For much of the past decade, Berlin has been a convenient whipping boy for its failure to spend enough on defense, especially when contrasted with Warsaw, the poster child of European rearmament, spending a larger share of GDP on defense that even the United States. This division of roles suited both sides—Germany economically, Poland politically—but it has begun to shift since Chancellor Friedrich Merz took office. His coalition of center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and center-left Social Democrats (SPD) has taken seriously both NATO’s new capability targets and the core defense spending goal of 3.5 percent of GDP, agreed at the transatlantic alliance’s 2025 summit in The Hague.
As a result, defense spending has been exempted from the country’s constitutional “debt brake,” leading to a sharp increase in planned defense spending. The German defense ministry’s budget is set to rise from the current €86 billion to €152 billion by 2029. Plans to modernize and reform the Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, culminated in the publication, in April 2026, of the Military Strategy and the Bundeswehr Capability Profile, which set out the ambitious goal of building a technologically advanced armed force of 260,000 personnel by 2039. Moreover, Chancellor Merz has repeatedly spoken of creating “the strongest conventional military in Europe,” with Germany assuming a leadership role in European security.
Unsettled Neighbors
Germany’s plans have unsettled its neighbors. Poland is not the only country that has reservations about Berlin’s ambitions. France and the United Kingdom, too, are approaching Germany’s rearmament with some concern, albeit for different reasons. One thing is certain: The European balance of power is shifting as Germany invests heavily in its armed forces while the United States reduces its military presence and steps back from its role as a European hegemon.
In Poland’s case, however, the unease appears to be more pronounced, and the country is engaged in contentious debates about the direction of its western neighbor’s military development and the consequences this may have for Poland. These intense discussions are shaped by history, recent political developments, and Germany’s strategic culture, which give rise to often contradictory arguments about German weaknesses.
It is no secret that Polish-German relations remain burdened by the legacy of Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 and the subsequent brutal occupation, in de facto cooperation with the Soviet Union until 1941. More broadly, Poland’s historical experience—the partition of the country in the late 18th century by powerful neighbors that preyed on the weakness of the Polish state—continues to shape the collective memory of Poles.
More recent history also looms large in Warsaw, particularly Germany’s failed, yet consequential, attempts to forge a strategic partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Equally well remembered is the decision by the then German defense minister, Christine Lambrecht, to send 5,000 helmets to Ukraine in early 2022, just as the Russian full-scale invasion got under way. This move is often cited as emblematic of Germany’s culture of military restraint and its reluctance to engage in military confrontation, especially with Russia.
Consequently, Polish concerns about Germany’s rearmament take different forms. On the one hand, there is widespread skepticism about Berlin’s political willingness to deploy the Bundeswehr in defense of Poland or the Baltic states, raising concerns about excessive military dependencies within a more Europeanized NATO. On the other hand, some fear that a rearmed Germany could one day become a security risk to Poland. Such scenarios range from Berlin using military leverage to advance German interests—potentially in cooperation with Russia—to Germany itself emerging as a military threat in the event of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) coming to power. The sense of uncertainty is being reinforced by the perception that the United States is becoming less willing to play its traditional role as the principal stabilizing force in European security.
German and Polish Misperceptions
The Merz government deserves credit for taking defense seriously and firmly anchoring Germany’s rearmament within NATO. However, its rhetoric about building the strongest conventional military in Europe and assuming a leadership role in European security is far from assured when measured against the political, economic, and societal constraints. What is more, they are extremely unhelpful when it comes to recalibrating security and defense relations in Europe.
Not without reason, the development of the Bundeswehr has been divided into three phases. By 2029, the German armed forces are expected to expand their capabilities as rapidly as possible using existing resources. However, personnel numbers are set to increase only from the current 186,000 to around 204,000 service members. In practice, this amounts largely to filling existing vacancies and reaching the Bundeswehr’s officially declared strength—a target that has remained elusive due to persistent recruitment difficulties. These challenges are unlikely to disappear unless the Bundestag decides to reintroduce compulsory military service for men, a politically contentious issue in Germany. As a result, the more substantial increases in personnel and capabilities are planned only after 2029—that is, following the next federal elections. The responsibility for implementing and financing these ambitious plans will therefore fall largely on future governments. The key question is whether they will follow through. Taken together, these constraints place the narrative of Germany building the strongest conventional military in Europe into a more realistic perspective.
As for the question of leadership, financial resources alone are not sufficient to secure a leading role in European security and defense. Germany is not a nuclear power, and without a national nuclear deterrent Berlin is unlikely to be able to balance Russia through conventional military strength alone. Russian threats of nuclear use—or the actual use of nuclear weapons—would pose a profound challenge to Germany’s political resolve. Moreover, leadership cannot simply be declared; it requires acceptance and recognition by allies. Any German claim to a leadership role in European security is therefore likely to be contested above all by France and the United Kingdom, and, for the reasons outlined above, also by Poland.
Commentators in Poland too often fall into the trap of taking the political narratives of the country’s larger neighbor at face value, rather than testing them against practical constraints. Also, Germany tends to overlook the progress made by the Polish Armed Forces over the past decade through sustained increases in defense spending, modernization, and personnel growth.
The Polish Armed Forces currently comprise more than 217,000 personnel, including professional soldiers, members of the Territorial Defense Force (over 40,000), and volunteers undertaking basic military service (more than 20,000). The long-term objective is to increase this number to 300,000. In 2025, Poland allocated more than €44 billion to defense, with approximately 54 percent of the budget devoted to equipment procurement, compared with just over 20 percent in Germany. Warsaw has also committed to spending 5 percent of GDP on defense in the coming years.
The Polish Armed Forces currently field four divisions and plans to establish two more, while the Bundeswehr has three divisions and intends to raise an additional one. There are areas in which Germany will acquire capabilities beyond Poland’s reach, particularly for its navy and, to some extent, for its air force. However, when it comes to the land domain, Poland’s army is unlikely to be less capable than the Bundeswehr, and in some respects even more so.
Due to the changing US military posture in Europe, Poland and Germany are becoming increasingly interconnected through NATO’s defense planning process. Both countries are equally important elements of the defense plan for Central Europe. Germany is assuming greater responsibility not only for the defense of Lithuania and north-eastern Poland (in cooperation with Poland), but most likely also for the defense of Latvia and Estonia (together with other NATO allies), with US coordination and involvement in future operations. This reality is not reflected in either the German or the Polish debate and narrative on NATO and the alliance’s eastern flank.
Another issue that needs to be addressed when discussing security and defense relations between Warsaw and Berlin is Germany’s tendency to underestimate the progress Poland has made over the past two decades. The country is not only emerging as a major military actor in the region but is also on the verge of becoming the world’s 20th-largest economy, with a growth rate of around 3 to 4 percent in 2025. Poland’s importance has increased significantly, including as Germany’s fourth-largest trading partner. This represents a remarkable success story in terms of political, economic, and social development, one that has elevated Poland’s standing both in Europe and globally despite persistent domestic political polarization. By contrast, Germany’s economy has experienced a period of stagnation in recent years and faces the challenge of redefining its economic model in response to past policy failures and a changing international environment.
The failure to take account of these changing dynamics between Poland and Germany has led to parts of the political elites and public opinion in both countries remaining stuck in outdated perceptions and sentiments that no longer reflect reality. This, in turn, affects the way bilateral relations are shaped, including in the fields of security and defense. Among the older generation of Germans, including within the ministries and the civil service, one can still sense an inclination to treat Poland as the poorer cousin from the east that needs to be lectured, patronized, or, at times, disregarded. Poles, too—still not fully aware of their country’s own success—often fall back on historical resentments toward a seemingly all-powerful Germany. The picture has, however, changed, and this needs to be reflected in the process of adapting the European security order.
Addressing Polish Concerns
To better shape the European debate on Germany’s rearmament, Berlin should address the following issues in particular:
The first is to change the narrative. Rather than focusing on European military leadership, Germany would be better advised to emphasize the shared responsibility for the defense of Central Europe, based on Polish-Baltic-German cooperation and continued US engagement within NATO. The details of NATO’s defense planning demonstrate how closely interconnected Polish, German, and American military efforts would be in the event of collective defense operations on the alliance’s eastern flank. Such an approach would help counter arguments that Germany’s rearmament is a national project that could ultimately pose a threat to its neighbors.
The second point is to include Poland. The most important task in Europe, beyond enhancing military capabilities quickly, is organizing collective political leadership in security and defense. For reasons mentioned above, Germany taking over this task is neither feasible nor accepted. This also applies to of E3 group of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Excluding Poland from discussions on European security—both on ending the Russian-Ukrainian war and on NATO’s adaptation to reduced US military involvement in Europe—risks leaving Polish public opinion and political elites feeling alienated and increasingly suspicious. Poland is too important, both for sustaining support for Ukraine and for adapting NATO to a changing transatlantic security environment, to be left on the sidelines. Bringing Poland into the E3 discussions on these issues, or conducting them in an E5 format, would be the most effective way forward.
And third, Germany should enhance its credibility. Reforming and modernizing the Bundeswehr, alongside changes in political rhetoric and military posture, should be accompanied by investments in capabilities that genuinely strengthen collective defense. These include investments in military mobility—roads, railways, ports, airports, as well as the simplification of regulations and procedures —and the extension of NATO’s Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) to Poland. Both issues are critical for the conduct of collective defense operations in Poland and the Baltic states. Without tangible progress in these areas, whether through NATO or multilateral initiatives, an important component of allied deterrence and defense will remain insufficiently developed. Greater German engagement on both fronts would be highly valued by its allies, as it enhances Germany’s credibility in the region.
Justyna Gotkowska is deputy director of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) and head of its security and defense department.
