Germany’s loss to Portugal and Austria in early June was its first-ever defeat in an attempt to earn a two-year term on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The result is notable because for more than two decades Germany—along with its partner countries Japan, India, and Brazil in the “G4”—has argued that it deserves a permanent seat on the UNSC similar to the permanent members: the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, also known as the P5.
If Germany cannot convince UN member states any longer that it deserves a non-permanent seat (it did six such stints in the past), its chances of meriting a permanent seat in the eyes of the international community are much diminished. The results of the election should prompt Germany’s political elite to reflect not only on their country’s place in the world, but also to revisit their approach to reforming the Security Council. With a permanent seat now likely out of reach, Berlin should consider the establishment of a new category of membership—a “semi-permanent” seat—that would benefit middle powers and “small” countries alike.
Hubris and Hypocrisy
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul was quick to attribute his country’s defeat to its support for Ukraine and Israel. It would not be surprising if Russia had conducted a behind-the-scenes effort aimed at torpedoing Germany’s bid. But such a negative campaign could have been overcome if Germany had proven itself to be a more reliable custodian of international peace and security in the eyes of UN member states.
The real reasons for Germany’s defeat involve hubris and hypocrisy. The former was evident in Berlin’s late entrance into the race and its efforts to strong-arm countries that had already pledged their support to the other two candidates into reversing their positions. Clearly, the German elite has not fully internalized the reality of a global landscape in which power has grown more diffuse, leaving Berlin’s relative clout diminished.
But it is the latter aspect—hypocrisy—that most clearly exposed the inadequacy of Germany’s candidacy. For more than four years, under both Christian Democrat (CDU/CSU)- and Social Democrat (SPD)-led governments, Berlin has uncompromisingly lectured the international community about the need to uphold the so-called rules-based international order in the wake of Russia’s decision to launch an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
But the “rules” turned out to be more malleable when Western political interests were at stake. Germany supported Israel’s conduct in Gaza, even as the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his defense minister. After the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran in violation of the UN Charter, Merz noted that now was “not the time to lecture our partners and allies.” He even praised Israel’s earlier attack on Iran last year, claiming that it was doing the “dirty work for all of us.” Merz also equivocated on calling out the US kidnapping of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro earlier this year as a breach of international law.
This is not the track record of a defender of the UN Charter. The contrast between these stances and Berlin’s break with Moscow since 2022 is impossible to ignore. Naturally, this raised doubts over whether Germany could be trusted to champion international law consistently as an elected member of the Security Council.
An Opportunity
Today’s deepening crisis of international order, in which the “rules” themselves are increasingly in question, requires robust multilateral institutions to mitigate the risk of conflict and instability. This will be impossible without multilateral reform, given that the composition of the UNSC still resembles the world of 1945 rather than the world of 2026.
Germany should treat this defeat as an opportunity to rethink both its approach to international law and its increasingly unrealistic proposal for UNSC reform, the G4 formula. Changes on both fronts would go a long way toward regaining the international community’s trust.
Reforming the composition of the Security Council requires the support of two thirds of all member states to amend the UN Charter. Unfortunately, for the past two decades, no model for reform has managed to clear that bar. And given Germany’s—and, to a lesser extent, Japan’s—relative decline on the world stage since the group’s formation in 2005, the G4 proposal comes across as even less feasible than before.
One way forward would be to propose the creation of a “semi-permanent” category of membership—an elected pool of countries that would take turns serving multiple longer-lasting terms on a rotating basis. For example, with a 15-country pool, being elected just once could entitle a country to serve two separate four-year terms on the Council, with five countries serving at a time. In other words, countries in the pool would sit on the Council for a guaranteed eight years out of 24 before new elections were held.
Improving the Status Quo
Such a proposal offers the potential for a marked improvement over the status quo for the majority of middle powers, including countries such as Italy, Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan, and South Korea, who oppose the G4 model because it would bolster the status of their regional competitors. But by taking 15 states out of the running for a non-permanent seat, it would also raise the chances of others earning a place on the Council.
Electing a rotating pool would also provide creative opportunities to grow the representation of cross-regional groupings, such as Arab countries and small island states, without excessively increasing the overall size of the Council. And with longer terms allowing semi-permanent members to develop greater fluency in UNSC business, power would become more decentralized—diluting the relative influence of the P5 and giving elected members more space to pursue their own priorities. Outgoing semi-permanent members would also be eligible for immediate re-election.
Embracing this proposal is not a substitute for deeper reflection on what has ailed German foreign policy. But by improving the lot of so many countries, it would help to build the two-thirds support of all member states necessary for reform, demonstrating that Germany continues to take the interests and perspectives of the international community to heart. And in an increasingly post-unipolar world, it would also offer Germany a more realistic pathway toward upgrading its status on the Security Council.
Zachary Paikin is deputy director of the Better Order Project at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Trita Parsi is director of the Better Order Project at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
