At the end of 2021, the center-left German coalition announced in their coalition agreement: “In order to be able to realize our values and interests in the systemic rivalry with China, we need a comprehensive China Strategy in Germany within the framework of the joint EU China policy.” The Greens and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) in particular had been advocating a critical policy toward Beijing. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD), too, had stated in its election manifesto: “Conflicts of interest and values with China are increasing.”
The German foreign ministry took the lead in devising the joint strategy. This was followed by a sometimes arduousprocess in which the coalition partners agreed on a common line. On July 13, 2023, the government adopted the first “Strategy on China” in the history of the Federal Republic. “For Germany, China remains a partner, competitor, and systemic rival,” Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Greens) explained at the presentation of the 61-page paper, “but the aspect of systemic rival has increasingly come to the fore in recent years.”
The presentation was remarkable not only because of its historical dimension, but also for two other reasons. Firstly, it took place on the premises of the China think tank MERICS, on which the Chinese government had imposed sanctions in response to EU sanctions against Chinese officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang: employees of the research institute and their relatives are no longer allowed to travel to the People's Republic. The fact that the China Strategy was presented there of all places was a clear signal of support for the institute.
Secondly, Baerbock presented the strategy alone. A month earlier, when the government had presented the joint National Security Strategy, she addressed a press conference with other cabinet members including Chancellor Scholz. The leader of the government devoted no more than a brief tweet to the new China Strategy, writing on X: “The aim is not to de-couple ourselves. But we want to avoid critical dependencies in the future.” This seemed to confirm what had already become apparent—the two most important departments for conducting foreign policy within the German government, the foreign ministry and the chancellery, disagreed with regard to China.
What Has the China Strategy Achieved?
The paper undoubtedly constitutes a point of reference that the ministries, federal states and local authorities can keep referring to when dealing with China - a role that should not be underestimated.
In addition, in the course of developing the China strategy, all departments concerned for the first time jointly considered how to engage with the People’s Republic—with the involvement of experts, trade associations, and corporate leaders. The China Strategy institutionalized the exchange between the ministries by introducing regular meetings at state secretary level on the topic of China—a major step forward compared to previous years, when all ministries worked separately.
Last but not least, the China Strategy serves as a guide for other countries on Germany’s current stance toward the People’s Republic. The paper has been read carefully in the United States in particular, but also in countries such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and, of course, China.
Little Coherence in Practice
However, the past year has also shown clearly what the China Strategy has not been able to achieve. The German government's China policy has appeared inconsistent and shaped more by party politics than by new realities in dealing with China.
A strategy sets the direction; it is supposed to be a plan for achieving common goals—not a detailed guide on what actions to take. According to the China Strategy agreed by the German government it aims to “present means and instruments by which the Federal Government can work with China, without endangering Germany’s free and democratic way of life, our sovereignty and prosperity, as well as our security and partnerships with others.” It adds that it aims to “provide the framework within which our Federal Ministries can give coherence to their policies on China.”
However, the past year has shown that the departments interpret these principles very differently in practice: here are three examples.
Example 1: The German 5G Debate
The China Strategy attaches particular importance to the protection of so-called critical infrastructure, which explicitly includes the telecommunications infrastructure. It states: “The timely reduction of risks that originate from their producers therefore plays an important role in the protection and functioning of Germany’s critical infrastructure.”
Although Chinese manufacturers are not named directly, it is clear who this sentence is aimed at. A dispute has raged in Germany for years about how to deal with Chinese components in the 5G network. Security agencies on both sides of the Atlantic have issued strong warnings especially about technology from Chinese provider Huawei due to fears of both espionage and sabotage.
In September 2023, security experts at the German interior ministry made clear what the protection of critical infrastructure ultimately means. In their view, Chinese components must be “immediately” and “completely” removed from the German 5G network, the ministry’s experts said. However, as this was not possible, the experts suggested setting deadlines and defining areas in which security should be established particularly quickly.
The German foreign office and the economy and climate ministry, which were involved alongside the chancellery and the transport and digital ministry, followed the line of the interior ministry. However, the decision that was taken in the end was neither immediate nor does it amount to a complete removal of the Chinese components from the German 5G network, whose share is currently estimated at around 60 percent. It was not until July 2024, almost a year after the experts of the interior ministry gave its clear assessment, that the German government agreed on what should be done about the Chinese components already installed.
Security experts criticized the solution as completely inadequate and said the dismantling deadlines were far too long. The chancellery and Volker Wissing (FDP), the minister responsible for transport and digital affairs, who had argued for longer dismantling periods in favor of the network operators, had gotten their way.
Example 2: Travelling to China
Visits by high-ranking politicians to the People’s Republic often only last a few days, but they have a lot of significance. Other countries look very closely at the signals sent out by such trips.
Here, too, the German government sent ambivalent messages. Scholz’s most recent visit to Beijing gave the impression of “business as usual.” In April of this year, the chancellor not only travelled to China with a delegation of heads of major German companies, but also had three other ministers in tow—of all people, those who are more in favor of cooperation than confrontation: Wissing, who had advocated a softer line toward Beijing, particularly in the 5G debate. Agriculture Minister Cem Özdemir (Greens), whose aim during the trip was to get China to reopen its market for German pork. And Environment Minister Steffi Lemke (Greens), who was tasked with driving forward climate cooperation with the People’s Republic—an area that all parties like to cite as a reason for a more accommodating approach toward China.
Given the China Strategy that the government had agreed on just a few months earlier, this was an astonishing constellation. The strategy states: “The German government is working towards a de-risking of economic relations with China.” Studies such as those conducted by the German Economic Institute show that it is precisely the large German companies that are investing more rather than less in the People’s Republic despite the China Strategy.
By contrast, Foreign Minister Baerbock had taken a more robust stance during her trip to China a year earlier. She had initially met with German business representatives and later visited several German companies in the People’s Republic. However, this did not stop her from criticizing her Chinese hosts—and warning her then-counterpart Qin Gang against an invasion of Taiwan. According to Baerbock, such a move would have economic consequences that would also affect China and Germany.
Chancellor Scholz, on the other hand, omitted the most critical points: in his statement following a meeting with Premier Li Qiang in April, he made no mention of China’s threats against Taiwan or the massive human rights violations committed by the Chinese leadership in Xinjiang.
Example 3: Wissing’s Go-it-alone Approach
Wissing travelled again to Beijing in June 2024. The aim: to sign a memorandum of understanding on the transfer of car data between Germany and China. As several sources reported, the coherence agreed in the China Strategy in dealing with the People’s Republic once again failed to materialize. Wissing had not sufficiently coordinated the declaration with the other ministries ahead of his trip. The foreign office, the interior ministry, and the economy ministry reacted angrily.
It was also too much for the chancellor. Scholz cited the China Strategy as the basis of the German government’s actions and publicly admonished the FDP politician that the German government should, as a matter of principle, “agree things together and make sure that the things actually happen.” In this respect, it was “regrettable” that this had not taken place in this case. The transport ministry felt that it had been unfairly criticized and that its actions were in line with the China Strategy.
Such incoherence has irritated allies such as Japan, which is being unusually active in helping Ukraine despite the big geographical distance. One reason for this assistance is that Tokyo is hoping for support from the German government against China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific. That would require a more critical stance vis-à-vis Beijing.
What Could Happen Next
Since the German government adopted its China Strategy around a year ago, the People’s Republic has continued to change under President Xi Jinping. The West now sees it as proven that China’s exports of so-called dual-use goods, i.e. products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes, are decisive in keeping the Russian war machine running and are undermining Western sanctions. In their joint communiqué at the NATO summit in July, the member states made it clear that China had become a decisive “enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Despite repeated appeals from top Western politicians, China’s leadership denies any responsibility. On the contrary: Beijing and Moscow continue to expand their “friendship without limits,” which Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed shortly before the latter’s attack on Ukraine. As recently as July, the Chinese and Russian navies conducted joint exercises in the South China Sea. Shortly before that, China held military drills with Belarus—just 15 kilometers from the border with NATO member Poland and coinciding with the NATO summit in Washington.
Experts such as Gunnar Wiegand, Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and former Asia Director of the European External Action Service, where he was instrumental in driving forward Brussels’ reorientation toward Beijing from 2016 to 2023, believe that it is time to add a fourth dimension to the triad of “partner, competitor and systemic rival:” China as a security threat to Europe.
In terms of transatlantic relations as well, the way Germany conducts its China policy will be decisive in the coming years—regardless of who wins the US elections in November. It has long been clear to the US that China is a threat to the West. A new US administration will demand with much greater force than today that Germany position itself clearly vis-à-vis China. The German government should have answers by then at the latest.
Dana Heide is a political correspondent for Germany’s financial newspaper Handelsblatt based in Berlin. From 2019 to 2022, she reported from China.
