’s primary threat is a rising China, not a declining Russia that Europe may hope to deter collectively after several years of increased defense spending. Without the alliance with the US, Japan cannot deter China by conventional means alone.
Going Nuclear?
Given the absence of viable alternatives, Japan’s real “Plan B” amounts to little more than a nationalist utopia. In this line of thinking, Japan could deter China independently only if it acquired nuclear weapons and thereby achieve genuine strategic independence. This would constitute a strategic revolution, and the option is discussed only within small circles of right-of-center hawks. After an adviser to Takaichi was linked to such thinking, the prime minister strongly denied any intention of abandoning the country’s longstanding non-nuclear principles. As Ryo Sahashi of the University of Tokyo argues, it is only a minority among Japanese elites who are contemplating such a move—not to mention the broader public, which strongly opposes any notion of the country of Hiroshima and Nagasaki going nuclear itself.
This leaves Japan with little choice but to accommodate many of America’s demands. In response to the Chinese threat, the process of raising defense spending to 2 percent of GDP is already well underway. Now Takaichi, who after snap elections a month ago commands a two-thirds majority in the Japanese parliament, is considering a further increase, even as debt-servicing costs rise and additional borrowing could endanger economic stability. Her new government is weighing a range of measures to strengthen defense readiness and resilience. It will also seek to intensify relations with its “value partners” in Asia—without hoping a web of new partnerships could ever replace the relationship with the US.
In late February, the government announced it would deploy medium-range surface-to-air missiles on Yonaguni Island, just 110 kilometers east of Taiwan, in the hope of contributing to deterrence against China. Japan also plans to loosen its strict arms export guidelines and grant expanded powers to its intelligence services. The hope is that greater military assertiveness will translate into greater leverage vis-à-vis the United States.
Adding Incentives
Some Japanese analysts doubt that even this will suffice to influence a United States that has increasingly resorted to extortionate demands of its allies, including steep increases in host-nation support payments. Consequently, the Japanese government believes it must add economic incentives to its “Plan A Plus.”
The Takaichi government has therefore refrained from questioning the US-Japan bilateral tariff agreement following the US Supreme Court ruling that declared Trump’s tariff regime unconstitutional—a marked contrast to the European response. The European Union has concluded a comparable agreement, but does not plan to implement it anytime soon, with the European Parliament putting it on ice. Japan, by contrast, has emphasized that it will honor the investment commitments embedded in its agreement with Washington. It has pledged to invest $550 billion in the US and, in response to the Supreme Court ruling, announced the first three projects, worth $36 billion.
As Japan doubles down on its alliance with the United States, it will seek to ensure that it protects its core national interests—and that the alliance does not devolve into vassalage. Prime Minister Takaichi faces a delicate balancing act.
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff is the Otto Wolff Director at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
