In July 2024, the German and American governments announced plans to station US conventional medium-range missiles on German soil, beginning in 2026. Moscow’s response was to threaten new deployments of its own nuclear-armed weapons systems. These moves and countermoves have revealed key elements of the new, third nuclear age which we are now living through. This new era differs from the post-Cold War era in three ways.
First, nuclear relations between the great powers are now all about confrontation, not cooperation. Russia and the United States are modernizing their nuclear weapons and considering an expansion of operational doctrines. In the case of Moscow, we see the abandonment of old guidelines, which had kept nuclear weapons issues separate from regional conflicts. In addition, China is building up its own nuclear arsenal: By 2035, its current total of over 400 warheads could rise to around 1,500. The days when nuclear stability was above all a question of the US-Russian relationship are now over.
Second, small and medium-sized states threatened by nuclear-armed neighbors are building up their defenses. Investment in conventional capabilities can have an impact on the nuclear situation. Cruise missile systems, including Tomahawks, Storm Shadow/Scalp-EG, Taurus, and JASSM-ER, as well as with hypersonic weapons are now able to attack strategic targets within Russia. Moreover, crisis management has become more difficult as previously separate areas—conventional, nuclear, cyber, and space warfare—are increasingly intertwined.
Third, these developments increase proliferation risks and pressures to expand extended deterrence guarantees within alliances. There have been calls for a separate European nuclear deterrent, as well as the expansion of nuclear sharing within the NATO alliance. Fears about US reliability in the event of a second Trump administration are exacerbating this situation, both in Europe and Asia.
All of this means arms control will be determined by military requirements of defense and deterrence for the foreseeable future. The onus will not be on disarmament, but on the stabilization of rivalries. Arms control—even in the form of unilateral decisions not to acquire or use particular weapons—will not replace deterrence. However, it can ideally complement it, by containing arms races and reducing risks of escalation.
From a New START to No START
There is still no nuclear arms race in the strategic sphere. In February 2023, Russia suspended the New START Treaty, which had regulated strategic nuclear relations between the United States and Russia. However, both Moscow and Washington have continued to adhere to the upper limits set out in the treaty: 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems.
Nevertheless, Moscow’s suspension of the treaty has not been without consequences. Agreements on notification, information exchange, and on-site inspections—all of which are necessary to verify treaty arrangements—have been suspended, making it increasingly difficult for both sides to verify the number of nuclear warheads actually deployed on each other’s missiles. The New START Treaty is expected to expire in 2026, with no successor treaty in prospect, leading to further uncertainty.
For the major nuclear powers, this has produced a contradictory situation. Uncertainty about enemy arsenals is increasing and with it the pressure to re-arm. The United States now assumes that by the 2030s it will have to deter two nuclear adversaries of similar strength, Russia and China, rather than a single rival, as when it faced off against the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Controversy continues in American nuclear debates: Some think the United States must match the total strategic arsenals of both rival powers; others argue a smaller number of strategic nuclear weapons could be enough, if supplemented with conventional missiles. A second Trump administration would probably look to expand the nuclear arsenal quantitively, but this could also happen under a Democratic president. This would concern Russia as it fears that an expansion of Western missile defense and an increase in Western conventional missiles stationed in Europe, which could undermine its own second-strike capability.
However, for both Russia and the United States, industrial capacity to develop new strategic delivery systems is severely limited. Current development plans are still based on New START ceilings and will take up all available capacity until the 2030s. Any quantitative upgrade in nuclear arsenals will inevitably entail massive costs and could not be done immediately. Moreover, strategic weapons systems will have to compete for financial resources with conventional systems, which Russia relies on for its war in Ukraine and the United States needs for deterrence against China.
Medium-range Missiles in Europe
For Germany, medium-range missiles are of particular importance, since their greater range means they could potentially be used by or against Russia. In addition, Germany is home to key NATO logistics centers and command structures: In the event of war with Russia, these could become targets. To make matters worse, the improved accuracy of today's medium-range missiles makes them essential weapons in conventional warfare. During the Cold War, these systems were nuclear-armed and thus primarily served purposes of nuclear deterrence and alliance cohesion.
In 2019 the Trump administration pulled the United States out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This 1987 deal between the United States and the Soviet Union entailed both countries destroying land-based cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The US government justified its abandonment of the treaty by citing Russia’s development of the 9M729 cruise missile. US intelligence suggested the new missile system, with a range of over 2,000 kilometers, would violate the INF agreement.
Major changes in conventional warfare must be taken into account if we are to understand the demise of the IMF treaty. The control and domination of airspace continues to be essential for US and allied forces, both in terms of military operations and to ensure effective deterrence. However, in recent years, this capability has been called into question by advances in Russian and Chinese missile technology and air defense. As a result, Washington now fears that areas may emerge where its capacity for military action is severely limited. For worried US allies this could mean that adversaries could make territorial gains in the early stages of a conflict, then securing those gains with nuclear threats.
From the US point of view, ballistic and cruise missiles of different ranges are needed to break up and penetrate these zones, for example by destroying radar systems, logistics hubs, and command structures. These missile systems are considered particularly crucial in the geographically extensive Indo-Pacific region. Unlike Washington, Beijing was not bound by INF restrictions and has been able to build up a considerable arsenal of land-based intermediate-range missiles. For this reason, some observers have suggested Moscow’s breach of the INF treaty may also have been beneficial for the United States.
Germany 2026
Plans to station American conventional medium-range missiles in Germany from 2026 must be seen against this background. Another reason for their deployment is to strengthen US ties to Europe in terms of security policy. In May and June 2024, Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons exercises included the use of systems capable of hitting Germany. Nevertheless, Berlin’s decision to accept the deployment requires some explanation, not least since missiles will only be stationed on German soil, meaning risks within NATO are unevenly distributed.
Conventionally-armed medium-range missiles in Germany, and short-range missiles in Eastern and Northern European countries, have relevance beyond the immediate context of conventional warfare. These missiles have the capacity to reach large parts of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, and its early warning systems, its control structures, and its political leadership, even if this is not their primary function. As a result, they contribute to crisis instability and create pressure for nuclear armament.
Within the conventional context, a broad expansion of missile systems is expected in the coming years, in both Europe and Asia. Germany, Poland, Finland, the Netherlands, and Japan have all initiated the procurement of hundreds of cruise missiles, which will gradually be integrated into their armed forces. For its part, Russia has roughly quadrupled ballistic missile production capacity since it launched its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It has also imported and deployed missiles from North Korea on a large scale.
At the same time, nuclear-weapon states with inferior conventional arsenals are expected to expand the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in their overall defense capacity. In the Russian context, this has led, among other things, to nuclear sharing with Belarus, which may lead to warheads being stationed directly with military units or on delivery systems, rather than in storage facilities, as previously. Countries can also compensate for conventional weakness by deploying a larger number of medium-range nuclear-armed missiles.
Strategic Dilemmas
In the strategic sphere, competition between powers will probably be reflected above all in intensified competition around systems modernization. Russia is relying on new capabilities to overcome defense systems, for example the Sarmat super-heavy missile, said to carry 10 to 15 nuclear warheads, and the Avangard hypersonic glide missile, which flies at an altitude out of reach of current US interceptor capacities. Among other things, the United States is relying on the stealth capabilities of its strategic bomber aircraft, which can carry both conventional and nuclear payloads. The Biden administration has made no decision on quantitative expansion of the US strategic arsenal, but the step has not been ruled out.
One reason for this is large American and Russian reserves of nuclear warheads (the United States has 1,938, Russia an estimated 2,670), which can relatively quickly be mounted on existing strategic delivery systems. Washington may go for this option if China’s nuclear build-up continues. If so, Moscow would probably take the same step, looking to maintain numerical parity with Washington in strategic nuclear forces. For Russia, this would present another challenge: The United States has a greater capacity to “upload” warheads, meaning Moscow might be forced to deploy additional nuclear missiles.
But for the time being at least, industrial bottlenecks and the question of access to warhead reserves are likely to put limits on a numerical arms race in new strategic delivery systems.
Changes in Nuclear Doctrine
Rather than quantitative increases, Russia is more likely to change its nuclear doctrine in the near future to increase the deterrent power of its nuclear forces. Less clearly defined conditions for the use of nuclear weapons—for example, a threat to vital interests—could lead to misunderstandings about the nuclear threshold, while more specific conditions could narrow interpretative scope for decision-makers, creating additional pressure to escalate. Either way, increased risk awareness would be necessary, especially in the early phases of any new context, a time when all sides would have to adjust to known or rumored red lines.
Risks would become even greater if states delegate the chain of command over nuclear weapons to lower levels of authority. In particular, smaller nuclear-weapon states like North Korea may feel compelled to take this step, fearing the possibility of a disabling conventional first strike. For their part, in an escalating conflict large nuclear powers may transfer authority over non-strategic battlefield nuclear weapons to commanders, not least since plans exist for these weapons to be used in conjunction with conventional forces. Finally, there is no current consensus among nuclear powers about the use or non-use of artificial intelligence in nuclear command, control, and communication structures.
This global situation presents a major challenge for Germany. Old certainties no longer apply or are being rapidly called into question. The decisions that Germany makes—whether relating to the United States, China, or Russia—will also have consequences for Europe and beyond. This makes it all the more important for the German foreign policy debate to establish a number of guidelines on this issue.
What Germany Must Consider
First, decisions with potentially far-reaching consequences must be justified in detail by the German government and discussed in the Bundestag and in the wider public sphere. The US-German declaration on the stationing of American long-range weapons, which was made without prior discussion, was not a great moment for German diplomacy, nor did it give the impression of self-confidence on Berlin’s part.
Second, discussion must include the detail of policy. Why is a particular weapons system the right one for Germany? How does it function? What are the costs involved? In what way is it meant to boost deterrence? What would be its targets? What path dependencies could arise from its development and deployment, and how would they complicate or facilitate future action? Opponents of new systems must also address the same level of detail: To what degree does a particular system serve to undermine stability in moments of crisis? What exactly would be its impact on possible arms races? In concrete terms, what would be the possibility of miscommunication and misinterpretation?
Third, procurement and deployment must derive from an overarching political strategy. What are the operational considerations and strategic assessments underlying decisions? Does a weapons system serve solely to strengthen deterrence and warfare capability? Or does the announcement, development, and stationing of a weapons system also communicate a willingness to engage in dialogue, for example in the form of arms control offers, as happened with the NATO double-track decision in 1979?
Fourth, risks must be identified. This applies to the development and deployment of particular weapons, but also any decision not to do so. Unintended escalation is also a possibility, be it through misjudgments, insufficient information or time pressure. In this respect, complementary steps should be taken, combining deterrence and reassurance. This could include declarations that give an indication of the intended targets of intermediate-range missiles, but also what they will not be used on.
Fifth, we must adhere to the principle that international security policy is characterized by sequences of action and reaction. What one country understands as a defensive measure may be seen by another as an offensive one, prompting it to take destabilizing steps. Whether or not deterrence works depends above all on the reactions of the adversary. Acknowledging this is not appeasement.
Sixth, it must be stated more clearly what arms control can and cannot achieve. Arms control cannot prevent intentional wars, but it can increase both the warning time available and the costs for an aggressor. But arms control is not an exercise conducted among friendly states. Rather, by stabilizing adversarial relationships, it represents realpolitik in action.
Lucian Bumeder is a research associate at the Berlin office of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH).
Tobias Fella is a research associate at the Berlin office of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH).
