Mr. Sadjadpour, we’re speaking just after a first round of peace talks between the United States and Iran, brokered by Pakistan, failed over the weekend. In response, US President Donald Trump has introduced a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, after pressuring the Iranians to reopen it. Can you make sense of this?
I think the dilemma that both the United States and Iran face is that President Trump, having spent upwards of $50 billion on this war, cannot afford to ask less of Iran than he did before the war, while the Iranian side believes that they prevailed. It’s a war of survival for them, and they are demanding much more now than they were before the war because they have incurred tens of billions of dollars in damages. In a way, the two sides are even further apart than they were before the war.
It took the Obama administration more than two years to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran, and I think it is totally unrealistic for the Trump administration to expect that not only Iran’s nuclear program, but also its missiles, drones, and proxies, as well as the Strait of Hormuz can be negotiated in a short period. In my view, the best-case outcome is that we move from what has been a hot conflict back to a cold conflict.
A “deal” is not thinkable?
No, a real resolution is not possible as long as the Islamic Republic’s ideology and its identity remains “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” The regime believes that it cannot abandon this identity, because if it does so, it will not prolong its life but hasten its collapse. This was the obsession that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—the 86-year-old supreme leader who was killed on the first day of the war—had with the fall of the Soviet Union. He believed that it collapsed when Mikhail Gorbachev tried to reform it. Many people will say, “Well, why can’t the Americans just make peace with Iran?” The answer to that this is not a unilateral choice. In fact, I think that Trump wanted to have a grand bargain with Iran. He wanted a “Nixon to China” type outcome with Iran. That was his initial hope. But when Iran would not meet with him, the way that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un or other adversaries would meet with him, he chose violence.
Trump and his administration have named a multitude of war aims. What, in your view, was the key motivation to launch the war in late February?
You have to look at the history of Trump’s interactions with Iran. In 2018 he pulled out of the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that Obama had negotiated. A lot of people, including his advisors, warned Trump not to do that, that there would be consequences, and he felt vindicated when the consequences were not too severe. In January 2020, he assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Again, many people warned Trump that there would be severe consequences for doing so. There were not and he felt vindicated. And then last summer he dropped 14 bunker-busting bombs on Iranian nuclear sites. Many people feared that it would trigger regional war. It did not.
So, on several occasions, Trump had rolled the dice on Iran. He gambled, and he felt that his policies were vindicated. This time around, his decision was shaped by that history coupled with the fact that he had just seized President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. He was riding high from the Venezuela example.
In my view, it was not even Trump’s first option to launch this war against Iran. He had hoped that with a massive build-up of US military forces in the Gulf region, he could intimidate Iran into capitulation. His special advisor for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, alluded as much when he said that President Trump has been surprised: Why hasn’t Iran capitulated? Witkoff said that a couple of weeks before the attack.
I think that was when Trump decided to launch the war. In addition, he felt that Iran was perhaps weaker militarily than it has ever been, and that it did not control its own airspace. So that was the context and Trump hoped to be the person that was going to essentially end this 47-year menace of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
But it has not quite worked out that way. What does this tell us about US power?
I think if there was one critical lesson to learn from America’s last quarter century of experience in the Middle East it is that we from Washington cannot dictate political outcomes in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, we spent perhaps a trillion dollars and thousands of American lives, and two decades later, the Taliban came back to power. In Iraq, there were grand ambitions of bringing democracy to the country. Now virtually everyone looks at the experience of Iraq and says that was not worth the cost and American blood and treasure. Also, during the Arab Spring, we tried to positively impact the political outcomes there, and we failed to do so. I think that was a bipartisan lesson that most Americans learned over the last quarter century.
However, Trump, encouraged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, thought that he could be the person that finally ends this Cold War with Iran, which started with the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the hostage-taking of US Embassy staff in Tehran. In Trump’s head, the model wasn’t Iraq, it was Venezuela. He was simply hoping to decapitate the political leadership and that someone more friendly could emerge, to partner with the United States.
Russia and China have been watching closely. What role do you think they are playing?
Russia and China are commonly lumped together when it comes to their interest in this conflict, but I think it’s important to separate them. Russia wants to keep the regime in power, for a number of reasons. The Islamic Republic is a thorn in the side of the United States. And as long as the regime is in place, Iran will remain isolated and dependent on Russian strategic and nuclear support. In fact, Iran has become highly dependent on Russia. And it cannot exploit its vast reserves of natural gas. Iran has the second largest reserves of natural gas worldwide, after Russia. But because of its isolation, it does not have the technology to profit from it; it’s not even in the top 15 of gas exporting nations. As a consequence, Iran does not compete with Russia for instance for European gas markets. Also, it doesn’t compete with Russia when it comes to influence in Central Asia. And Iran has been very helpful to Russia, providing it with drones in this war against Ukraine.
China is in a somewhat different category. A different government in Iran, let’s say one that prioritizes Iran’s national interest rather than revolutionary ideology, would be beneficial to China, because Iran is punching way below its weight when it comes to its energy potential. In 1978, Iran was producing 6 million barrels and exporting 5 million barrels of oil per day; today, it’s a tiny fraction of that. An Iran that fulfills its enormous energy potential would be beneficial to China.
And Beijing has close ties with Iran’s regional rivals and adversaries, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and wants regional stability; in contrast, Russia benefits from regional instability, which keeps the risk premium of oil prices high. So, I do not think that their interests are identical. That said, on a macro level, neither country minds seeing the US bogged down in Iran, because it gives America less ability to focus on Ukraine and Taiwan.
Speaking of regional stability, in which way has the war reshaped the balance of power in the region?
I think of the countries in the region as falcons and vultures. The falcons want to build soaring societies and economies, and the vultures prey on the misery and misfortune of others. The falcons are countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar. They have forward-looking visions, and their visions require regional stability, partnership with the United States, and detente with Israel. They are trying to become international hubs for technology and finance and transport, and all those ambitions require regional stability.
Contrast that with the Islamic Republic of Iran. If you look at the countries Tehran was dominating before October 7, 2023, they are essentially five failing states: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza. Iran’s business model is based on instability, not stability. Whenever there is a conflict which introduces profound instability and insecurity, then that plays to Iran’s strengths, not to the strengths of the Gulf countries. In some of them, for instance the UAE, the vast majority of residents are non-nationals, so if people feel that those places are no longer safe environments, it could cause an exodus of talent. The data centers, for example, that are currently being built there—if major international companies think that those data centers are potentially vulnerable to Iranian missiles and drones, they are going to rethink their investments there.
I’m not making the argument that the balance of power has shifted toward Iran. But it’s true to say that instability and chaos play to the Islamic Republic’s strengths.
And where does Israel stand in all of this?
That’s an important question, because Israel has different interests in Iran than the United States or the Gulf states. The ideal scenario for most regional countries as well as the US and Israel would be an Iran whose organizing principle is the national interest, rather than revolutionary ideology; an Iran, if you will, which is aspiring to become a falcon. But if you are not able to achieve that ideal outcome, what is your plan B—another scenario that you could live with? For the Gulf states and the United States, an Iran that implodes and becomes a failed state like Syria is a terrible outcome, whereas for Israel, an Iran mired in internal chaos and unable to project power and threaten Israel is not necessarily a bad outcome either. Also, for Israel the closing of the Strait of Hormuz is not as much of an existential threat as it is for Gulf countries that rely on that strait being open for their imports and exports.
What’s the current situation in Iran itself? Has the war weakened or strengthened the regime?
The war has definitely diminished Iran militarily. The question is whether the regime is more cohesive and entrenched than it was in January, when it was facing mass nationwide protests. Millions of people took to the streets, including in very traditional cities, shouting “Death to Khamenei, Death to the Islamic Republic.” At that time, I made the argument that Iran was a “zombie regime” because it had a dying ideology, a dying supreme leader, and dying legitimacy.
The question is whether this war has breathed new life into the zombie regime. Ayatollah Khamenei died a martyr instead of a loser, as did many other Iranian officials. So, has this war convinced Iran’s remaining political elite that they either have to kill or be killed? Has it breathed new life into this revolutionary ideology? I think that remains to be seen.
History suggests that when nascent authoritarian regimes or revolutionary regimes experience an outside attack, it helps them consolidate power. A good example of that is when Saddam Hussein invaded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Iran in 1980: It helped entrench the Islamic Republic. What we also know from history is that when late-stage dictatorships experience a military humiliation it can help hasten their demise—think of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. So, it’s possible that we’ll argue in five years that the regime’s existing problems were simply exacerbated by this war and led to its demise. But we do know from history that for authoritarian change or collapse to happen, it requires not only the pressure from below, but more importantly the divisions at the top. So far, we have not seen any cracks in this system, especially among the military elite.
The final thing I would say is that empirically around four out of five authoritarian transitions lead to another form of authoritarianism. They do not lead to democracy. And when that transition has been triggered by external military intervention, the odds of transfer to democracy are much, much lower.
European reactions to the war have been mixed. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz started off supporting the war, then pedaled back. Staying out of the war is now the biggest priority, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has said, “This is not our war.” But how do you see Europe in relation to this conflict?
I think the European view on Iran shifted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Iran started to help Putin and sent him drones. Whereas before you would sometimes hear Europeans say that it is Israel or the United States being the aggressor against Iran, many Europeans now came to understand the malign nature of the Islamic Republic after its support for Putin.
Broadly speaking, Europeans preferred a containment approach vis-à-vis Iran, trying to contain the problem until the regime is eventually forced to change or implodes under the weight of its own contradictions, much like the Soviet Union. And I appreciate the European dilemma, because this began as a war of choice for President Trump. Now, in some ways, it has morphed into a war of necessity. It isn’t in anyone’s interests, neither in Europe’s nor Asia’s, nor obviously the United States’ nor Arab Gulf countries’ interest that Iran leaves this war in control of the Strait of Hormuz, turning it into their Panama Canal. That is inimical to European economic interests.
Iran is emboldened when it sees a transatlantic divide, and it will continue to try to exploit differences between American and Europe. The JCPOA was an example in which America and Europe acted in lockstep—because the Europeans saw President Obama making numerous efforts trying to engage Iran, and Iran would not reciprocate. This convinced the Europeans to say, “Okay, we have to support the Americans here.” President Trump obviously did not make that effort this time around. And not only did he not make that effort, but many Europeans saw him not as an ally, but as a quasi-adversary with predatory ambitions over Greenland.
So, I appreciate the European dilemma. It is probably not popular among European publics to involve themselves in this war militarily, but, at the same time, if Iran feels that it has parts of Europe on its side, it will continue to fight. And as I said, an outcome in which Iran is left with control of the Strait of Hormuz is inimical to the European interests as well.
The “E3”—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—as well as the EU played an important role when it came to the JCPOA nuclear agreement. What’s the situation regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions now? And, more generally, is there a role for the Europeans again?
There are perhaps as much as 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that are unaccounted for at the moment. That is an issue which must be addressed. Iran’s nuclear facilities have been badly damaged, but the regime has the know-how to rebuild some of those facilities in a bunker elsewhere.
When Ayatollah Khamenei was living, his goal was the “Japan model”—to be a screwdriver turn away from having a nuclear weapon. I think Iran’s new leaders are probably broadly united in believing that they need to acquire nuclear weapons as a cloak of deterrent, similar to North Korea. The nuclear issue has not gone away, and it requires a united US-European position on Iran and I’m not sure that exists, nor does a united European position on Iran.
One way of coming up with a united US-European position is to think about the lowest common denominator. It’s in Europe’s interests that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. It’s in Europe’s interest that Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz. There will be differences of opinion about to what extent we should be trying to shape political events inside Iran, to what extent we can really push back against Iranian regional proxies and their missiles and drones. But two pillars of Iran policy that virtually all Europeans can agree on are there.
What is the war telling us about the abilities of middle powers, considering the Islamic Republic is one that is withstanding a military attack by a great power?
It’s important to note that the Islamic Republic has not tried to win the battlefield. Instead, its leaders have tried to win in the living room. There is an advantage that dictatorships have when they are fighting democracies: They don’t have to care about their public opinion. You can be a very tough negotiator when you do not care about the tremendous damage that your obstinance inflicts on your own population.
What Iran has tried to do from the very beginning is to influence American public opinion and restrain Trump; that applies to global public opinion and European public opinion as well. Not all citizens around the world feel impacted by Iran’s nuclear program, but when Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz and oil prices spike, all citizens of the world are impacted by it.
In the United States, we have seen that the popular support for this war is limited. It wasn’t that popular to start with, and it has gone down. That is even more true in Europe, there is little popular support for this war. That is one of things that middle powers, especially authoritarian countries, can do: impact Western public opinion.
And then there is one of the great lessons of the Iraq War: Building things takes decades, destroying things takes weeks. If you are in the business of building, that means high costs, great commitment, and long-term planning. Whereas destroying things is far less costly and takes far less time. One percent of a society can make life hell for 99 percent of a society, as we saw in Iraq.
The Islamic Republic is very effective at sabotage and destruction, at playing the role of spoiler. That is another advantage that an authoritarian adversary, even one that's a middle power, can have over great democratic powers. This has been a winning strategy for the Islamic Republic, and a losing strategy for the people of Iran.
The interview was conducted by Henning Hoff and Tim Hofmann.
Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
