Russia’s war is not only an attack on Ukraine, but also a threat to the whole of Europe. By defending itself, Ukraine is also defending Europe’s security. Standing up for Ukraine’s independence, its territorial integrity, and Euro-Atlantic integration is therefore in Europe’s strategic interest. However, many EU member states lack sufficient resources—and oftentimes the political will—to provide comprehensive military support. As a result, US support for Ukraine has so far been indispensable.
The Critical Role of US Leadership
The US government has pledged and allocated more than $53 billion in military aid since 2022, an amount that still exceeds the combined military aid commitments by European countries. Washington is also leading the coordination of Western military aid to Ukraine. At the same time, it has further expanded the US presence in Europe to bolster NATO; a “pivot to Asia” at the expense of Europe, as feared by many, has not occurred under the Biden presidency.
Support for Ukraine has also been strong in the US Congress across party lines, even though members from both parties have regularly criticized the lack of a clear strategy in Biden’s Ukraine policy. The support among Republicans, however, waned after it became clear that Donald Trump would be the party’s presumptive presidential candidate.
Since last year, Ukraine aid has increasingly divided the Republicans, especially in the House of Representatives, with the result that a new aid package was blocked in Congress for months—with serious military consequences for Ukraine. However, a new package was finally approved in April by around half of the Republicans in the House of Representatives, and support for Ukraine is now secured until 2025 and thus beyond the elections. But the delays in Congress have shown that US support has become much more vulnerable to partisan disputes than before.
How will US support for Ukraine likely develop and which are the implications for Europe? There are several plausible scenarios.
Continuity With a Democrat in the White House
The first set of scenarios starts with a Democratic win on November 5. An US administration led by a Democratic president would continue its support for Ukraine. It would likely intensify efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian armed forces (Ukraine Future Forces) to put them in a position to credibly deter future Russian aggression.
However, any new administration will continue to rely on congressional appropriations for financial and military support, and future negotiations on further aid will depend on the balance of power in Congress as well as on the future stance of the Republicans. It is difficult to predict how the congressional Republicans would position themselves on Ukraine aid after a potential Trump’s election defeat, but it’s likely that the number of critics among them will be higher in the next Congress. Thus, if the Republicans will hold a majority in one of the two chambers next year, they could potentially block further aid.
Another issue is the availability of military capabilities. Arms production in the US is increasing, partly with funds from the April package, in order to replenish US stockpiles. The Biden administration keeps emphasizing that the US is capable of acting in several conflict regions simultaneously. Nonetheless, future aid to Ukraine may also depend on whether US equipment will be needed elsewhere, e.g. the Indo-Pacific or the Middle East.
What is clear, however, is that US policymakers of either party will expect a stronger role for the Europeans when it comes to supporting Ukraine.
A Trump Push for Ceasefire Negotiations
Under a second Trump presidency, Ukraine policy would become much more unpredictable. Trump fundamentally believes that the Europeans must provide much more financial and military support, as the “survival” of Ukraine is more important to Europe than to the US. A second Trump administration may stop US aid completely, but it could also make its continuation dependent on concessions from Ukraine and the European partners.
Donald Trump has bragged that he could end the war “within 24 hours.” He could indeed initiate ceasefire negotiations that would call Ukraine's territorial integrity into question. Trump could also urge the Europeans to join his initiative by implying that he would otherwise question continued US commitment to NATO.
At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that Trump would continue US support for Ukraine, for example in the form of loans, and may end up with a more hawkish approach than the Biden administration. Trump could be persuaded by the argument that Iran, North Korea, and China are also involved in the war by supporting Russia, with the aim of weakening the US and the West. “We’re dealing with tentacles of an octopus now,” Matthew Pottinger, Trump’s former deputy national security adviser (2019-21), argued in early July. “It doesn’t make sense for us to say, ‘Well, let’s ignore the tentacle that’s grabbing a big chunk of Europe,’ or, ‘Let’s ignore the one that’s now starting to squeeze the Philippines, and just focus on the tentacle that’s starting to surround Taiwan’ … because it’s the same frickin’ octopus.”
Europe and a Democratic Win
Should the Democrats keep the presidency, the European allies should work closely together with the next US administration to strengthen the Ukrainian armed forces and their long-term defense capabilities. At the same time, a gradual burden-shift toward Europe should be implemented. The strong role played by the Biden administration since February 2022 has bought many European governments time, and they should make up for their shortcomings by strengthening the security of supply and thus be in a better position to provide critical support Ukraine militarily in the future—even without comprehensive US support, if necessary.
To do so, the German government and other European governments should consider providing Ukraine with additional equipment from national stocks, which they often withhold with reference to their own defense needs. This includes, for example, additional Patriot air defense systems, of which several European countries have models in use, and which Ukraine urgently needs.
Furthermore, Germany and other countries should resolutely implement the bilateral agreements on security cooperation with Ukraine they have entered into over the past months, which often have been portrayed as an interim mechanism until Ukraine joins NATO. But this will involve ensuring reliable financing to sustain and expand further military support, to train Ukrainian forces, to cooperate in intelligence-sharing and in cyber defense, and to strengthen the Ukrainian defense industries. At the same time, the governments should ensure that the bilateral support is effectively coordinated according to Ukraine’s needs, including in the framework of the new NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) element.
The European governments should also continue to expand their defense industrial base to ensure the procurement of equipment and ammunition that Ukraine may need in the coming years. The German government has recently stepped up efforts to increase arms production, including supporting the construction of a new ammunition factory, and NATO has commissioned the production of missiles and spare for air defense systems.
In order to increase economies of scale in the future, the German government should support the adoption and funding of the European defense industrial strategy that the European Commission presented in March. European Governments should also support the establishment of joint ventures between national and Ukrainian companies to enable faster maintenance, repair, and production of equipment in Ukraine. At the same time, to address Ukraine’s short-term needs, the European governments should continue efforts to acquire military equipment globally, as is already being attempted under the Immediate Action on Air Defense or the Czech ammunition procurement initiative.
Europe and a Second Trump Presidency
In the face of a second Trump administration, European governments should adjust to Trump's transactional understanding of international affairs, but take a clear position on potential peace negotiations.
They should make it clear to a second Trump administration that they are prepared to shoulder the majority of financial and military support for Ukraine in the medium term. Also, they could point out that they will continue to buy a significant proportion of defense acquisitions for both their national defenses as well as for Ukraine from US defense companies, which is already the case and will continue to be necessary for the time being due to the lack of European capacity.
Trump may be prepared to hold back on changing Ukraine policy for the time being. But it may also be important who will speak on behalf of Europe. Poland, with its defense spending nearing 4 percent of GDP (far above NATO’s 2-percent-goal) and which will take over the EU presidency in early 2025, would be ideally suited.
At the same time, the Europeans should make it clear to Trump that while they are not opposed to ceasefire negotiations, they would not accept any talks over the heads of the Ukrainians or any negotiation outcomes that go against Ukraine’s interests, its independence and territorial integrity. However, this stance is only credible if the Europeans are in fact able to provide Ukraine with comprehensive military support.
Dominik Tolksdorf is a research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), focusing on US politics and transatlantic relations.
