You took over the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in May 2025 and presented a comprehensive reform plan eight months later. Why was “carrying on as before” in German development policy not an option for you?
The main reason for the realignment is the current global situation. We are experiencing momentous upheavals and an increasingly multipolar world. Old alliances no longer hold. We find ourselves in a world order in which new rules apply, or in some cases there are no rules at all. At the same time, there are cuts in the federal budget, especially in my budget. That’s why it was clear to me from the outset that we must reform in order to handle this new global situation with fewer resources.
Apart from the need to save money—which applies across the federal budget with the exception of defense expenditure—and the changed global situation, what role did the demands and needs of partner countries play in the reform considerations?
A major role. Many partner countries would like to see closer cooperation with Germany. While others are pulling back, we are making it clear that we are a reliable partner. That is being noted. At the same time, I quickly realized when I talked to people that they want more honesty when it comes to where interests lie, and it is clear that we, too, have interests. A partnership on equal terms requires that they are clearly stated.
The traditional goal of development policy is to reduce global injustices. With the reform, you are now also pursuing the goal of focusing more clearly on national economic interests. How do you combine these two goals?
It’s about German interests—not just German economic interests. And combating inequality is, of course, in our interest. For me, the reform is about value-driven and interest-driven development policy. These are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it is in our own best interests to combat global inequality and the effects of climate change, to prevent crises, and to support people in crisis areas. This is part of the core DNA of German development cooperation.
And these interests which Germany is pursuing with its development policy, were they not adequately identified before?
Of course, interests were also important in the past. With the reform, I am implementing both a thematic and a regional strategic focus. We are taking a more precise look at where we are most effective and stating this clearly.
And what are the results of this?
One focus of my development policy remains overcoming poverty, hunger, and inequality. With this reform, we will ensure that in particular countries where the need is greatest receive more support. At the same time, we will help these countries become financially independent in the long term. Permanent dependency is not a forward-looking solution.
When it comes to peace and stabilization, our own neighborhood is our top priority. This is in Germany’s interest and contributes to our security. This regional focus is on the EU neighborhood, on North Africa and the Middle East, and also on the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa.
In emerging economies such as India, Mexico, and South Africa, the focus is more on economic cooperation and climate. Here, we will mainly work with loans rather than grants in the context of Financial Cooperation.
One consequence of this regional focus is that engagement in the area of peace and stabilization in Latin America is to be discontinued. Does that mean that your ministry will no longer be involved in the ongoing peace efforts in Colombia, for example?
These are primarily diplomatic efforts. We will continue to work with our partner countries in Latin America and will not withdraw from any country. However, we are focusing our engagement in this region on democracy and the rule of law. What we will no longer be able to afford in the future is our involvement in Latin America as it pertains to refugees, such as supporting Latin American countries in taking in refugees.
With this reform, you want to strengthen multilateral processes in a targeted manner. In return, some bilateral cooperation is to be scaled back, for example in the area of health. Why was this decision made?
That is not entirely true. We are making use of all possible tools. Bilateral cooperation remains central; it is our greatest strength—compared with other donor countries, too.
At the same time, we examined the areas in which, working via large multilateral alliances such as the global vaccine alliance Gavi or the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, we can achieve more with fewer resources than we can through bilateral cooperation.
You mentioned the declining budget. While the BMZ still had €12.4 billion at its disposal in 2020, this figure had fallen to just €10.3 billion by 2025. Your reform plan states that “prevention is more cost-effective than acute relief in response to a crisis.” Are cuts really justifiable in this context?
Of course, I would like to see more funding given the current challenges. But even the BMZ has not been spared from cutbacks. But let me be perfectly clear: I have done my bit here. Further cuts would not be wise.
Does the federal government still feel committed to the internationally agreed official development assistance (ODA) ratio, i.e., the target of spending 0.7 percent of GDP on official development assistance?
Yes. However, the coalition agreement stipulates an appropriate reduction in the ODA ratio. This makes the situation challenging because there are different interpretations of what “appropriate” means. That is why I say that I have done my bit with the budget cuts already made.
It is also important to note that only one third of ODA funds come from the BMZ budget. I think there is sometimes a misunderstanding about this. A large proportion of the funds which count as ODA come from other sources, such as the federal states or other ministries.
The reform refers to a triad of development, diplomacy, and defense. What new role do you see for your ministry?
Development policy must play a greater role in this triad. It is an integral part of our German security architecture. Thus, it is logical that we are represented in the national security council. However, we would also like to expand our role here and position ourselves even more effectively. As part of the reform, we are creating a dedicated unit within the BMZ that will focus on strategic outlook.
The BMZ and its partners are active in regions where, in some cases, no one else is present. The German armed forces had to withdraw from Mali, for example. We are continuing to support the local people there. We want to make much greater use of this presence to prevent crises and enable us to intervene more quickly.
Does that mean that cooperation with other ministries mainly takes place within the National Security Council?
We work closely with the other ministries. We are pooling our coordination efforts in the area of security in the new national security council. This is particularly necessary at the moment.
The Directorate-General for Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance, the so-called Directorate-General S, is being dissolved as part of the restructuring of the German Foreign Office. Does this mean that your ministry will be needed even more?
Each ministry carries out reorganizations independently. We are working closely with the foreign office and looking at how we can better shape the transitions between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. This is particularly relevant in crisis contexts, such as in Gaza.
Given these overlaps in content, there are repeated calls for the two ministries to be merged. What is your opinion on this?
The BMZ has been in existence for 60 years. We have decades of expertise. Right now, we need this expertise for new partnerships and alliances. It is precisely for this reason that the current federal government has decided against merging the two ministries. Abolishing the BMZ is therefore not up for debate.
You also refer to the BMZ as the “reconstruction ministry.” How do you intend to substantiate this claim?
Giving people a future is a fundamental tenet of German development policy and a guiding principle for our work. This is particularly true in countries that have been devastated by war and crisis. There, we support people in rebuilding their countries and aim to give them a future. Conflicts have increased to an alarming extent, particularly in our immediate neighborhood. In order to provide effective support here, we are setting up our own department for reconstruction—with a focus on Ukraine, Syria, and, in the long term, Gaza.
On Gaza: What role does Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace” play in your plans?
Germany is not part of this. The chancellor has made that clear. However, it is true that we are prepared to play an important role in the reconstruction process. To this end, we are continuing our discussions with all stakeholders, including the members of this committee, on the reconstruction of Gaza.
What forms of cooperation with the Americans remain after the end of USAID and the general withdrawal of the US from development policy?
Cooperation has become more difficult. The US was not represented at the G20 Development Ministers’ Meeting in South Africa in July 2025. Under the current American G20 presidency, there will be no development agenda.
I also deeply regret that the US has withdrawn from the global vaccine alliance Gavi. In Sierra Leone, which I visited in January this year, this means around 60 percent fewer vaccinations for children under the age of five, in a country where almost 10 percent of all children die before their fifth birthday, one in five of them from malaria.
At the G7 Development Ministers’ Meeting in October 2025, I met a colleague from the state department for the first time who is responsible for development issues. I want to stay in touch because, despite major differences, we can now see that the US is not withdrawing completely: it is still present in Congo and Gaza. That is why I am continuing to engage in dialogue with them.
The United Nations Development Program, or UNDP for short, recently announced that it would be relocating large parts of its headquarters from New York to Bonn. Is this an indication that players are no longer counting on the US in their medium to long-term planning?
Above all, it is a sign that Germany supports the multilateral system and stands by the United Nations. I have also advocated personally for many UNDP employees to find a new home in Bonn. As the responsible minister from the UNDP’s largest contributor, it is important to me to develop the UN City of Bonn into a central location for sustainable development. Back in November, I inaugurated an office of the UN women’s organization UN WOMEN in Bonn together with the Mayor of Bonn. We have achieved this great success by working together across party, state, and municipal lines.
You repeatedly emphasize that Germany alone cannot compensate for the loss of the US. Who do you see as the most important partner in Europe?
Cooperation with the European Commission is important, especially with Commissioners Jozef Síkela and Hadja Lahbib, who are responsible for development cooperation and for crises. In addition, I have a good working relationship with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas, who is also responsible for development.
At the same time, there are many like-minded countries, such as France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Ireland, with which I am in regular contact.
And outside Europe?
In addition to the G20 countries Canada and Australia, it is primarily the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia. I was the first German development minister to visit Riyadh because countries like Saudi Arabia are particularly active in Africa and are increasingly expanding their development cooperation there.
Is China a country that Germany can work with when it comes to development policy, despite the fact that it primarily pursues its own goals? Or does it make more sense to distance ourselves?
We must acknowledge that China is becoming increasingly present on the African continent and also in South America. Of course, many global issues cannot be addressed without China. Tackling the climate crisis is one example. When it comes to global issues in particular, we must try to find joint solutions at a multilateral level, for example within the framework of the G20 or the World Bank. However, there is no official bilateral development cooperation with China.
Acceptance of development policy among the German population has been declining for years. According to the DEval Opinion Monitor, 68 percent were still in favor of maintaining or increasing spending on development cooperation in 2022, but two years later that figure had fallen to just 47 percent. How are you dealing with this?
The goal must be to explain development policy better. I am a member of parliament, with my own constituency, and I know what the mood is like on the subject of development cooperation in times of declining funds.
At the same time, we see that approval ratings rise significantly when people are asked specifically whether Germany should be involved in combating hunger and poverty, especially when it comes to children and young people.
I am also encouraged by the fact that civil society and church organizations tell us that Germans continue to donate generously. This is precisely where my reform approach comes in: shaping the future together globally, with a clear focus on the BMZ’s core mission—and making it clear why doing so is also in our interest.
Let’s take a look at the year 2029. You will be campaigning in the parliamentary elections, your term of office will be coming to an end—at least provisionally. How will you determine whether your term of office has been successful?
By the fact that we were able to show why international solidarity and responsibility are so important right now.
The interview was conducted by Max Gotthans, Henning Hoff, and Tim Hofmann. Translated from the German by Kate Brown (the original version can be found here).
Reem Alabali Radovan is the youngest member of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’ cabinet. Born in Moscow in 1990, she grew up in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, a federal state in Germany’s north-east. In 2020 she was appointed as the federal state’s integration official and then worked in a similar role on the national level, as a minister of state at the chancellery (2021-25) under Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the center-left Social Democrats (SPD). In May 2025, she was sworn in as Germany’s youngest ever development minister, and the first who had arrived in the country as the daughter of refugees.
The IPQ Spring 2026 issue, out on March 27, will focus on German foreign policy.
