January 2026 confirmed the moment of political rupture. US President Donald Trump spelled out his detest for international law and norms, and perhaps most significantly, allies in Europe. The year started with news of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s sudden capture without any legal mandate or international backing. Next came threats to invade Greenland, the sovereign territory of a NATO ally, and then a rambling speech at Davos where Trump defended his legally-questionable tariffs and usurping of trade norms. As the bombing of Iran weeks later confirmed, the United States is no longer a member of “the West,” the broadly democratic, liberal set of alliances that has formed since World War II.
A World of Two Super Powers
For the “residual West”—encompassing Europe and Pacific states like Japan and Australia—China also presents a concern. China has achieved self-reliance in many key sectors, whilst making the world dependent on its economy. It is now weaponizing that dependency in areas like critical minerals to achieve strategic goals. The residual West is thus being squeezed from both sides, having to contemplate competition and threats from two hostile superpowers.
For many in the (poorly defined) “Global South” a relatively hostile world is familiar and yet the ongoing rupture adds significant jeopardy. These countries can no longer call out US hypocrisy to constrain Washington’s aggression. Similarly, they cannot reliably appeal to values shared with the United States, whether action to prevent conflict or to secure development aid. Rather Trump has imposed the highest reciprocal tariffs on many of the poorest nations and is increasingly threatening territorial sovereignty in the Western hemisphere.
Meanwhile, those in China’s neighborhood face its aggressive pursuit of territorial ambitions in the South China Sea and Himalayas. Equally its economic doctrine of over-production and competence across the entire technology spectrum—from kettles to cutting-edge electric cars— is blocking the industrialization pathway broadly used by East and Southeast Asian states. Other economies will struggle to compete on the price of basic goods despite their cheap labor. Consequently, both the Global South and the residual West face threats of de-industrialization and unequal joblessgrowth.
Carney’s Response
Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech at Davos provided the first eloquent articulation of this rupture to the global order. Whilst not romanticizing the past and the inconsistent way in which norms and rules were applied, Carney acknowledged the great loss this represents, whether in forging joint action on global public goods or solving conflicts and reducing weapons proliferation.
However, Carney also tried to paint a hopeful picture of a future where a coalition of “middle powers” maintains the internationalist spirit and unites to shore up their own security, continue enriching economic cooperation, and solve global challenges. This has triggered a raft of analyses and opinion pieces calling for a new united front, whilst key politicians, notably Finland’s Prime Minister Alex Stubb and Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, spelled out their visions for the emergent world order uniting the residual West and Global South.
How likely is such a coalition to come together? Will a new third way, non-aligned group emerge between the China-US superpower competition? While greater cooperation between the so-called middle powers is likely given their shared strategic interest, history suggests, however, that this group lacks the ideological glue necessary to sustain a deeper and more powerful global movement. Its divergent understandings of international relations, contrasting structural economic positions, and converse histories create significant barriers.
The Parallels and Differences to the NAM
Carney’s rhetoric contains striking parallels to the logics of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of the 20th century. Forged in the Cold War’s geopolitical bifurcation, the Non-Aligned Movement mainly united independence leaders who, having achieved liberation from colonialism, did not want to become Soviet or US vassal states. They rejected alliances and attempted to play Eastern and Western blocs off against each other, extracting finance and technology on a case-by-case basis. Through weight of numbers, the NAM developing countries hoped to influence global governance, particularly at the UN. Simultaneously, they pledged to forge equal partnerships for technology transfer and economic growth.
Today, as in the NAM era, there is a recognition of the urgent imperative of strategic independence and belief that collective action could provide the answer. Whether in the realm of technology development, trade, or security partnerships, “the rest” have the resources to develop alternatives and stand a better chance of achieving strategic independence than the former NAM states. Afterall, this group would contain countries with leading universities (e.g., in Europe, Japan, and Australia), advanced militaries (e.g., France and the United Kingdom), and significant shares of global financial capital. Moreover, the weight of their collective action would be far stronger, given their representation of the majority of the global economy and its population.
There are signs of this emerging coalition when it comes to trade. The European Union’s recently agreed trade deals with India and Mercosur (notwithstanding the EU parliamentary stumbling block) demonstrate intent, as does the reported Europe-Pacific initiatives. Both deals were pushed through on an accelerated timeline by their respective governments cognizant of the need to provide alternatives given the US tariffs.
However, beyond trade, is a new strategic coalition possible?
Will Countries Need to Choose?
The logic for such a third bloc is contested. Some assert that independence from the US and China is impossible given their military power, economic heft, and technological leadership. Whether it is AI models, semi-conductors, internet hardware, electric vehicles or renewables, either the US or China are leaders, holding near monopolies on parts of the supply chain.
For many countries in Africa, China is increasingly the main game in town. Over the last 20 years Beijing, regional Chinese governments, and firms large and small have taken the initiative, becoming the continent’s main trading partner, key source of finance and technology suppliers, whether in electric automobiles or telecoms.
An alternative view, exemplified by international relations scholar Amitav Acharya, is that countries will adopt multi-alignment and avoid taking sides. His theory of multiplexity argues that the world resembles a multiscreen cinema, with numerous orders, coalitions, and collectives emerging and that countries are able to choose between: In this analogy, some may want to sit through a whole movie, fully subscribing to a particular set of norms, rules, and interconnection, whereas others will pick and choose.
This theory refutes the idea of multipolarity, as it is premised on hard power dominance and the need for less powerful countries to choose. Rather, multipolarity asserts that as power dissipates from the unipolar US dominance of the 1990s, Global South powers, as well as those in the West, will want to maintain the freedom to mix and match, often in more fluid and informal institutional structures. Countries will align on specific issues, say the governance of AI, but diverge on others, such as the imposition of sanctions.
India might be the prime example of a multiplex actor. It has long maintained relations across geopolitical divides, building its own status and avoiding reliance on a single partner. Thus, India continues to maintain its friendship with Russia, whilst growing a technological partnership with Germany, at the same time as purchasing high-end military kit from the US and receiving large inward investment from China.
However, the current rupture of international relations challenges the multiplex theory. The US and China’s weaponizing of economic and military dependence shows cooperation is not risk-free. Access to US and Chinese technology may also come with increased conditionality, such as entailed by former US President Joe Biden’s CHIPS Act, pushing countries to pick sides. Carney’s thesis is premised on this more hostile reality, in which the only way to achieve strategic independence is to forge a third-way, middle coalition that develops its own technology, military, and economic capabilities.
Who Are the Middle Powers?
If there is to be a new “third-way” coalition, which countries should it include? Carney’s speech talked about a league of “middle powers” but whilst this term is a well-established phrase in Canadian diplomacy—described by Thorsten Benner “as Canadian as maple syrup”—it isn’t accepted elsewhere.
Many countries reject being labelled a middle power, at least publicly. The nuclear-armed, permanent UN Security Council members France and the UK don’t embrace the term. Similarly, the EU has consistently sought recognition as an alternative pole in the world, given its global economic and technological weight. India has similar aspirations, wanting to become its own great, civilizational power with considerable independence and freedom of action. Brazil also yearns for international recognition as a major power.
Whilst rhetorical, these differences are indicative of wider rifts in the middle power group, not least in their acceptance of co-dependencies.
There are also questions of who the coalition should involve. Should it, for example, encompass the Gulf monarchies? Their personalized rule rejects the pretense of a democratic state whilst Saudi and Emirati actions in the wars in Yemen and Sudan contrast with the progressive ideals outlined by Carney. Yet, Merz’ Munich Security conference speech included them alongside the Western states, India, and Brazil.
Should the coalition rather focus on the supposedly “like-minded” democracies of the residual West, essentially Europe plus Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea? Surely though, to solve global challenges, any new constellation would need to include at least India, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa, given their economic heft, geostrategic importance, and diplomatic prominence? To answer this, it is useful to assess these countries’ different histories.
Struggling Against the Weight of History
The proposed middle power strategic alignment spans “developing/Global South countries” that are largely former colonies and “industrial/Global North” former colonialists. This matters. Global South countries rightly view the previous world order with suspicion. It preached a doctrine of economics and international relations that primarily empowered the Global North.
Market-led economics hurt many developing countries from the 1980s onwards. Those that managed to thrive, like Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, adopted a different model with strong state intervention and degrees of trade protectionism.
Longstanding intellectual traditions amongst the Global South powers critique the previous architecture and practice of global governance. To generalize, Global South governments often felt only able to block, not reshape, international decision-making processes whether on trade, climate change or nuclear proliferation. For example, there is widespread critique that just five permanent members of the UN Security Council can override the global majority. Similarly, despite having to accept disastrous IMF Structural Adjustment Plans, developing countries have a minority of votes on the IMF’s board.
Thus, whilst many in the “residual West” would like to resuscitate the 20th-century order, others from the Global South have continuing grievances against the Global North and each side has fundamentally different views of international relations and governing priorities. Afterall, the Global South, although heterogenous, typically faces different development realities and scales of poverty than those of the generally richer and more technologically advanced West.
The colonial experience has also influenced views on sovereignty, with most in the Global South asserting principles of non-interference, autonomy, and self-reliance. Amongst the top strategic aims for Global South actors is the ability to freely operate, particularly in areas of trade and industrial policy.
Thus, for the Global South, security alliances and legally-binding treaties are viewed as highly suspicious and potentially neo-imperialistic, whilst for the West, these have been a source of strength and mutual benefit. Trust built through action versus trust built through treaty. These differences have spawned common critiques in Western diplomatic circles of Global South countries being “difficult,” obstructionist, and free-riding (reaping the benefits of Western interventions without contributing to security or the provision of global public goods). In contrast the West’s espousing of democracy and sustainable development, is seen as hypocritical and neocolonial.
Russia, Gaza, and Legacy Problems
These historically-imbued differing viewpoints, and economic structural realities, create a hurdle for any new coalition. They make the formation of new alliances and legally-binding treaties harder to sustain and shape states’ willingness to agree to new economic dependencies.
Opposing relationships with Russia demonstrate the significance of these fissures. As made clear by the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow poses an existential threat to Europe. Russia’s hybrid war against Europe has, if anything, heightened this threat perception, encompassing sabotage, blocking airports, devastating cyber-attacks, and cuts to undersea internet and power cables.
In contrast, many Global South powers maintain close relations with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. India and South Africa conduct joint military exercises and support the Russian economy, for instance by trading dual-use technologies. The “residual West” has often made substantial efforts to compartmentalize these relationships with Moscow as they pursue closer ties. Perhaps the best example of this are UK, Germany, and EU-India relations which have substantially grown across the trade, defense, and technology sectors in the last three years, despite Delhi’s proximity to Moscow. However, this tolerance is partly premised on the India-Russia relationship lessening, which is debatable. Furthermore, continued India-Russia economic ties, particularly in the supply of technology and especially that with dual military use, will continue to generate tension and could well reduce the ceiling of India-Europe collaboration: Europe can’t afford to inadvertently support its enemy.
Europe asking for universal condemnation of Russia also looks hypocritical amidst the West’s disunity on criticizing Isreal for its campaign against Gaza, when Isreal appears to have broken the same international laws as Russia has in Ukraine.
Existing global governance groups could create further tension. China and Russia have promoted the Shanghai Security Organisation (SCO) and BRICS as alternatives to Western-led institutions and governance initiatives from NATO to the G7 and World Bank. Thus, membership of these groups may undermine trust amongst the “residual West” that a country really believes in building a middle coalition. Conversely, Europe’s continuing membership of NATO, or other US alliance structures, could create a similar concern amongst Global South countries if they take a hardline approach to de-risking from Washington. History has a tendency to lock in pathways that countries will find hard to escape.
Another area of concern stems from domestic political fissures that would undermine internationalist, progressive engagement. Europe has a resurgent far right with extensive ties to the Trump world, an isolationist streak, and often active hostility to the Global South. Such governments would likely reject the compromises, and the internationalist spirit, necessary to maintain a new “majority middle coalition.”
Comparable movements exist in the Global South, such as former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro whose term in office rapidly reversed Brasilia’s previous diplomatic positions. Add to this the ongoing retreat of democracy across the world and rise of majoritarian politics in countries like India and South Africa, and there are threats to the resilience and longevity of a new internationalist coalition from within and without.
The Importance of Shared Ideologies
It could be argued that the Non-Aligned Movement shows how such fissures can be overcome. Afterall, the NAM contained a wide variety of regimes, from military dictatorships to democracies, non-Soviet communist states to outwardly capitalist ones. Two factors held the group together; strategic interests and ideas.
The colonial experience created crucial ideological common ground, with the NAM being largely constituted of liberation movements. This meant participant politicians tended to have a shared relatively maximalist belief in sovereignty, autonomy, and self-reliance, whether in their political system or economic governance. Non-interference was, at least rhetorically, an article of faith. Equally solidarity, the principle that developing countries should support each other, became a rallying cry. Governments in the NAM also broadly shared a fervent anti-imperialism, calling out interventions by the US especially, criticizing the global governance architecture as embedding colonial era power structures, and articulating a New International Economic Order. By extension, many in the NAM were deeply committed to fighting Apartheid South Africa.
These shared ideological principles created important underpinning glue for the NAM but was matched by shared strategic interests. As established above, these interests rested on the logic that whilst individually weak, the NAM had collective strength. Through associated groupings like the G77, the NAM countries changed agreements at the World Trade Organization, Climate Change COP summits, and the UN General Assembly.
As the 20th century wore on, these strategic interests and ideological commonalities faded. Liberation movements matured into incumbent parties or were replaced over time by politicians with different interests and ideas. Whilst more comparable at the NAM’s birth, constituent countries’ economic development also varied widely with, for example, transformative growth in India or Indonesia contrasting with the middling performance of Tanzania and Zambia. This in turn created different strategic interests. However, this fracturing only underlines the importance of the shared ideological and strategic underpinnings for any new coalition of middle powers.
The Absence of Ideological Glue
What, then, is a sensible prognosis? At this stage, answers are inevitably speculative but there are reasons to believe that diplomatic fissures and divergent historical legacies can be partially overcome.
On the economic front, progress is being made on trade: The COVID-19 pandemic, and the threat of Chinese mercantilism, has led to the West’s rediscovery of industrial policy and appreciation of economically activist states. The market-triumphalist doctrine that ruled the West to varying extents from the 1980s seems to be passing.
This opens the door to greater economic cooperation between the Global North and South, whether on remaking parts of the global financial system to reduce US dependence, or policies that deliver non-Chinese green technologies. Equally, the pragmatic turn in Europe also shifts foreign policy in the direction of the NAM’s principles of mutual respect, non-interference, and equal partnerships. These ideas are reflected in Finland’s Values-Based Realism and the current UK Labour government’s Progressive Realism.
Thus, several politicians seem optimistic: In an article to coincide with the Munich Security Conference, Merz asserted that the potential middle coalition shares a “fundamental interest in an order in which we trust agreements, tackle global problems together, and resolve conflicts peacefully.”
However, we should question how far such values are shared. Contrasting North and South, democratic and illiberal middle powers have fundamentally different approaches to foreign policy. Their structural economic positions diverge. They are not held together by an equivalent post-colonial ideological glue as existed for the diverse Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, the contestation by the far right creates a degree of instability to any progressive or internationalist project.
Therefore, as multilateralism expert Stewart Patrick argues, we are likely to see an array of different initiatives, with various mini-laterals working alongside the multilateral legacy institutions and no single identifiable framework like the NAM. It’s hard to see a deep security alliance that provides guarantees and develops cutting-edge military technology extending beyond the “residual West”: Such security partnerships tend to require legal alliance structures that continue to make diplomats in capitals from Brasilia to Delhi queasy and are jeopardized by many potential partners continuing relations with Russia.
Elsewhere, cooperation is easier to imagine. Specific partnerships to tackle global public goods, whether in soft security issues like piracy and illegal fishing, or others like climate change, already exist and could gain in strength. An ambitious middle coalition could try to take over the World Bank in order to pursue economic development objectives. Equally, it’s possible to imagine successful new technology partnerships in areas like space and pharmaceuticals that increase strategic independence.
However, it is harder to see a coalition rising to key tests. Could the new coalition forge rules on collective threats, such as artificial intelligence, cyber security, and weapons proliferation? Could it extend security over, for instance, maritime geographies? Hard yards of diplomacy await.
The summer issue of IPQ, out on June 30, will focus on the EU as a middle power and its new partnership strategy.
Barnaby Dye is a British Academy Global Innovation Fellow at the Germany Council of Foreign Relations (DGAP) and a lecturer at King’s College London.
