New Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s first month in power saw an unprecedented diplomatic sprint.
After the landslide election victory of Magyar’s Tisza party in April and the formation of the new government in early May, Budapest moved quickly to signal it wanted to return to the European democratic mainstream. The EU flag was back on the parliament building, and the tone toward Brussels changed, as Magyar sped across Europe to repair the damage done by 16 years of Viktor Orbán’s government. Orbán had routinely treated allies as adversaries and EU institutions as domestic campaign props.
Now, as the reset slowly settles and constitutional, institutional, and economic reforms are gradually enacted, the sprint looks like turning into an obstacle race.
The Diplomatic Sprint
The early results look impressive. Magyar chose Poland for his first foreign visit to restore the age-old Polish-Hungarian friendship that ran aground due to the Orbán government’s coziness with Moscow even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The trip to Warsaw also signaled Magyar’s intention to revive the Visegrad Group (which brings together the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) as a Central European engine of the EU.
Magyar then moved on to key European capitals, including Berlin and Paris, while talks in Brussels produced the release of €16.4 billion in previously frozen EU funds. Most consequentially for European external policy, the new government reached an agreement with Ukraine on a roadmap for the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia—a decade-old dispute which Orbán’s government instrumentalized to halt Kyiv’s integration prospects. With a roadmap in place, Magyar’s government lifted Hungary’s blockade of the first substantive phase of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.
For the EU and its member states, a Hungary that no longer reflexively obstructs decisions on Ukraine (and sanctions on Russia), but instead treats both fellow EU members and the Ukrainians as partners, brings a welcome shift. For Hungary, the restoration of goodwill is not only about external relations, however. It has been closely intertwined with the pressing need to secure access to frozen EU funds, which are essential to stabilize a weak economy, fund investment, and respond to the socioeconomic frustrations that helped carry the Tisza party to power. The reset of the first month is politically promising—for both Hungary and the EU as a whole. But it should not be mistaken for a completed transformation.
The Domestic Obstacle Course
The decision to unlock funds came in response to the Hungarian government’s promise to address the European Commission’s rule-of-law concerns, particularly those regarding corruption and judicial independence. Holding a two-thirds majority in the national parliament, Tisza is now in a position to pass legislation that tackles these issues.
Joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, empowering the Integrity Authority, and creating asset-recovery mechanisms are all necessary steps. The prosecution of Orbán-era corruption through impartial and transparent processes will need to follow. Yet, implementing profound institutional change that upends networks of informal power built over a decade and a half will be a long process, requiring not only the establishment of new procedures but also the replacement of personnel.
Indeed, institutional capture is perhaps Fidesz’ most enduring legacy, currently epitomized by the confrontation between Prime Minister Magyar and President Tamás Sulyok. Magyar has called on Sulyok and a wide range of other Fidesz-appointed officeholders to resign, arguing that they should not obstruct the new government and its cleaning-up efforts, returning to European standards. Sulyok has refused, saying his mandate is constitutional.
Tisza may now seek legislative routes to force out officials who owe their positions to the old system. There is indeed a legitimate democratic argument for ending Fidesz’ control over captured institutions. But there is also a risk of triggering a constitutional crisis should the Tisza government resort to tailor-made constitutional engineering reminiscent of Fidesz’ own actions. Magyar’s mandate is strong, and Tisza’s supermajority in parliament gives the government tools that allow for constitutional reform. However, meeting rule-of-law standards is essential for change to be durable.
The hurdle of turning the released EU funds into economic growth is no less high. While Hungarians voted for cleaner governance, anti-corruption messages resonated because people felt the financial consequences of Fidesz’ corruption and government failures in their own pockets.
The financial injections the EU funds can now provide are urgently needed and will certainly boost the economy. However, the new government will ultimately also need to undertake systemic reforms. To build a competitive economy, it needs to break with the old growth model rooted in cheap labor, low-value manufacturing, sectoral taxes, and politically connected investments. At the same time, it also needs to invest significant resources in modernizing public services, including health care and education.
There are also social and cultural benchmarks that will determine whether the regime change Tisza promises paves the way toward a pluralist, liberal democracy. The submitted public media reform package and the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office are important steps, especially after years in which journalists, NGOs, academics, and opposition politicians were treated as enemies within.
But a liberal public space needs safeguards and, most urgently, a shift in political attitude and communication. Civil society and interest groups sidelined by Fidesz need to be involved in public consultation. Independent media outlets weakened under Orbán now need fair access to information and stable legal protections. Similarly, Roma inclusion, LGBTQ rights, and the protection of academic freedom will show whether Hungary’s democratic renewal is selective or comprehensive.
Looming Conflicts
Although the diplomatic sprint suggested a smooth international run, hurdles await on that path, too. Conflict with the EU is already looming on the horizon when it comes to migration. The EU’s Migration and Asylum Pact has now entered into application, and Hungary remains opposed to key solidarity mechanisms, including relocation quotas and financial contributions.
Magyar’s government has taken a restrictive position not entirely dissimilar from Fidesz’ old line, even if it frames it in less confrontational language. This is not an accidental continuity. Tisza is closer to Fidesz on migration than many of its Western partners might like, and the topic remains salient in Hungarian domestic politics. The government may seek technical compromises, but it is likely to clash with the European Commission on EU asylum policy. Brussels can expect a more constructive Hungary, but not an uncontentious one.
Ties with Russia present a different kind of problem. Here Magyar is not so much ideologically aligned with Orbán as trapped by his legacy. Tisza has broken with the cordial political relationship and Orbán’s veto politics that made Budapest Moscow’s most reliable advocate inside the EU.
Yet, Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy remains deep. And as the EU’s 2027 deadline to decouple from Russian gas nears, conflicts may arise on this matter, too. Russia still supplies most of the country’s gas and oil and all of its nuclear fuel, while the Soviet-built Paks nuclear power plant and the ongoing construction two new reactors continue to tie the country to Russian technology and finance. A serious diversification strategy will need to identify alternative routes, based on non-Russian contractors, nuclear fuel diversification, investment in renewables, and, ideally, European cooperation.
Toward a New System
Tisza’s victory opened Hungary’s most consequential democratic opportunity since 1989. But the hurdles ahead are immense. Hungary’s allies want the country to become a predictable and reliable partner again. Hungarian voters want cleaner government, better living standards, functioning public services, and a state that once more belongs to them rather than to a ruling party.
The first month suggests that Tisza understands the urgency of the moment: It hit the ground running. The next phase will be slower, harder, and more revealing. Magyar’s task is not only to dismantle Orbán’s system, but to ensure that what replaces it is more restrained and more pluralist as well as durable. The sprint has been impressive. Now comes the obstacle course.
Zsuzsanna Végh is a program officer in the European Resilience Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and an associate researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
