On June 3, 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy became the first Ukrainian leader to visit the Republic of the Philippines since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries over 30 years ago. The visit came just one day after Zelensky’s speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. In his address, the Ukrainian president connected Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine to coercive, revisionist, and revanchist behaviors carried out by China in the Indo-Pacific.
That message, and its framing of the states of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific as being in the same global fight over sovereignty, resonated strongly with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and other policymakers in Manila. Although the two leaders did not meet in Singapore, Zelensky’s visit to Manila highlights the growing interest among European and Asian partners in strengthening ties. While the Europeans’ security engagement with the Philippines had started years before, Zelensky’s visit accelerated a series of new defense agreements, dialogues, deployments, and other initiatives. They are quickly establishing the Philippines as the Euro-Atlantic’s newest security pillar in the Indo-Pacific.
The Rise of Euro-Philippine Engagement
Security cooperation between the Philippines and European states stretches back decades. Beyond the EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) security dialogue, which has existed for less than 50 years, formal Euro-Philippine “peace and security” cooperation goes back to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 2012 and implemented in 2018.
The PCA’s legal framework was reinforced by several Indo-Pacific strategies and policy guidelines issued at both the national and European Union levels between 2018 and 2021. Documents published by the French, German, and Dutch governments during that period did not explicitly mention the Philippines. Still, they highlighted issues of importance to the Philippine government’s maritime security, the law of the sea, support for the rules-based order, trade, and broader engagement with Indo-Pacific nations.
In 2021, the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was the first to specifically include the Philippines, listing it alongside other Indo-Pacific countries facing “increasingly similar security challenges and threats.” A subsequent Indo-Pacific strategy document from an EU member state, the Czech Republic, in 2022 also echoed these sentiments. Following President Marcos’ 2022 inauguration, his administration drew on European policy cues and discreetly strengthened defense ties with multiple European countries. Collectively, these efforts reflect a “complex patchwork” of Euro-Philippine political, defense, and security engagement, indicating Manila’s efforts to expand ties beyond the Indo-Pacific.
In 2023 and 2024, the EU and the Philippines aimed to strengthen security cooperation. Paris and Manila started talks on a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOFVA). At the same time, the Philippines and Sweden signed a defense equipment deal and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to purchase Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets. Spain’s agreement with the Philippines on protecting defense-related classified information came into force after years of engagement with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), driven by historic ties and shared maritime interests. The Czech Republic expressed willingness to support the AFP’s modernization efforts, and Germany and the Philippines reaffirmed their commitment to a rules-based international order and the law of the sea. Additionally, Turkey supplied helicopters to the Philippines, and the United Kingdom and the Philippines signed an MOU to boost defense cooperation. This expanding web of Euro-Philippine engagement marked only the beginning of a deeper relationship that accelerated after Zelensky’s visit.
The expansion of these European ties is happening against the backdrop of the Philippines’ long-standing alliance with the United States. A US colony until 1946, the Philippines has been a treaty ally of the United States since 1951. Though this relationship ebbed in the 1990s with the withdrawal of permanent US forces, it has flowed again since 2014 with the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The EDCA allows US troops and materiel rotational access to respond to regional contingencies. The Trump administration has stated that the US commitment to the Philippines is “ironclad.” It has doubled down on US military base access and multilateral exercises in Northern Luzonand the Bashi Channel islands, just south of Taiwan, as well as Palawan Island astride the South China Sea.
Operational Signals
In the year following Zelensky’s visit, Euro-Atlantic militaries transitioned from symbolic engagement to active interoperability with the AFP. France has participated in the Sama Sama exercises for several years and, along with the UK and Germany, has also served as an observer for the Balikatan exercises.
Following Zelensky’s visit, in July and August 2024, the Italian Navy’s flagship aircraft carrier, the ITS Cavour, and its Italian Carrier Strike Group (CSG) on its first deployment to the Indo-Pacific, participated in the annual Exercise Pitch Black, hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force. This was not only the first time an aircraft carrier participated in Exercise Pitch Black but also marked an increase in the number of European militaries involved in joint exercises, including the AFP. The Italian CSG then made a port call to Manila that included humanitarian efforts.
Months later, in early 2025, the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and its CSG conducted combat drills with the Philippine Navy in the West Philippine Sea (also referred to as the “South China Sea”) and docked at Subic Bay for the first time. In April, the Philippines launched the annual Balikatan exercise, with observers from the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Poland in attendance. The UK and France both maintain a permanent presence across the Indo-Pacific, complementing their deepening ties with the Philippines. The UK has forces in Brunei and Singapore, while France maintains a presence in its territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
In September 2025, as part of the HMS Prince of Wales CSG, HMS Richmond made a port visit to Manila with the British deputy defense minister, Lord Vernon Coaker, on board. The purpose of the visit was to initiate discussions on a future UK-Philippines SOFVA. The HMS Richmond’s crew even played a friendly football match against the Philippine Navy. The Philippine government viewed these developments with the UK as “clear support” for the Philippines’ claims in the West Philippine/South China Sea. Together, these exercises and visits have demonstrated Europe’s gradual transformation from a symbolic maritime presence to a sustained, interoperable partner for the AFP.
Cross-Regional Geostrategic Convergence
Overall, the Euro-Philippine cross-regional geostrategic convergence has continued to strengthen. In March 2025, the UK and the Philippines held their first Joint Economic and Trade Committee meeting, with security and defense among the issues on the agenda. Just weeks later, as a direct result of Zelensky’s visit, President Marcos welcomed the first Ukrainian ambassador to Manila. Two months later, Germany and the Philippines signed an Arrangement concerning Defense Cooperation pact following German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’ visit in August 2024. Italy, too, has agreedto accelerate discussions on a bilateral defense deal, which the Italian ambassador to the Philippines noted was advancing “very positively.” In May, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas visited the Philippines to announce the upcoming EU-Philippines Security and Defense Dialogue.
Europe’s Nordic and Baltic countries are playing important roles, too. In March 2025, Swedish lawmakers visited the Philippines to reaffirm the country’s support for closer defense ties. In June, Stockholm appointed a new non-resident defense attaché to the Philippines, stating that the Philippines is “a natural partner for Sweden in promoting a rules-based global order and enhancing security cooperation.” At the end of June 2025, the Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Dovilė Šakalienė visited the Philippines to sign an MOU, as “Lithuania sees the Philippines as an important partner” in strengthening regional stability, public resilience, and defense capabilities.
Six Drivers Behind Euro-Philippine Convergence
Taking a step back, the security convergence between Europe and the Philippines is propelled by six potential drivers.
First, sovereignty and maintaining the rules-based order remain possibly the central drivers, with Chinese coercion and lawfare in the West Philippine/South China Sea mirroring Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.
Second, responses to gray-zone and hybrid threats are another driver, as exemplified by recent alleged Russian drone incursions across Europe and a desire for Europeans and Filipinos to share best practices on maritime domain awareness, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns.
Third, defense-industrial interests are also driving engagement. As the AFP advances its Re-Horizon 3 modernization plan, European firms such as Saab and Leonardo are interested in the Philippines’ defense market. This driver will become more prominent as European defense budgets and the availability of platforms grow.
Fourth, outreach to the countries of the so-called “Global South” is a key driver, especially for Ukraine. European governments view the Philippines as a democratic bridge in Asia that can amplify like-minded perspectives among blocs like ASEAN, thereby counteracting the influence of China and Russia. Notably, the Philippines has supported Ukraine since Russia’s initial invasion of Crimea in 2014.
Fifth, contingency planning for Taiwan is a potential, yet unspoken, driver. European officials have repeatedly stated since 2022 that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait could pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic stability. This is evident in the growing ties over the past decade between Taiwan and three Central and Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Lithuania.
Sixth and finally, lessons from the First Island Chain can provide valuable insights into island-hopping warfare, which are relevant for Baltic Sea operations. Overall, increased cooperation with the Philippines, a frontline democracy with strategic geography, thus represents a pragmatic investment in deterrence, resilience, and upholding a shared rules-based international order.
Building for the Long Term
The rise of the Philippines as a key partner in Euro-Atlantic engagement across the Indo-Pacific indicates that these transregional relationships are not temporary; they are being built for the long term. By expanding its political, defense, and security ties, Europe is demonstrating both a strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific and a willingness to learn from a frontline democracy that faces gray-zone and hybrid threats daily.
For Manila, these partnerships help build diplomatic capital beyond traditional allies in ASEAN, Japan, and the United States, while also providing access to new suppliers and opportunities for defense modernization. Growing ties with Euro-Atlantic security partners also enable the Philippines to improve training, exchange best practices, and prepare more effectively for potential crises.
For Europe, the experience offers valuable lessons in gray-zone deterrence, archipelagic and coastal defense, outreach to the Global South, and strategic capacity-building relevant to a Taiwan contingency. From the Baltic Sea to the West Philippine/South China Sea, this growing Euro-Philippine connection shows how democracies can enhance deterrence across regions and why more European capitals should follow in building ties.
Bryce C. Barros is an Associate Fellow with GLOBSEC’s GeoTech Center. He is based in Taiwan and has worked at the intersection of the Indo-Pacific, Euro-Atlantic, emerging technology, and national security.
