General Hodges, as a former commander of the US Army Europe and in other ways, you embody the transatlantic relationship as we used to know it. How do you view the current situation?
Three things come to mind immediately as I look at what’s happening on a strategic level. First, I worry about the implications for American security and prosperity, if we damage our relationship with our European allies and damage our credibility within NATO. I think this has long term negative consequences. We depend on the access that European nations give us for air bases and seaports all over Europe.
Second: The perception of American commitment to NATO’s Article 5 and to deterrence in Europe, does it lead on the Russian side to the assumption that we Americans don’t really care? Does that cause the Russians to think that we are vulnerable? And do they make a terrible miscalculation because they sense that we are not willing to do what needs to be done? And that would have implications, obviously, not only for European security, but also for American security. There are hundreds of thousands of Americans that live and work all over Europe. There are thousands of American businesses all over Europe.
And third, on a personal level: I started my career in Germany, in West Germany, as a brand new lieutenant in 1981. My first posting was in Garlstedt, at the Lucius D. Clay barracks between Bremen and Bremerhaven. Working closely with our friends in the Bundeswehr, the British Army of the Rhine and also the Dutch Army at the height of the Cold War, that now feels like it is no longer relevant or important—the things we believed in for all those decades. So maybe that's just a personal feeling, which is not strategic. I spoke at an event last night, where young Germans talked of their sense of loss, that the picture that they had of America is gone forever. For me, that’s hard to hear, but I know what they mean.
But isn’t that a somewhat romanticized view?
Well, I've always known that the favorite sport in Europe was not football, but it’s criticizing American policy. And there was a lot to criticize over the years, but there was always also this kind of a respect for America—if not for American policy, then for the idea of America, even though we could never live up to that idea. And it feels like that this is maybe gone and won’t come back. I don’t mean to be melodramatic, but that's what it feels like.
We don’t know exactly whether or not the United States is really withdrawing from Europe…
My best assessment of what I think is going to happen is this: The regular Global Force Posture Review is coming up. A new US administration needs to define: What are the priorities, and do we have the resources correctly aligned with those priorities? That’s a normal, healthy process. With President Donald Trump, it’s no mystery that he plans for his administration to focus on the Indo-Pacific region. And so, we are beginning to hear reports of things coming out that would reflect that.
Number one is a dependence on Europe to provide for the bulk of the security of Europe, including US interests, without having a large presence. Indeed, every US president since Harry S. Truman has said that our allies have got to do more. This is not new to Trump. Part of realigning to the Indo-Pacific means you have to grow the capacity of the Navy and the Air Force because of the geography out there. That costs a lot of money. And so typically, when our Department of Defense goes through these cycles that we always go through, the Army is always the one that gets cut the most because that’s how you get the most money the fastest. If you reduce the size of the Army overall, you can free up hundreds of billions of dollars to use elsewhere. Also land forces don't seem to be as applicable to the Indo-Pacific region as they are in Europe, obviously.
So, I anticipate we’re going to be hearing soon about a major cut to land forces, not just in Europe, but overall. The Army today is about 490,000 women and men, and the number I heard the other day was going down to 360,000, something like almost a third. That gives you a sense of the scale of the cuts.
Then, there is the idea of combining AFRICOM and EUCOM, the two headquarters that are in Stuttgart. AFRICOM was created in 2007 during the George W. Bush administration because of a recognition that the headquarters of the US European Command could not also provide the necessary planning, thinking, and engagement with all of Africa and with their allies who were working in Africa as well. So, a new headquarters was created. And now they're talking about combining them back together again.
There’s also been talk of walking away from the SACEUR position—having a US four-star general as military commander of NATO. I don't know if that happens, and I don't know how it would advance America's interest. But it could indicate that it is the beginning of a process of walking away from NATO.
I think the thing we'll see cut from Europe first will be the rotational forces, because those are paid for by above-normal budget funding, what we call supplemental. This started back in 2016, I think, after the NATO summit in Warsaw when the US said: Well, all right, we have to bring tanks back over here. And they come on a nine-month rotation. So, all of the heavy armored capability, all of that stuff paid for by supplemental spending, I think that'll be the first thing that gets cut, maybe even before the end of this year.
The expected cutbacks go together with an unprecedented US alignment with Moscow. The president is talking about a “huge economic potential” that closer ties with Russia would bring. What’s your take?
This has been one of the most difficult things for me to understand. But the language you hear, not only from the president, but also from Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others, is that you get the sense of exactly what you just described—a desire to have a normal relationship, to bring Russia back into the G8, play ice hockey again, trade, etc. Within that context, then, Ukraine starts to look like an irritant or an obstacle to getting to that.
I don’t know this, I can only speculate. But it has that sort of feeling to it. And with the Trump administration’s desire to get to a deal as fast as possible—I used to think this was just about the president wanted to get a Nobel Peace Prize like Barack Obama got and like Theodore Roosevelt got. But I think it’s about something much bigger. We never actually had a relationship where it was totally normal to have close US-Russia ties, the way it was with the United States and Germany or the United States and the United Kingdom. The relationship has mostly been within the context of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and communism, followed by this brief period before Vladimir Putin showed up.
To hear the American president talking about Vladimir Putin, whose arrest is sought by the International Criminal Court, saying that they “experienced so much together” … It’s hard for me to understand that. And when I watched how he and US Vice President JD Vance were treating Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky like crap in the Oval Office, that was when it became completely clear to me that they were on the side of Russia. Suddenly, you can't say Russia is the bad guy or any of that. Never in my life did I imagine this.
Do you see a grand strategy element in this, a “reverse Nixon” of peeling Russia away from China?
I think that anybody who believes that Russia can be disconnected from China, at least with anything I've seen thus far, is naive. Putin is going to play along and drag it out. All he cares about is the destruction of Ukraine.
Has Europe what it takes to deal with this new reality?
I must say I am really growing weary of Europeans not having enough self-confidence to take advantage of the capabilities they have. And to deal with Russia for what it really is. So, I think I have more confidence in Europe than most Europeans do! And you’re going to be confronted with the results of this anyway.
So, seeing people like incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, President Emmanuel Macron, Prime Minister Keir Starmer, also Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who is emerging as a real leader in Europe, in my view, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk, but also in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and all these people, that is impressive to me: People are coming to grips with the challenges.
The reasons why I'm optimistic about Europe’s ability is because I see what terrible shape Russia is in. They’re the ones that don’t have any cards. I mean, the only card that they have is the Trump card, literally. Their economy is in terrible shape. They’ve lost almost 900,000 troops. Now, they don't care how many they lose. But it’s an indicator of how bad it’s going.
And that’s without us, the West, even committing to helping Ukraine win the war. They could have won it two years ago if President Joe Biden had said, it’s in our interest that Ukraine wins, knocks Russia back to the 1991 borders, and we’re going to give everything they need. And then Germany’s going to do it, and then everybody else. We didn’t do that.
Now we are at a state where, unless there’s a big change from Europe and the United States, Ukraine cannot win, but Russia cannot win, either. And when I look at the economic potential of Europe, it dwarfs Russia. And so, if we get the political will for nations to work together and make the necessary changes to laws and cultures, Russia doesn't have a chance.
The only area where they have a significant advantage, of course, is the number of nuclear weapons and a willingness to destroy life without regard for international law. But Europe doesn't have to match Russia in terms of numbers of warheads. France has hundreds of nuclear warheads; the UK has hundreds of nuclear warheads. I’m simplifying a little bit, but the Russians just have to believe that the French would actually use one to have a nuclear deterrent.
Starmer and Macron are pushing for a multilateral force to bolster a possible ceasefire in Ukraine. Is this the right approach?
This whole process needs to be thought in three phases. Credit for this construct goes to President Stubb, and I agree with it. The first phase is preparation. The second phase is a ceasefire agreement and implementation and the deployment of a ceasefire implementation force, and then the third phase is the actual negotiation.
The preparation phase is where we are now. That’s all of these crazy discussions happening in Brussels, London, the Oval Office, and in Riyadh and Jeddah. That's the preparation phase. It wasn't designed that way, but that's what we'll call it. And the aim of the preparation phase is to figure out a ceasefire and a force that could compel the Russians to comply with it.
And then the third phase, those are the real negotiations for the long-term settlement that probably includes more than just Ukraine, but the lifting of sanctions and more, so all those things will be part of the negotiation. But the Ukrainians know the Russians will never live up to any ceasefire unless there’s somebody there to make them do it, and that there's no hope of having any meaningful negotiations with the Russians unless they are forced to do it.
So, we need a ceasefire—not this 30-day thing that has already failed, but a real ceasefire, followed by something akin to what happened after the Dayton Peace Accords when NATO's implementation force was put into place. That was months in development—the training, the preparation, getting the mission, the headquarters, the rules of engagement. It was completely different from UNPROFOR, the UN Protection Force, which was a disaster. But then you have almost the exact same nations under a NATO structure with rules of engagement and clarity of mission, which was a huge success.
In other words, it’s not a peacekeeping thing we’re talking about. This is an implementation force that has to have real deterrent capability, and they need to have the authority to punish the Russians each and every time that Russia violates the ceasefire, and that the colonel or the captain or whoever doesn't have to call back to Brussels or Berlin to ask permission to shoot back. It happens immediately. That’s what we're talking about.
And yes, Europe does have the capability to do that. They just need the time and the political will to get organized for it.
Who should take the lead within Europe when it comes to defense issues?
You know, I always thought that the best leaders were not people that said, “Hey, I'm the leader, everybody follow me,” but were the people who led by example.
Think of your favorite football club. Probably the best, most important player on the team is not the one that talks the most, but the one that shows up and performs at practice and at the game every time. The one who is always the most prepared. And so, I think that’s the kind of leadership that Germany is going to be providing, leading by example.
I mean, everybody is standing around now with their mouth open like, wow, Germany has passed legislation that is historic. And it seems you've got leaders in place who are willing to do what's necessary. Obviously, it's not going to be easy. I mean, we have friends in the Bundestag who are getting death threats from people who say: You've changed, you did this 180, you're dishonest, you abandoned what you advocated for—because they're making hard decisions about protecting the population.
So, it's going to take that kind of thick-skinned moral courage by political leaders to do what needs to be done. And also, you have to explain to the population what is at stake and speak to them as if they are adults, and why you have to do that. So, I see Germany having that role not only because it's the richest, biggest economy in Europe, but also because of where it sits on the map.
But I have to say, President Macron has provided a tangible, actual leadership, even though he's under great pressure at home. Prime Minister Starmer has demonstrated some steel that I had not seen before, even though he’s got enormous challenges at home.
I've already mentioned Finnish President Stubb. I think Finland is emerging as the anchor of European security for the Arctic, Baltic region, and the eastern flank, leading by example. I mean, the Finns are not famous for patting themselves on the back. They just do stuff. And I think Prime Minister Tusk has—is a respected person. And Poland clearly is investing —they’re putting their money where their mouth is. And then the surprise in all this is Italy, for me. The Italians have really grown their defense industry, and I think they are going to be an important part of all of this.
So, I'm not avoiding answering the question of who's the leader. There clearly has to be institutional leadership from the European Commission. But Brussels can't drag Germany, France, etc., to do things.
Where do you see Europe’s most important weaknesses?
I think of it in terms of deterrence, capability, and credibility. The capabilities that are missing are air and missile defense. And you have to assume if Russia has made the decision to attack any NATO country, then they have already made the decision to destroy transportation infrastructure because they know that our whole defensive posture is based on rapid movement from west to east to deal with a crisis.
That means Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Gdansk, Klaipėda, Tallin, Riga—all of these places will be attacked by cyber operations and with missiles. And then the other major transportation hubs for rail, etc., those would be attacked. So, do we have enough air and missile defense capabilities in Europe to deal with what Ukraine gets right now, which is about 100 to 140 drones and missiles every night? The answer, of course, is no, we don't, not yet.
The second sort of vulnerability—but I feel confident that this is going to get fixed—is in industrial production. But that’s not because you don’t have enough factories, they just are not organized and moving toward the production targets. I heard at the European Defence Agency, when I visited about a year and a half ago, a senior person there told me that more than 50 percent of the ammunition that is produced in Europe goes to customers in Africa and the Middle East. So, in other words, there is capacity, but it's not all going to the Bundeswehr or to Ukraine.
And then the third thing is transportation. It's still too difficult to move forces quickly across Europe. This is not for convenience of exercises. This is to be able to signal to the Russians that in peacetime conditions, we can still move as fast or faster than they can up to the Suwalki Corridor, for example, or somewhere in Poland or down in Romania. We can't do that yet.
Germany’s next government has promised to do both: invest in infrastructure and in the military …
It's essential. Germany is the transport hub for NATO. I mean, almost everything that's not already on the eastern flank is going to have to pass through Germany. So, rail and highway, it's all critical. I don't want to be too specific because transportation requirements are driven by classified plans. But let's just say that, right now, the capacity of Deutsche Bahn Cargo to move armor brigades simultaneously in peacetime conditions is well below what would be required. And that’s not the fault of DB cargo, it’s a business. Somebody has to give them the demand signal to have more capacity.
Will there still be a NATO in 10 years’ time?
NATO's mission will continue to be the collective security of all of its members, even if the US has a lesser role. The threat does not go away. In fact, the threat might even increase. And so, NATO still is the best structure that already exists for the collective security of all of its members. So, I wouldn't even want to think about throwing the whole thing into the rubbish and then trying to create something new.
It’s always better with having that alliance and the structure. As former NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg once said, It’s good to wake up every morning knowing that you have 31 other friends. We don't want to lose that.
So, you’re saying that Washington might eventually return to becoming the reliable transatlantic partner we knew for decades?
I can't predict exactly with confidence what the US government will do, but I keep thinking that there's no benefit for us to just completely walk away from it. I mean, because of the economic interest that we have. Also, the United States has never had enough capability to do everything by itself. All of our best and most reliable allies come from Europe, as well as Canada and Australia. So, for all kinds of reasons, it seems unlikely that any administration, even this administration, would just completely turn their back on NATO because of the damage we'd be doing to ourselves.
That doesn't mean it won't happen, but I think it's unlikely. And the need for collective security will only grow. That's why I think responsible leaders across Europe will want to continue the existence and the readiness of NATO.
Lieutenant general (ret.) Ben Hodges served as commander of the US Army Europe from 2014 to 2017. He was born in Jacksonville, Florida, in 1958 and was first stationed in Germany after graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1980. During the 2003 Iraq war he led the first brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. Today he lives in Frankfurt am Main.
The interview was conducted by the IP/IPQ editorial team.
